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ARTICLES
THE PUSH TO PRIVATE RELIGIOUS
EXPRESSION: ARE WE MISSING SOMETHING?
Kathleen A. Brady*
INTRODUCTION
The last few years have been a busy time for the Supreme Court
when it comes to the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
In 2000, the Supreme Court decided a ground-breaking case relating
to government funding of religious institutions,' and in each of the last
two years, the Court has also decided a case relating to religious
expression.' One of the most striking things to note about these cases
is how different the trends have been between the Court's
jurisprudence regarding religious expression and the Court's funding
jurisprudence. When it comes to the funding of religious
organizations, the Court's jurisprudence is undergoing profound
change. The Court's 2000 decision in Mitchell v. Helms3 extended a
trend relaxing the restrictions on government funding of religiously-
affiliated primary and secondary schools, but the failure of the Court
to produce a majority opinion left the outer bounds of permissible
funding far from clear.' As the Court addresses the constitutionality
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law. J.D., 1994, Yale
Law School; M.A.R., 1991, Yale Divinity School; B.A., 1989, Yale College. I
gratefully acknowledge the support of the law firm Hunton & Williams, which
provided a research grant to make this project possible. My thanks to John Douglass,
David Frisch, Azizah al-Hibri, Emmeline Paulette Reeves, Charles Reid, Mark
Strasser, Jonathan Stubbs, John Witte and Gail Zwirner. For their excellent work, I
also thank my research assistants Caroline Davis Bragg and Molly Elizabeth Young.
1. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
2. In 2000, the Court decided Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, 530
U.S. 290 (2000), and in 2001, the Court decided Good News Club v. Milford Central
School, 533 U.S. 98 (2001).
3. 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
4. Justice Thomas authored the plurality opinion in Mitchell v. Helms, and he
was joined by Justices Rehnquist, Scalia and Kennedy. The plurality view articulated
new principles for government funding of religious organizations which would
significantly broaden the scope of permissible direct aid under the Establishment
Clause. Justice O'Connor's concurrence, joined by Justice Breyer, also supported
liberalizing the Court's approach to direct funding of religious organizations, but she
was unwilling to go as far as the plurality. Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens
and Ginsburg, favored the Court's traditional restrictive principles.
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of school vouchers this term5 and questions about funds for faith-
based social services programs loom on the horizon, the future of the
Court's case law in the funding area promises additional new
developments, and the outcomes of unresolved issues are hard to
predict. In the funding area, the court is, in short, in the middle of a
potentially far-reaching reconstitution of its basic legal principles.
By contrast, when it comes to the Court's decisions regarding
religious expression linked to the state, the Court's case law over the
past decade has been fairly stable, and the Court's recent decisions
have helped to solidify familiar terrain. At the heart of the Court's
recent jurisprudence has been a basic dichotomy between religious
expression endorsed by the state and private religious expression. In
its 2000 decision in Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe,6 the
Court repeated a statement that has become a refrain in recent cases.
Quoting from the Court's 1990 decision in Board of Education v.
Mergens,7 the Court affirmed that "'there is a crucial difference
between government speech endorsing religion, which the
Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing religion,
which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect."'" The
dissent did not disagree.9 Where the majority and dissent differed was
over which category the prayers in question belonged to.
This basic dichotomy between religious expression endorsed by the
government, which is prohibited, and private religious expression,
which is protected, stands in stark contrast to an earlier
"accommodationist" approach to religious speech defended by a
number of justices in the 1980s and early 1990s. During this period,
battles raged over whether the state could permissibly engage in
expression endorsing religion. The Court's justices divided into three
factions. The separationists viewed religion and government as
separate spheres or functions and, hence, they permitted little role for
5. In the fall of 2001, the Court granted certiorari in Simmons-Harris v. Zelman,
234 F.3d 945 (6th Cir. 2000). The Sixth Circuit in Simmons-Harris struck down an
Ohio voucher program for troubled school districts subject to state supervision by
federal court order. Id. at 948. The legislature had adopted the program in response
to a court order placing Cleveland's school district under state supervision. Id.
6. 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
7. 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
8. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 302 (quoting Mergens, 496 U.S. at 250 (O'Connor, J.,
plurality)). This basic dichotomy has appeared in other recent cases as well. See, e.g.,
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 834 (1995)
(recognizing a "distinction between the [government's] own favored message and...
private speech"); Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 765
(1995) (Scalia, J., plurality) (citing Mergens to support the crucial "difference between
government speech and private speech").
9. See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 324 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (repeating statement
in Mergens that there is a "'crucial difference between government speech endorsing
religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing
religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect,"' but arguing that
the speech in question should be identified as private, not government, speech).
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religious expression by the state." In 1984, in Lynch v. Donnelly,
Justice O'Connor developed her "endorsement test," which permits
religious expression by the state as long as the purpose and effect of
the expression are not to endorse religion over nonreligion,
nonreligion over religion, or one religious perspective over another."
Justice O'Connor's endorsement approach has gained a vide
following on the Court, including among the Court's separationists,
although the trend has been to interpret the test more strictly than
Justice O'Connor initially envisioned. 12 Indeed, in the hands of
separationists and others who interpret the test strictly, the
endorsement approach has moved very close to separationism." By
contrast, the Court's accommodationists envisioned a broader scope
for religious expression by the state than either the separationists or
supporters of the endorsement test, and accommodationists denied
that government expression endorsing religion is always
impermissible. According to the accommodationists, the state may
engage in expression which "recogniz[es],"' 4 "take[s] note"'" of,
10. For a detailed discussion of the separationist position regarding religious
expression by the state, see Kathleen A. Brady, Fostering Harmony Among the
Justices: How Contemporary Debates in Theology Can Help to Reconcile the Divisions
on the Court Regarding Religious Expression by the State, 75 Notre Dame L Re'. 433,
509-13 (1999).
11. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). Justice O'Connor first articulated her
endorsement test in Lynch, id. at 690-91 (O'Connor, J., concurring), and further
elaborated the approach a year later in Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 69-70 (1985)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). For a detailed discussion of the
endorsement approach, see Brady, supra note 10, at 513-17.
12. See Brady, supra note 10, at 515-17. For example, in County of Allegheny v.
ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989), Justice O'Connor disagreed with Justices Blackmun,
Brennan, Marshall and Stevens over the proper application of the endorsement test.
Justice Blackmun argued that the endorsement approach demands a -secular state"
limited to secular speech and symbols. Id. at 610-12. Justice Brennan, joined by
Justices Marshall and Stevens, argued that any government use of speech or symbols
which retain a religious meaning constitutes impermissible endorsement. hi. at 637.
643 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Lynch, 465 U.S.
at 701, 711, 713 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that the use of symbols which retain
religious meaning in holiday displays makes minority groups feel like outsiders). By
contrast, Justice O'Connor argued that her endorsement test is consistent with
government use of symbols or other forms of expression which retain a religious
significance as long as the overall context does not endorse. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at
633-37 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice
Souter has also adopted a strict interpretation of the endorsement test and has
disagreed with Justice O'Connor's conclusion that presidential religious
proclamations and religious invocations at Thanksgiving can survive the endorsement
test. Compare Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 630-31 (1992) (Souter. J., concurring).
with Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692-93 (O'Connor. J., concurring), and Allegheny. 492 U.S. at
630-31 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
13. See Brady, supra note 10, at 517; see also Ira C. Lupu, Governnent Messages
and Government Money: Santa Fe, Mitchell v. Helms, and the Are of tile
Establishment Clause, 42 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 771. 802-04 (2001) (noting accelerating
trend over past fifteen years towards "'message separatism" or. in other words, a
separationist approach to evaluating government-sponsored religious messages).
14. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 657 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part
2002] 1149
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
"accommodat[es], ''1 6 "acknowledg[es], '' 17 and even "support[s]"' 8 the
central role that religion plays in American society as long as the
government does not coerce individuals to participate, 9 engage in
proselytizing, 0 or give direct aid to religion in such a degree that it in
fact "'establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do
SO."
2 1
While none of the Court's accommodationists have repudiated their
position, they have not commanded a majority opinion since Lynch v.
Donnelly in 1984, and the last major defense of accommodationism
was Justice Kennedy's opinion concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part in County of Allegheny v. ACL U22 in 1989. After
the Court struck down the practice of using clergy members to deliver
graduation prayers in public high schools in its 1992 decision in Lee v.
Weisman,' accommodationism has appeared to move quietly off the
Court's radar screen as the basic dichotomy reaffirmed in Santa Fe has
gained in prominence. In Santa Fe, Justice Kennedy joined with five
other justices in agreeing that the relevant distinction is between
government expression endorsing religion, which is impermissible,
and private speech endorsing religion, which is protected.24 Even
Justice Rehnquist and the Court's two other dissenters agreed with
this fundamental distinction.2 The Court's dichotomy between
impermissible government expression and permissible private
expression leaves little room for the accommodationist perspective,
and at its heart is an affirmation of Justice O'Connor's endorsement
approach. Today, the real battleground within the Court and among
the lower courts is over whether the speech at issue is private speech
endorsing religion or government speech endorsing religion. If it is
the former, it is protected; if it is the latter, it is prohibited.
While this basic distinction between impermissible government
speech and protected private speech is now well established, there are
some exceptions to this rule. In 1995, in Capitol Square Review and
Advisory Board v. Pinette, five justices argued that the Establishment
Clause places special limitations on private religious speech when that
speech might be confused with government speech endorsing
and dissenting in part).
15. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 668, 680, 686.
16. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 657 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part).
17. Id.; Lynch, 465 U.S. at 677.
18. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 657 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part).
19. Id. at 659.
20. See id. at 661.
21. Id. at 659 (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 678).
22. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
23. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
24. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290,302 (2000).
25. See id. at 324 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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religion.? The Court revisited this issue in 2001 in Good News Club v.
Milford Central School, and a number of the justices reaffirmed that
the Establishment Clause may justify special restrictions on private
religious speech.' However, while a majority of justices have favored
special restrictions on private religious expression in at least some
cases, the Court has never actually applied any special limitations to
private religious speech, and the Good News decision makes clear that
at least five of the justices would be very hesitant to do so. Thus, in
practice, the basic dichotomy between permissible private religious
expression and impermissible government religious expression will
usually control, and the decisive question wiU be whether the speech
at issue is properly categorized as government speech or private
speech. If the speech is categorized as private, it will be protected, but
if it is state-sponsored, it will be struck down.
In this article, I will be challenging the appropriateness of using this
basic dichotomy between government speech and private speech to
evaluate the constitutionality of student religious expression in the
public schools. The permissible scope of student religious expression
in public schools has been a recurring issue in lower court opinions in
recent years, and the expression at issue in the Court's recent decision
in Santa Fe represents just the tip of the iceberg. In Santa Fe, the
court struck down a policy authorizing student-initiated, student-led
prayers at high school football games on the grounds that the prayers
would be school-sponsored religious speech, not private student
speech.? Both before and after the Santa Fe decision, lower courts
have been using the same dichotomy to address the constitutionality
of student religious speech at graduations and other school-sponsored
assemblies. A similar dichotomy has also been used to evaluate
student religious expression in classroom settings. Scholars writing on
student religious expression in public schools have generally followed
the courts in supporting the basic distinction between private and
state speech, and like the courts, they mainly disagree over whether
the speech in question is public or private.
I will be arguing that this basic dichotomy is too simplistic for the
public school setting. The dichotomy misses the fact that most of the
26. See Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 774-75
(1995) (O'Connor, J., with Souter & Breyer, J.J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment); Id. at 787-91 (Souter, J., with O'Connor & Breyer, JJ., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment); Id. at 807 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Id. at 817-18
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
27. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 121 S. Ct. 2093, 2111-12 (2001)
(Breyer, J., concurring in part); see id. at 2118 (Souter, J., with Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting). The majority argued that even if the Establishment Clause can place
special limitations on the speech rights of religious speakers, the expression at issue in
Good News did not implicate the Establishment Clause because it posed no danger of
government endorsement. See id. at 2106.
28. See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 301-10.
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disputes in the public school context concern speech that is neither
purely public nor purely private. When it comes to student religious
expression in public schools, there is a significant amount of speech
that occupies a "grey area" between private and school speech, and
most disputed cases are about such "grey area" speech. While the
courts and scholars agree in principle on the basic distinction between
private student speech and school speech, they disagree vehemently
over whether student speech in captive audience situations is properly
categorized as private speech or school speech. Captive audience
situations like school-sponsored assemblies, graduations and
classroom activities recur as the fault line in court decisions because in
these cases both sides are partly right and partly wrong. Grey area
speech is both partly private and partly public, and, thus, should be
approached as a distinct category of speech requiring unique
treatment.
After clarifying the concept of grey area speech, I will propose an
approach to address grey area religious speech in the public schools.
This approach will seek to balance the critical importance of grey area
speech to the educational process in the public schools with the special
risks that grey area speech poses to Establishment Clause values.
Allowing grey area speech is valuable for mitigating values conflicts in
public education, forging common bonds among an increasingly
diverse citizenry and strengthening the public schools. However,
because grey area speech is partly public, schools should have greater
control over grey area religious speech than purely private student
speech. Schools have a legitimate interest in protecting the interests
of student listeners as well as achieving their own pedagogical goals.
Nevertheless, any school supervision over grey area religious speech
must also avoid school interference and entanglement in religious
matters. The approach that I defend takes into account all of these
considerations and strikes a workable balance between Establishment
Clause principles, the school's pedagogical interests, and the great
value that grey area religious speech can have for religious and
nonreligious students alike.
I. THE PUSH TO PRIVATE RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION
The basic dichotomy that the Supreme Court and the lower federal
courts have drawn between government religious speech and private
religious speech is not just a judicial phenomenon, but reflects a larger
shift in public attitudes about the proper relationship between
government and religious expression. Before examining the case law
employing this dichotomy in the context of public schools, it is helpful
to back up and situate the courts' decisions against this larger
backdrop.
As discussed above, over the last decade the voices of the justices
who promoted an accommodationist approach to religious speech in
[Vol. 701152
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the 1980s and early 1990s have died down, and a consensus has
developed on the Court around the familiar refrain from Mergens that
private religious expression is protected but government speech
endorsing religion is prohibited. This development has not occurred
in isolation, and a parallel shift has also occurred among many of the
groups in the United States who had supported the accommodationist
position in the past. Conservative Christian groups who had battled
vigorously in the 1980s and early 1990s to preserve a place for
government expression acknowledging America's religious traditions
in public institutions like the public schools, town squares and the
halls of government have now shifted their agenda. Consistent with
the Court's position, many of these groups are now focusing their
efforts on protecting private religious expression rather than on
preserving government-sponsored religious speech. Indeed, for some
of these groups, the effort to retain religious references in government
settings has not only taken a back seat to the protection of private
religious speech, but has almost disappeared. -'
Some scholars have viewed this new push towards protecting
private religious expression rather than preserving government
religious speech as merely a litigation strategy by conservative
religious groups. Because the Court has not been receptive to
government-sponsored religious speech, conservative religious groups
have shifted their focus away from preserving public religious
expression towards protecting private religious speech, and they are
repackaging as much religious speech as they can as private
expression.' However, while all advocacy groups in the church-state
29. For example, as will be discussed further below, in the education context
groups like the Christian Legal Society and the National Association of Evangelicals
have taken the position that schools must not sponsor religious expression. Religious
expression in the public schools is permissible if it is private religious expression, but
not if it is government-supported speech. See, e.g., Religion in the Public Schools: A
Joint Statement of Current Law (1995) (endorsed by both groups), available at httpJ/
ajcongress.org/clsa/clsarips.htm; The Bible and Public Schools: A First Amendment
Guide (Bible Literacy Project, Inc. & First Amend. Ctr., eds., 1999) (endorsed by
both groups), available at http///wwwv.freedomforum.org. The American Center for
Law and Justice has also taken the position that schools must not sponsor religious
messages or teach or inculcate religion. See Jay Alan Sekulow et al., Proposed
Guidelines for Student Religious Speech and Observance in Public Schools, 46 Mercer
L. Rev. 1017, 1093-95 (1995).
However, some conservative groups continue to support accommodationism.
For example, the National Legal Foundation continues to argue that the government,
including the public schools, may sponsor religious expression which acknowledges.
accommodates and even encourages religion. See Steven W. Fitschen, Religion in the
Public Schools After Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe: Time for a New
Strategy, 9 Wm. & Mary Bill of Rts. J. 433, 446-47 (2001). Recently, the National
Legal Foundation has criticized other conservative religious groups for adopting the
Court's dichotomy between permissible private religious expression and
impermissible government expression in the public school context. See id. at 435-41.
30. See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, When is Religious Speech Not "Free Speech"?, 2000
U. Ill. L. Rev. 379, 380-81 (citing statement by Jay Sekulow, chief counsel for the
2002] 1153
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area are certainly interested in developing effective litigation
strategies, it would be a mistake to reduce the shift towards protecting
private religious expression among conservative groups to mere
strategy. The development of a "new consensus '31 among a wide
range of religious organizations and civil liberties groups regarding
religious expression issues in the public schools makes this clear.
Over the past decade, religious and educational organizations and
civil liberties groups from all parts of the spectrum have been working
together to develop common ground regarding the place of religion in
America's public schools, and these efforts have born much fruit. In
1995, groups as diverse as the American Jewish Congress, the Anti-
Defamation League, the Christian Legal Society, the National
Association of Evangelicals, the ACLU, and the People for the
American Way endorsed a document titled Religion in the Public
Schools: A Joint Statement of Current Law.32 That statement then
became the basis for a set of guidelines on Religious Expression in
Public Schools33 developed by the Clinton administration that same
year and sent to all public school districts across the country.34 At the
heart of this new consensus is the same dichotomy that appears in the
Court's decision in Santa Fe. Private religious expression by students
in their personal capacity is to be protected on the same basis as other
nonreligious private speech, but school-sponsored expression
endorsing religion is prohibited. Conservative, liberal and
American Center for Law and Justice, that "the free speech strategy has proven
effective with judges across the ideological spectrum against opponents who rely on
the First Amendment's clause against the establishment of religion"); see also
Fitschen, supra note 29, at 435-44 (criticizing other conservative religious groups for
adopting a "free-exercise-as-free-speech" strategy which backfired in the Supreme
Court's decision in Santa Fe).
31. Charles Haynes, who is the Senior Scholar for Religious Freedom Programs at
the Freedom Forum First Amendment Center, and has played a principal role in
helping to forge this agreement, refers to the new common ground as the "new
consensus." See, e.g., Warren A. Nord & Charles C. Haynes, Taking Religion
Seriously Across the Curriculum 9-10 (1998); Charles C. Haynes, From Battleground
to Common Ground: Religion in the Public Square of 21' Century America, in Azizah
Y. al-Hibri et al., Religion in American Public Life: Living with our Deepest
Differences 96, 103 (2001).
32. Religion in the Public Schools: A Joint Statement of Current Law, supra note
29.
33. Religious Expression in Public Schools (1998), reprinted in Finding Common
Ground 13-1 to 13-10 (Charles C. Haynes ed., 3d ed. 1998). The Clinton
administration's guidelines were first issued in 1995, revised and reissued in 1998, and
then re-released in 1999. The guidelines are also available on the U.S. Department of
Education web site, www.ed.gov/Speeches/08-1995/religion.html (last visited Jan. 10,
2002).
34. See Haynes, supra note 31, at 107.
35. When the Clinton administration reissued its guidelines on religious
expression in the public schools in 1998, local school districts received a letter from
U.S. Secretary of Education Richard Riley explaining that:
These guidelines... reflect two basic and equally important obligations
imposed on public school officials by the First Amendment. First, schools
1154 [Vol. 70
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separationist groups alike have agreed that "[plublic schools may not
inculcate nor inhibit religion," and the schools do that best when they
"protect the religious liberty rights of students of all faiths or none."-"
Neutrality, fairness and respect for religious and nonreligious beliefs
alike are the values embraced by participants in the new consensus.'
Rosemary Salomone has noted that some conservative groups
active in church-state matters have not been regular subscribers to the
documents endorsed by the new consensus. -" The two most
prominent of these groups are the American Center for Law and
Justice and The Rutherford Institute. In 1995, however, the American
Center for Law and Justice issued guidelines regarding religion in the
public schools that embrace a similar distinction between private
speech and school speech.3 9 According to these guidelines, schools
must not sponsor religious messages or teach or inculcate religion.J
They must, however, give private religious expression by students the
may not forbid students acting on their own from expressing their personal
religious views or beliefs solely because they are of a religious nature.
Schools may not discriminate against private religious expression by
students, but must instead give students the same right to engage in religious
activity and discussion as they have to engage in other comparable
activity.... At the same time, schools may not endorse religious activity or
doctrine, nor may they coerce participation in religious activity.
Letter from U.S. Secretary of Education Richard W. Riley to American Educators
(May 30, 1998), in Finding Common Ground, supra note 33, at 13-2, 13-3.
In addition to the Clinton administration guidelines and the 1995 Joint
Statement of Current Law, other documents endorsed by the new consensus include
Religious Liberty, Public Education, and the Future of American Democracy: A
Statement of Principles (First Amendment Center 1995), reprinted in al-Hibri et al.,
supra note 31, at 132; The Bible and Public Schools: A First Amendment Guide,
supra note 29; A Parent's Guide to Religion in the Public Schools (First Amendment
Center 1995), available at http://www.ed.govlinitstreligionandschoolslguides.html; A
Teacher's Guide to Religion in the Public Schools (1999), available at http://www.ed.
govlinits/religionandschools/guides.html.
Charles C. Haynes, Senior Scholar at the Freedom Forum First Amendment
Center, has been instrumental in the process of forging consensus among religious,
educational and civil liberties groups, and he has written several pieces that explain
the development of the new consensus and the various principles and documents
endorsed by this consensus. See, e.g., Haynes, supra note 31; Finding Common
Ground, supra note 33.
36. Religious Liberty, Public Education, and the Future of American Democracy:
A Statement of Principles, supra note 35, at 134. Groups endorsing this statement
include the American Center for Law and Justice, the Anti-Defamation League, the
Christian Coalition, the Christian Legal Society, Council on Islamic Education,
National Association of Evangelicals, the National Council of Churches, People for
the American Way, and the Union of American Hebrew Congregations. See id. at
132-33.
37. See Haynes, supra note 31, at 102-03. School endorsement of religion is
rejected. Id.
38. See Rosemary C. Salomone, Visions of Schooling: Conscience, Community,
and Common Education 138-39 (2000).
39. See Sekulow et al., supra note 29, at 1091-95.
40. See id. at 1018, 1091-95.
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same protections as nonreligious student speech.41 John Whitehead,
President of The Rutherford Institute, has also authored several
articles embracing the distinction between impermissible government
religious speech and protected private student expression.42
What accounts for this push to private religious expression among
religious groups who only a decade ago were defending public
religious expression by the state? There are certainly numerous
factors involved, but three factors in particular have played a
prominent role in this shift. In the first place, in recent years there has
been a growing recognition of the deep diversity of religious and
nonreligious perspectives in American society among conservative
religious groups, and these groups are increasingly aware that their
own views might not prevail over others if the state were permitted to
endorse religion. When Paul Weyrich, a leader of the religious right
since the 1970s, encouraged fellow Christians to abandon politics in
1999, he expressed this sentiment bluntly: "I no longer believe that
there is a moral majority."43
Second, the process of forging consensus with a wide range of
religious and civil liberties groups also certainly helped to bring
conservative and liberal participants alike closer to a middle position.
Agreement on protecting the free speech and free exercise rights of
students was easy to obtain, and conservative groups could agree that
robust protections for private religious activity are first priority.
Third, another factor that has contributed to the recent focus on
protecting private religious speech rather than preserving state
religious expression has been a growing belief among conservative
religious groups that religion is best promoted and protected through
private expression and activity rather than through state action in the
public realm. This is particularly so as the increasing pluralism of
American society has fractured a sense of common values. If religious
expression is to be deep and meaningful, it will not be the type of
ecumenical, watered-down, least-common-denominator religious
expression characteristic of state speech, but it will come from
religious individuals themselves.'
41. See id.
42. See John W. Whitehead & Alexis I. Crow, Beyond Establishment Clause
Analysis in Public School Situations: The Need to Apply the Public Fonm and Tinker
Doctrines, 28 Tulsa L.J. 149, 207 (1992); John W. Whitehead, Avoiding Religious
Apartheid: Affording Equal Treatment for Student-Initiated Religious Expression in
Public Schools, 16 Pepp. L. Rev. 229, 230, 243-44, 254-55, 258 (1989).
43. David Von Drehle, Social Conservatives' Ties to GOP Fraying; Weyrich's
Disillusion "Touched a Chord," Wash. Post, Feb. 28, 1999, at Al.
44. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Equal Treatment and Religious
Discrimination, in Equal Treatment of Religion in a Pluralistic Society 30, 34-35
(Stephen V. Monsma & J. Christopher Soper eds., 1998). McConnell makes a similar
argument in his defense of educational choice, which has replaced public school
reform as the priority of many conservative religious individuals and groups.
According to McConnell, only private schools can effectively inculcate the public
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All of these factors have contributed to the push to private religious
expression among many religious groups in American society, and the
result has been that fewer and fewer groups are assigning high priority
to state religious speech in contexts like the public schools. Protecting
private religious speech is of great importance, but preserving state
endorsements of the country's religious heritage is much less so. This
shift was illustrated well when representatives from a wide variety of
religious groups as well as advocacy groups active in the church-state
field were invited by The American Assembly to participate in an
Assembly on "Religion in American Public Life" in 2000."5 When it
came to the place of religion in public schools, Assembly participants
barely discussed accommodationism, but they quickly agreed upon the
importance of protecting the free exercise and free speech rights of
students as well as other principles embraced by the new consensus4
The recent push to the private among religious groups in American
society has not been limited to religious expression or the context of
the public schools. At the same time that conservative groups have
been shifting their focus from publicly-sponsored speech to private
religious expression, there has been an increasing trend to withdraw
generally from politics and other institutions of mainstream American
public life. For example, instead of battling for the reform of public
education, many conservative Christians are looking towards a
solution in private religious schools and home-schooling. In recent
years, the numbers of students attending conservative Christian
schools has continued to grow,47 and there has been a steep increase in
virtue necessary for sustaining American democracy because when public schools
teach virtue in a way that is acceptable to the wide range of different world views in
modem American society, "the result is a thin, least-common-denominator version of
public virtue too pale to compete effectively with the forces of pop culture and
materialism that are all around us." Michael W. McConnell, The New
Establishmentarianism, 75 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 453.455 (2000) [hereinafter. McConnell,
The New Establishmentarianism]. The same would be true if the government tried to
engage in religious speech acceptable to all Americans.
45. The American Assembly was established by Dwight D. Eisenhower at
Columbia University in 1950. Each year it holds at least two nonpartisan meetings on
issues of national importance. In March of 2000, the topic of the Assembly was
"Matters of Faith: The Role of Religion in American Public Life." The report of this
Assembly is reprinted in al-Hibri et al., supra note 31, at 159.
46. See the section on "Educating for Citizenship in a Religiously Diverse
Society" in the Assembly's report. Final Report of the Ninety-Sixth American
Assembly (2000), reprinted in id. at 159, 164-66. For other principles embraced by the
new consensus, see discussion infra notes 292-301 and accompanying text.
47. The numbers of students in conservative Christian schools rose rapidly from
the mid-1970s through the early 1980s. See James C. Carper, The Christian Day
School, in Religious Schooling in America 110, 114 (James C. Carper & Thomas C.
Hunt eds., 1984); James C. Carper & Jeffrey A. Daignault, Christian Day Schools:
Past, Present, and Future, in Religious Schools in the United States K-12, at 315, 318-
19 (Thomas C. Hunt & James C. Carper eds., 1993). Although growth rates have
slowed, over the past decade the numbers of students in conservative Christian
schools have continued to grow steadily as have their percentage of the total private
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the numbers of children being home-schooled." In politics as well,
conservative Christians have been withdrawing, and once mighty
organizations of the Christian right have been floundering.49 In 1999,
two leaders of the Christian right, Paul Weyrich and Cal Thomas,
announced the failure of organized political efforts to change
American society and culture and urged others to follow them in
abandoning political advocacy and separating from mainstream
American culture. In Weyrich's words, what is needed is a "strategy
of separation," a "sort of quarantine" that will preserve traditional
religious communities and their ways of life from being overwhelmed
by the larger society. 1 To be sure, George W. Bush's victory in the
recent presidential race has meant more political power for
conservative religious groups, and they have not rejected the
opportunity (including Weyrich himself).5 However, the shift in their
agenda has not changed. Instead of focusing their energy on making
public schools more hospitable to religious students and values, the
priority for religious conservatives is publicly-funded vouchers for
private education. 3 The triumphalist effort of the 1980's to convert
school population. See the National Center for Education Statistics's Private School
Universe Survey for the years 1989-90, 1991-92, 1993-94, 1995-96, 1997-98, 1999-2000
(students in conservative Christian schools have grown from 10.9 % of the total
private school population in 1989-90 to 15 % in 1999-2000 with an increase of
approximately 250,000 students); see also Carper & Daignault, supra, at 319
("Although their rate of growth in the United States has slowed since the early 1980s,
[evangelical and fundamentalist Christian day schools], along with the burgeoning
home school movement, still constitute the most dynamic segment of private
education.").
48. See Patricia M. Lines, Homeschoolers: Estimating Numbers and Growth (web
ed. Spring 1999) (paper available from the National Institute on Student
Achievement, Curriculum, and Assessment, in the Office of Educational Research
and Improvement, U.S. Department of Education). Patricia Lines writes:
"Homeschooling has more than doubled-possibly tripled-in the 5 years between the
1990-91 school year and the 1995-96 school year.... Within the private education
world, it has become a major sector, where it represents approximately 10 percent of
the privately-schooled population." Id. at 1. For the U.S. Department of Education's
most recent estimates of the numbers of children in home-schooling, see National
Center for Education Statistics, Homeschooling in the United States: 1999 (2001).
49. See, e.g., Bill Carter, TV Works in Mysterious Ways for Pat Robertson, N.Y.
Times, July 30, 2001, at C1 (discussing Christian coalition losing membership and
influence); Andrew Sullivan, Pushing the Puritan Over the Clifftop, Sunday Times
(London), July 4, 1999, Features (same).
50. See Gustav Niebuhr & Richard L. Berke, Unity is Elusive as Religious Right
Ponders 2000 Vote, N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1999, at Al; Von Drehle, supra note 43.
51. Margaret Talbot, A Mighty Fortress, N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 2000 (Magazine), at
34,36.
52. See Robin Toner, Conservatives Savor their Role as Insiders at the White
House, N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 2001, at Al.
53. In their defense of educational choice, conservative religious groups are now
being joined by a host of other groups who are challenging state monopolization of
publicly funded education. These groups include inner-city minorities and their
clergy, scholars in the liberal tradition and from across disciplines, libertarians, and an
increasing number of political leaders on the left and right. See Salomone, supra note
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and reclaim American culture has ended. The new agenda is
protecting private religious activity from the dangers of a hostile
public culture.
In 1999, I wrote my own defense of a push to the private in religious
expression. 54 I argued that robust private religious expression in the
public sphere rather than government expression best protects
religion and religious liberty and is also the most promising way to
balance and harmonize the concerns of all the factions on the Court,
separationist, accommodationist and supporters of the endorsement
test alike. I still believe that my thesis is generally correct, and I
would certainly reject any renewed efforts by conservative religious
groups to commandeer public culture through government-supported
religion. However, in this article I will focus on something that my
previous article did not address: the existence and value of grey area
speech in settings such as the public schools. Those who have joined
in the push to private religious expression, whether they are
conservative religious groups, other members of the new consensus, or
justices and judges of the federal courts, have also been missing the
importance of grey area speech. Grey area religious expression and
the public schools in which this expression occurs are critical for
promoting understanding, respect and engagement among diverse
perspectives in an increasingly pluralistic society. In this article, I will
propose an approach for addressing religious expression that
recognizes and accounts for the existence and value of grey area
speech.
II. THE DICHOTOMY BETWEEN GOVERNMENT RELIGIOUS SPEECH
AND PRIVATE RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION
Up to this point, I have only written in very general terms about the
dichotomy that the Supreme Court and other federal courts have
drawn between government speech endorsing religion and private
religious speech. This section vill examine the case law employing
this dichotomy in the public education context. As will become clear,
there is actually less consensus among courts and religious and civil
liberties groups than at first meets the eye. While the judges and
litigants alike embrace the basic distinction between government
speech and private speech, there is often vigorous disagreement over
whether the speech involved is protected private speech or prohibited
government speech. Generally speaking, the disagreements arise in
situations involving captive audiences where strong arguments can be
made that the speech is both private and public.
38, at 243, 248, 269-70, 312 n.32.
54. See Brady, supra note 10.
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A. Student Religious Speech at Graduations, School Assemblies and
other School-Sponsored Events
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Santa Fell was the
culmination of a series of lower court cases addressing student
religious speech at graduation ceremonies and, to a lesser extent,
other school-sponsored events and assemblies. After the Supreme
Court's decision in Lee v. Weisman56 in 1992, it was clear that clergy-
led graduation prayers sponsored and directed by schools were
unconstitutional. According to the Court in Weisman, where a school
selects the clergy person and directs and controls the content of the
prayers, the result of the school's involvement is that the prayers bear
the imprint of the state.5 7  The state-sponsored character of the
prayers together with the graduation context also results in a coercion
problem. Dissenting students who object to the prayers will
experience public and peer pressure to stand or at least maintain a
respectful silence during the prayers, and high school students may
perceive this silence to be the equivalent of state-coerced participation
in the prayers." While dissenting students are, in theory, free not to
attend their graduation ceremony, graduation is an event of great
importance to high school students and, thus, one that they are, in
practical effect, compelled to attend. 9
After Weisman, a number of school districts across the country
established policies that replaced clergy-led graduation prayer with
student-initiated and student-led invocations. These policies usually
gave the graduating class the opportunity to vote upon whether to
have a prayer or other type of inspirational message at graduation,
and if the graduating class elected to have an invocation, the class
would elect a student volunteer to deliver the message. Prior to the
Supreme Court's decision in Santa Fe, the lower courts decided six
cases involving these policies, and the courts divided over their
constitutionality. In 1992, in Jones v. Clear Creek Independent School
District, the Fifth Circuit upheld a policy permitting seniors to choose
student volunteers to deliver "nonsectarian, non-proselytizing
invocations" at their graduation ceremonies.' A year later, the
55. See supra notes 6-8, 28 and accompanying text.
56. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
57. Id. at 587-90.
58. Id. at 593, 595-96, 598.
59. Id. at 594-98.
60. Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963, 964 (5th Cir. 1992). The
Fifth Circuit's 1992 decision was actually the second time that it considered this
prayer policy. In 1991, the Fifth Circuit upheld the same policy in Jones v. Clear Creek
Independent School District, 930 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1991). Then, in 1992, in the same
term that it decided Lee v. Weisman, the Supreme Court vacated the 1991 decision
and directed the Fifth Circuit to reconsider the case in light of Weisman. See Jones v.
Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 505 U.S. 1215 (1992). The Fifth Circuit did so and
reached the same result in its 1992 decision.
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district court in Gearon v. Loudoun Couny School Board struck
down a policy allowing the senior class to vote upon whether to have a
student-delivered "nonsectarian, nonproselytizing invocation/benedic-
tion/prayer or inspirational message" at graduation." In 1994, in
Harris v. Joint School District No. 241, the Ninth Circuit struck down
a policy allowing seniors to determine whether they will have an
invocation and benediction at graduation and, if so, who would say
it.62 In 1996, the Third Circuit sitting en banc in ACLU v. Black Horse
Pike Regional Board of Education followed suit and struck down a
policy allowing seniors to vote on whether to have "prayer, a moment
of reflection, or nothing at all" at their graduation -'
In 1999, the Fifth Circuit revisited the issue of student-initiated
graduation prayer in Santa Fe along wvith a companion policy
permitting student-initiated prayer at high school football games.'
The Santa Fe School District's graduation policy permitted the senior
class to vote upon whether to have a student-elected volunteer deliver
an "invocation and benediction" as part of their graduation
exercises.' Relying on its decision in Clear Creek, the Fifth Circuit
held that the school district's policy would only be constitutional if it
required any prayers to be nonsectarian and nonproselytizing.6 The
district's football game policy provided that students may vote upon
whether to have a student deliver a "brief invocation and/or message"
at the pre-game ceremonies.67 The Fifth Circuit struck down the
district's football game policy, and held that the football policy, unlike
the graduation policy, would be unconstitutional even if it restricted
messages to nonsectarian, nonproselytizing speech.' s Just before the
Supreme Court delivered its decision in Santa Fe upholding the Fifth
Circuit's judgment regarding the football policy, the Eleventh Circuit
sitting en banc upheld a graduation prayer policy in Adler v. Duval
County School Board (Duval I).69 The Duval County policy permitted
the graduating class to vote on whether to have a student volunteer
61. Gearon v. Loudoun County Sch. Bd., 844 F. Supp. 1097, 1100 (E.D. Va. 1993).
62- See Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, 41 F.3d 447, 452-53 (9th Cir. 1994),
vacated as moot, 515 U.S. 1154 (1995). Pursuant to an order by the U.S. Supreme
Court, Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241 v. Harris, 515 U.S. 1154 (1995), the Ninth Circuit later
vacated its decision and dismissed the appeal as moot. See Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist.
No. 241, 62 F.3d 1233 (9th Cir. 1995).
63. ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Reg'l Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471, 1475 (3d Cir.
1996) (en banc).
64. See Doe v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 806 (5th Cir. 1999), afrd, 530
U.S. 290 (2000).
65. Id, at 812.
66. See id. at 824.
67. Id. at 812.
68. See id. at 822-23.
69. Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd. (Duval I). 206 F.3d 1070 (11th Cir. 2000) (en
bane), cert. granted and judgment vacated, 121 S. Ct. 31 (2000). opinion and judgment
reinstated, 250 F3d 1330 (11th Cir. 2001) (en banc), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 664 (2001).
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selected by the class deliver "a brief opening and/or closing message,
not to exceed two minutes. 70
In each of these lower court cases addressing student-initiated,
student-led prayer, the result turned on whether the court viewed the
prayers as private student expression or school-sponsored speech
endorsing religion. The Clear Creek and Duval I courts upheld the
policies in those cases on the grounds that any religious messages
delivered as a result of the policies would be private religious
expression.7' By contrast, the courts in Black Horse, Harris and
Gearon held that the messages would be public, school-sponsored
speech.72 The Fifth Circuit in Santa Fe held that restrictions requiring
messages to be nonsectarian and nonproselytizing would be necessary
to ensure that student prayers at graduation do not carry the
imprimatur of the state.73  At football games, by contrast, student
prayers would carry the imprimatur of the state regardless of any
nonsectarian, nonproselytizing restrictions.74
The courts which concluded that the prayers would be private
student speech focused on a number of factors. For example, the
courts argued that where the decision about whether or not to have an
invocation is made by the senior class and the speaker is a student
volunteer chosen by their peers, school involvement is minimal and
any prayers that result do not bear the imprint of the state.75 Judges in
several cases also noted that the policy at issue did not permit the
school to monitor, supervise or edit the content of any student
messages,76 nor did most of the policies require the messages to be
religious.77 In several cases, school districts took steps to negate any
inference of endorsement by requiring disclaimers to inform those in
70. Id. at 1072.
71. See id. at 1071; Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963, 968-69
(5th Cir. 1992).
72. See ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Reg'l Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471, 1479-80 (3d
Cir. 1996) (en banc); Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, 41 F.3d 447, 454-55 (9th Cir.
1994), vacated as moot, 515 U.S. 1154 (1995); Gearon v. Loudoun County Sch. Bd.,
844 F. Supp. 1097, 1099-1100 (E.D. Va. 1993).
73. See Santa Fe, 168 F.3d at 817-18.
74. See id. at 822-23.
75. See Duval I, 206 F.3d at 1071; Clear Creek, 977 F.2d at 968-69; see also Adler v.
Duval County Sch. Bd. (Duval II), 250 F.3d 1330, 1342 (11th Cir. 2001) (en banc),
reinstating 206 F.3d 1070 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 644 (2001);
Black Horse, 84 F.3d at 1489-90 (Mansmann, J., with Nygaard, Alito & Roth, J.J.,
dissenting); Harris, 41 F.3d at 460 (Wright, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
76. See Duval II, 250 F.3d at 1336-37; Duval 1, 206 F.3d at 1071; see also Santa Fe,
168 F.3d at 836 (Jolly, J., dissenting); Black Horse, 84 F.3d at 1490 (Mansmann, J.,
with Nygaard, Alito & Roth, JJ., dissenting). But see Clear Creek, 977 F.2d at 967
(stating that the policy permits review of messages to ensure that they are
nonsectarian and nonproselytizing); Gearon, 844 F. Supp. at 1100 (stating that school
reviewed student messages before they were delivered).
77. See Duval II, 250 F.3d at 1337-38; Duval 1, 206 F.3d at 1076; Clear Creek, 977
F.2d at 969; see also Santa Fe, 168 F.3d at 831 (Jolly, J., dissenting).
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attendance that student-delivered messages are student speech, not
messages endorsed by the school." According to the court in Duval I,
if student-initiated, student-led prayers become public, state-
sponsored speech merely by being delivered at a graduation program
controlled by the school, all graduation speakers would be turned into
state speakers.79 In the Fifth Circuit's decision in Santa Fe, the dissent
made the additional argument that the District's graduation and
football prayer policies created limited public fora for private student
speech.'0 The fora were open for the delivery of religious or
nonreligious invocations, and any graduating student (or, in the case
of the football policy, any student) could qualify as the speaker upon
being elected by their classmates.81
The judges who concluded that the prayers would be school-
sponsored speech, rather than private student speech, pointed to
factors supporting the public nature of the speech. For example, the
judges argued that while students make the ultimate decision about
whether to have an invocation or other message and they choose the
speaker, the graduating class only has this power because the school
has given it to them." The school also oversees the selection
process," and when the speech occurs, it is at a regularly scheduled
ceremony sponsored and controlled by the school, held on school
property at school expense, during a time scheduled by school
officials, and before an audience assembled by the school for an
official purpose." Schools carefully orchestrate and supervise
graduation ceremonies, and in these circumstances, delegation of one
aspect of the program to students does not divorce the student speech
from the school but, rather, turns the student speaker into a state
actor."s Some judges also argued that the school policies explicitly or
implicitly encouraged prayer by restricting the duration of the speech
or otherwise signaling that prayer is the preferred message., In other
cases, the court pointed to the history leading up to the policy as
evidence that the school district's real purpose was to circumvent
78. See Black Horse, 84 F.3d at 1496 (Mansmann, J.. with Nygaard, Alito & Roth,
JJ., dissenting); Harris, 41 F.3d at 460 (Wright, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
79. See Duval 1, 206 F.3d at 1080.
80. See Santa Fe, 168 F.3d at 831-33, 834-35 (Jolly, J., dissenting).
81. See id at 831,835 (Jolly, J., dissenting).
82. See Black Horse, 84 F.3d at 1479; Harris, 41 F.3d at 454.
83. See Duval 1, 206 F.3d at 1092-93.
84. See Santa Fe, 168 F.3d at 817-18; Black Horse, 84 F.3d at 1479-80; Harris, 41
F.3d at 454.
85. See Duval I, 206 F.3d at 1093-94 (Kravitch, J., with Barkett. J., dissenting); see
also Harris, 41 F.3d at 455 ("When the senior class is given plenary power over a
state-sponsored, state-controlled event such as high school graduation, it is just as
constrained by the Constitution as the state would be."); Black Horse, 84 F.3d at 1483
(citing Harris for the same).
86. See Duval 1, 206 F.3d at 1092 (Kravitch, J., with Barkett, J., dissenting).
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Weisman and perpetuate a long-standing tradition of prayer at
graduation.' In addition, judges have also disputed the claim that the
policies create a limited public forum for private student speech.
Where access is limited to one or two speakers and does not provide
an opportunity for the presentation of a wide range of viewpoints, no
public forum is created. 8
When the Supreme Court evaluated Santa Fe's football game
prayer policy, the Court invoked nearly all of these arguments made
by the courts below. While three justices led by Chief Justice
Rehnquist argued that any prayers that may occur as a result of the
policy would be private speech, 9 the majority viewed the prayers as
school-sponsored speech.' Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens
began by rejecting the claim that Santa Fe's football policy created a
limited public forum. According to the Court, the school did not open
the pre-game ceremony to general student participation, and the
election system ensured that the students who did have access to the
stage would always represent majoritarian views.91 These facts, the
Court argued, are inconsistent with the creation of a limited public
forumY2 The Court then argued that the school district had not
succeeded in divorcing itself from the religious content of the
messages by delegating the decision about whether to have an
invocation to the students.93 According to the Court, the students
only had the opportunity to vote about whether or not to have an
invocation because the school district gave them that opportunity, and
the school took an active role in overseeing the election.94 By limiting
the messages to solemnizing statements and expressly referring only
to invocations in the text of the policy, the school district also
circumscribed the purpose of the speech and clearly invited and
encouraged prayer over secular speech.95
Also contributing to school endorsement of the religious messages
was the fact that the invocations would be broadcast to an audience
assembled by the school via the school's public address system and as
part of a regularly scheduled, school-sponsored function taking place
87. See Black Horse, 84 F.3d at 1480; see also Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd.
(Duval II), 250 F.3d 1330, 1344-46 (11th Cir. 2001) (Kravitch, J., with Anderson, C.J.,
& Carnes & Barkett, JJ., dissenting), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 664 (2001); Duval 1, 206
F.3d at 1097-98 (Kravitch, J., with Barkett, J., dissenting); Santa Fe, 168 F.3d at 816.
88. See Duval 1, 206 F.3d at 1103-04 (Kravitch, J., with Barkett, J., dissenting);
Santa Fe, 168 F.3d at 819-22; see also Black Horse, 84 F.3d at 1478.
89. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 324 (2000) (Rehnquist,
C.J., with Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
90. See id. at 302-10.
91. See id. at 303-04.
92. See id.
93. See id. at 305-06.
94. See id.
95. See id. at 306-07.
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on school property.96 The Court conjured up the image of a pre-game
ceremony "clothed in the traditional indicia of school sporting events,
which generally include not just the team, but also cheerleaders and
band members dressed in uniforms sporting the school name and
mascot."' In such a context, with the "school's name. . . likely
written in large print across the field and on banners and flags," the
audience cannot help but perceive the student's message as one that
has been delivered with the approval and endorsement of the school
administration.98 The Court further argued that the history of the
policy reinforced the likely perception that the prayers are delivered
with school support.9 According to the Court, the Santa Fe School
District had long had a practice of officially-sanctioned prayer at
football games and graduations, and its prayer policies were
undoubtedly developed to preserve this practice."tu Because the
prayers bear the same imprint of the state that was present in
Weisman and attendance at football games is required for some
students and strongly desired by others, the Court also found the same
coercive pressures in Santa Fe that were present in Weisman."' Even
if a prayer were never delivered pursuant to the policy, it would still
violate the First Amendment because the purpose and perception of
the policy are to endorse prayer' 2- and because the policy subjects the
"inherently nongovernmental subject of religion to a majoritarian
vote."1 3 By "turn[ing] the school into a forum for religious debate," '
the policy encourages "divisiveness along religious lines""'- and
"impermissibly invade[s] [the] private sphere" of religious belief and
worship. 106
The Supreme Court's decision in Santa Fe made clear that the lower
courts were on the right track when they used the basic dichotomy
between school-sponsored speech and private student speech to
evaluate the constitutionality of student-initiated prayer at school
events. However, Justice Stevens's opinion left many open questions
about when student-initiated speech should be characterized as public
or private, and after Santa Fe, the judges in the lower courts have
continued to disagree vehemently over the proper categorization of
student speech at school events.
96. See id at 307.
97. Id. at 308.
98. Id
99. See id.
100. See id. at 309.
101. See id at 310-12.
102. See id at 313-16.
103. Id. at 317.
104. Id at 316.
105. Id. at 317; see also id at 311.
106. Id at 311.
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Two Eleventh Circuit decisions since Santa Fe illustrate these
divisions. In each of these cases, the Eleventh Circuit had issued
opinions prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Santa Fe, but
following Santa Fe, the Court vacated the judgments and remanded
the cases to the Eleventh Circuit for consideration in light of Santa Fe.
In both cases, the Eleventh Circuit reinstated its earlier finding that
the speech at issue was private student speech rather than state
speech. The decisions rested on a narrow interpretation of the
Court's opinion in Santa Fe. The dissenters read Santa Fe more
broadly. All of the judges agreed that after Santa Fe, school policies
designed to encourage prayer over secular speech or to submit the
issue of prayer to a vote are unconstitutional. However, they
disagreed about whether any of the other factors cited by the Court in
Santa Fe are enough by themselves to turn student speech into school-
sponsored speech.
In Adler v. Duval County School Board (Duval I)" ° , the Eleventh
Circuit reinstated its 2000 decision in Duval I upholding Duval
County's graduation prayer policy. Reading Santa Fe narrowly, the
Duval II court held that two factors were decisive to the Court's
finding of school-sponsored speech. First, the Santa Fe School
District policy allowed the school to regulate the content of the
student messages, and, second, the policy, by its terms, invited and
encouraged prayer.108 According to the court, neither of these factors
were present in the Duval policy,109 and the Duval policy also did not
involve a vote on prayer per se."10 Students voted on whether to have
a student deliver a message wholly of his or her own choosing, which
could be religious or not depending upon what the selected student
decided to do."' The court emphasized that "[w]hat turns private
speech into state speech. . . is, above all, the additional element of
state control over the content of the message," and that additional
element was absent here."2 The dissenting judges disagreed and read
Santa Fe more broadly. According to Judge Kravitch, the court in
Santa Fe also focused on the history of the policy, and like the policy
in Santa Fe, the purpose of the Duval policy was to encourage
prayer.'13 Judge Carnes argued that whenever a school board
delegates its power to choose a messenger and message for a school-
107. Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd. (Duval II), 250 F.3d 1330 (11th Cir. 2001) (en
banc), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 644 (2001).
108. See id. at 1336-37.
109. See id.
110. See id. at 1338-39.
111. See id.
112. Id. at 1341.
113. See id. at 1345-47 (Kravitch, J., with Anderson, C.J. & Carnes & Barkett, JJ.,
dissenting).
1166 [Vol. 70
PRIVATE RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION
controlled event to a majority of students, the resulting message is the
message of the school."'
The Eleventh Circuit judges also disagreed about how broadly to
read Santa Fe in Chandler v. Siegelman (Chandler II)."5 In 1999, the
Eleventh Circuit in Chandler v. James (Chandler I) held that a U.S.
District Court had unconstitutionally enjoined the DeKalb County
school system in Alabama from permitting student-initiated prayers
or other devotional speech aloud in classrooms, over the public
address system, or at school-related assemblies, sporting events or
graduations.11 6 According to the court in Chandler I, student-initiated
speech at school assemblies and other school-related events is only
impermissible if the school actively participates in, encourages or
supervises the speech 1 7 If the school merely permits a student to
speak without requiring the speech, commanding it or suggesting it,
the message is protected private speech, not prohibited public
speech." 8 After the Supreme Court's decision in Santa Fe, the
Eleventh Circuit reconsidered its decision in light of Santa Fe and
reinstated that opinion in Chander II. According to the court in
Chandler II, Santa Fe prohibits a school from "taking affirmative steps
114. See id. at 1349-50 (Cames, J., with Anderson, CJ. & Barkett, J., dissenting).
115. Chandler v. Siegelman (Chandler II), 230 F.3d 1313 (lth Cir. 2000), cert.
denied, 121 S. Ct. 2521 (2001).
116. Chandler v. James (Chandler I), 180 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 1999), judgment
vacated sub nor. Chandler v. Siegelman, 530 U.S. 1256 (2000), opinion and judgment
reinstated sub nom. Chandler v. Siegelman (Chandler II), 230 F.3d 1313 (lth Cir.
2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 2521 (2001).
The Chandler litigation arose when the Alabama legislature enacted a statute
permitting nonsectarian, nonproselytizing student-initiated prayer during compulsory
and noncompulsory school-related assemblies, sporting events, graduation
ceremonies and other school-related events. Id. at 1256. The Alabama legislature
passed the statute in 1993, and it was challenged in DeKalb County in 1996. Id. In
1997, the district court held that the statute was facially unconstitutional, and it
enjoined the DeKaIb county school system from enforcing the statute. Id. The district
court's injunction specifically prohibited DeKalb County and its employees from
encouraging, directing, leading or participating in officially organized or officially
sanctioned prayer and religious activities. Id. at 1257. The injunction also prohibited
school officials from permitting students to engage in prayer or other devotional
speech on their own initiative either aloud in the classroom, over the public address
system, or at school-related assemblies, sporting events and graduations. Id. DeKalb
did not appeal the district court's holding that the statute was facially
unconstitutional, nor did it appeal the part of the injunction prohibiting officially
organized or sanctioned prayer. Id. However, DeKalb did appeal the part of the
injunction which prohibited schools from permitting students to pray or use
devotional speech on their own initiative in the classroom or at school-related events.
Id. at 1258. It was this latter part of the injunction that the Eleventh Circuit struck
down in Chandler I and II.
117. Id at 1264 n.19.
118. See id. at 1264. Thus, a graduation prayer policy that intentionally encourages
prayer or limits student messages to prayers would be unconstitutional. See id. at
1259 (distinguishing ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Reg'l Bd. of Educ., 84 F3d 1471 (3d
Cir. 1996) (en banc) and Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, 41 F.3d 447 (9th Cir. 1994),
vacated as moot, 515 U.S. 1154 (1995)).
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to create a vehicle for prayer.""' 9 It did not hold that any student
religious expression at school-sponsored events was prohibited if the
school did nothing to "actively or surreptitiously encourage[] it."'' 0
Dissenting from the Eleventh Circuit's denial of an en banc hearing in
Chandler II, Judge Barkett read Santa Fe very differently and far
more broadly. According to Judge Barkett, the Court in Santa Fe
held that when "a religious message [is] broadcast over a public
address system controlled by the government and conducted on
government property at an official school-related event," the message
becomes school-endorsed speech.121 School encouragement of prayer
or a vote on prayer would also render the prayer school-sponsored
expression, but that is not required. The delivery of the message to an
audience assembled for an official school-related event controlled and
supervised by the school is enough to render the speech school speech
endorsing religion.
Thus, it is clear that Santa Fe did not settle the issue of when
student-initiated speech at graduations or other school-related events
is constitutional. The Court affirmed that the basic dichotomy
between government speech and student speech controls the analysis,
but beyond situations where schools encourage prayer over secular
speech or administer a vote on the issue of prayer itself, whether
speech is private or public is largely open for debate. The
disagreements on the Eleventh Circuit demonstrate that debate will,
indeed, continue for some time to come.
It would, however, be a mistake to blame Justice Stevens's opinion
in Santa Fe for the ongoing disagreements over when student-initiated
speech is public or private. The real reason that the issue will not go
away is that the speech at issue is often both public and private. In
some respects, the Supreme Court's choice of the prayer policy in
Santa Fe as a vehicle for addressing the constitutionality of student-
initiated prayer was unfortunate because the Santa Fe case had a
number of bad facts that obscured the most difficult issues at stake.
Santa Fe is a small, predominantly Protestant community in south
Texas.2 There was strong evidence from the history of the policy's
development and other related facts that the school district's purpose
was to encourage student prayer and that the school was not, in fact,
neutral between religious and nonreligious speech. For example, at
the outset of the litigation in this case, the school district had a policy
allowing the student occupying the position of "student council
chaplain" to deliver prayers at football games. 123 When this policy and
119. Chandler I, 230 F.3d at 1315.
120. Id. at 1317.
121. Chandler v. Siegelman, 248 F.3d 1032, 1033, 1035 (11th Cir. 2001) (Barkett, J.,
dissenting), denying reh'g en banc 230 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2000).
122. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290,294 (2000).
123. See id.
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the school district's practice of allowing prayer at graduation were
challenged, the school district developed several versions of the
policies at issue in Santa Fe.124 The final version was modeled on the
policy upheld by the Fifth Circuit in Clear Creek except that sectarian
and proselytizing speech was permitted unless the district court held
that a nonsectarian, nonproselytizing restriction was required by the
First Amendment." The litigation in Santa Fe also initially involved
several other challenges to school conduct. For example, the plaintiffs
alleged that one of the school district's teachers had announced a
Baptist religious revival in class and criticized the Mormon faith, 6
and that other employees had encouraged membership in religious
clubs, criticized other minority beliefs, and distributed Bibles on
campus.127 The district court below ordered the school district to
establish policies to deal with these and other First Amendment
infractions by school employees,128 and that ruling was not appealed. 29
With background facts like these, it is easy to see why the audience
in Santa Fe would perceive student prayers to be the equivalent of
state speech. However, consider a policy with better facts. Imagine,
for instance, that instead of the small, largely Protestant community in
Santa Fe, the policy is adopted by a religiously and culturally diverse
community in the suburbs of a large metropolitan city. The school
district's policy provides for graduating students to vote upon whether
to have "brief inspirational messages" at the beginning or end of the
graduation ceremony. Alternatively, the district's policy provides for
the messages without a student vote. Either way, if a decision to have
the messages is made, four speakers are then chosen randomly from a
list of student volunteers. In most years, the messages are diverse and
represent a range of religious and nonreligious perspectives. The
school does not review the messages, and the graduation programs
include a disclaimer stating that the statements made by the student
speakers do not represent the views of the school.
With good facts like these, it is far more difficult than it was in Santa
Fe to see the student messages as the equivalent of school speech, but
it is also too simplistic to see the student messages as purely private
speech. A number of factors support the private nature of the speech.
The messages that are delivered are chosen or created by the students
themselves. The school does not control or define the content of the
message except to specify that they be brief and inspirational. Nor
does the school review or edit what the student will say. In addition,
124. See id at 296-98; Doe v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 806, 811-12 (5th
Cir. 1999), aff'd, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
125. See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 296-98; Santa Fe, 168 F.3d at 812.
126. Santa Fe, 168 F.3d at 810.
127. See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 295.
128. See id at 295 n.3.
129. For the procedural history of these claims, see Santa Fe, 168 F.3d at 812-14.
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the mechanism for choosing volunteers is neutral with respect to the
religious or nonreligious beliefs of potential speakers, and as
administered, the policy provides for a range of diverse viewpoints to
be presented. The disclaimer also makes clear that the statements
represent the personal views of the students themselves. In a situation
like this, the state has clearly relinquished much of its control over the
speech, and any religious messages that result are manifestly not the
same thing as state-directed prayer.
On the other hand, there remain public aspects to the speech. The
messages occur at a school-sponsored event on school property via the
school's public address system, and even more importantly, they are
clearly an integral part of that state-sponsored event. The school
provides the opportunity for the speech. The students "take the
stage" at the graduation and speak from the school's pulpit. They use
the "machinery of the State""13 to express their views. As the students
speak with the permission of the school before an audience assembled
for official school purposes and on a platform with school officials,
listeners will naturally perceive the messages as speech approved by
the school. Indeed, there will be "quadruple endorsement" here. All
of the views represented will receive a general endorsement by the
state.
It is, furthermore, difficult to argue that the policy has created a
limited public forum. The state creates a limited public forum when it
opens up its property for expressive use by a designated segment of
the public or for the discussion of certain subjects. 3 The Supreme
Court has held that a limited public forum is not created by inaction
on the part of the state, nor by merely permitting limited discourse by
select speakers. 32 To create a public forum, the government must
intentionally open up its property as a forum for public discourse. 33
To determine whether the government has created a public forum, the
Court looks to the "policy and practice" of the government to
determine whether it intended to open up a public forum,3" as well as
the nature of the property and its compatibility with expressive
activities, 3 5 and the use of the forum. 136
In the facts I have described, the school clearly did not intend to
open up a forum for general expressive use by the graduating class or
for the discussion of certain topics or subjects. The school has limited
130. School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226 (1963)
(indicating that the Free Exercise Clause does not mean that a majority can "use the
machinery of the State" to practice its beliefs").
131. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802
(1985); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37,46 n.7 (1983).
132. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802.
133. See id.
134. See id.; Perry, 460 U.S. at 47.
135. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802.
136. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 47.
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the number of speakers to four, and while the selection process is
designed to be neutral between religious and nonreligious viewpoints,
students cannot take any perspective on their subject matter. To the
contrary, all student messages must be inspirational. A message
denigrating the event or one's fellow students will not be tolerated,
nor would a political diatribe or speech designed to be a practical
joke. This is not a soapbox opportunity for speakers to engage in
purely private speech. Students cannot speak about whatever they
would like. They have essentially been commissioned by the school to
play the important role of delivering uplifting messages to the
graduating class and their families.
Student speech at school-sponsored events like graduations and
assemblies is also unlike the type of expression found to be private in
Mergens. Recall that Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion in Mergens
is the source for the Court's recent dichotomy between government
speech and private speech. Mergens addressed the constitutionality of
the Equal Access Act. The Equal Access Act was passed by Congress
in 1984, and it guarantees student religious clubs equal access to
school facilities when they are made available to other noncurriculum-
related student groups for meetings during noninstructional time.131
The school in Mergens contested the constitutionality of the Act on
the grounds that permitting student religious clubs to meet on campus
with other school clubs would send an impermissible message of state
endorsement of religion.1 8 Justice O'Connor denied that an equal
access policy would have that effect. The message will be one of
neutrality rather than endorsement of religious speech. 39  The
activities of student-led, student-initiated religious clubs meeting after
school are private student speech endorsing religion, and "there is a
crucial difference between government speech endorsing religion,
which the Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing
religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect."1"'
Student speech before a captive audience at a school-related event
is, however, very different than the speech at issue in Mergens. Under
the Equal Access Act, attendance at the meetings of student religious
clubs must be voluntary.14 1 By contrast, attendance at school-related
events and functions is usually not voluntary. In addition, while the
Equal Access Act prohibits school employees from participating in
the activities of religious clubs,"' school officials not only participate
in, but they run, school events and assemblies. Furthermore, the
137. Equal Access Act of 1984 §§ 802-05,20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-74 (1994).
138. See Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 247-48 (1990) (O'Connor, J.,
plurality).
139. See id at 251.
140. Id. at 250.
141. § 4071(d)(1), (2), and (4).
142. § 4071(c)(3).
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activities of religious clubs take place during noninstructional hours
and their activities are noncurricular.143 School-related events and
assemblies, by contrast, are part and parcel of official school activities.
In reality, then, even in situations where a school does not actively
try to invite or encourage religious messages over nonreligious ones
but, instead, provides a fair opportunity for student speech regardless
of its religious or secular viewpoint, student speech before a captive
audience is both public and private. Rather than categorizing it as
either private speech or school speech, it is more accurate to say that
it belongs to both the private and public box. Where student-initiated
speech takes place at a school-sponsored event in a captive audience
situation, the context changes the purely private character of the
speech, but it does not convert the speech into government
expression. Unless the school has decided to open up a true public
forum for student discourse or debate, when a student steps onto the
platform before a captive audience in a school setting, what emerges is
grey area speech.
An additional example will make the "grey" character of the
student speech in these captive audience situations even more clear.
One type of school policy which courts have just begun to consider is a
policy that entitles students to deliver messages at graduation based
on academic achievement. For example, the school may provide an
opportunity for the senior class valedictorian to give a valedictory
address. The school might, instead, permit one or more students to
deliver briefer remarks or presentations based on class standing.
Courts are presently divided over whether religious messages
delivered pursuant to such policies would be permissible student
speech or impermissible school-sponsored speech, and scholars are
divided as well. In his concurrence in Weisman, Justice Souter
suggested that religious messages during a valedictory speech would
probably not give rise to unconstitutional endorsement by the
school.1" His reason was that valedictorians are chosen by wholly
secular criteria. 45 The dissent in Duval I agreed; secular, neutral
criteria for choosing a speaker will sever the state association with the
speech.14
6
So far only a few courts have directly addressed the
constitutionality of religious speech under such policies, and the two
143. § 4071(b).
144. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 630 n.8 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring).
145. See id. "If the State had chosen its graduation day speakers according to
wholly secular criteria, and if one of those speakers (not a state actor) had
individually chosen to deliver a religious message, it would have been harder to
attribute an endorsement of religion to the State." Id.
146. See Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd. (Duval I), 206 F.3d 1070, 1095 (11th Cir.
2000) (en banc), cert. granted and judgment vacated, 121 S. Ct. 31 (2000), opinion and
judgment reinstated, 250 F.3d 1330 (11th Cir. 2001) (en banc), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct.
664 (2001).
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most significant decisions are both recent cases in the Ninth Circuit."'
In 1998 in Doe v. Madison School District No. 321, the court
addressed a policy that provided for a minimum of four students to be
invited to speak at graduation according to academic class standing."
Students could deliver "an address, poem, reading, song, musical
presentation, prayer, or any other pronouncement." ' 9 Speakers were
to decide on the content of their messages on their own, and school
officials were not permitted to "censor any presentation or require
any content."'5 0
The plaintiffs in Doe challenged the policy on the grounds that
allowing students to make religious presentations would violate the
Establishment Clause.' The court disagreed and held that any
religious messages would be private student speech, not school-
sponsored speech.5 2 The court based this finding on the fact that the
policy provided for neutral and secular selection criteria and that
student speakers had autonomy over the content of their messages! 3
In 1999, the Ninth Circuit sitting en banc vacated the judgment in
Doe on mootness grounds,' ' and a year later in Cole v. Oroville
Union High School District,55 the court addressed another policy, this
time one inviting senior class valedictorians to deliver valedictory
speeches. The most significant difference between the policies in Doe
and Cole was the fact that the Cole policy provided for school review
of speeches for grammatical errors and appropriateness, and the
public school involved in the litigation insisted that speeches be
147. There have also been two lower court cases addressing religious speech by
valedictorians. In October of 2001, a U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California addressed proselytizing speech under a school policy similar to the policy
at issue in the Ninth Circuit's most recent decision, but the district court simply
followed the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit and did not provide any new analysis of its
own. See Lassonde v. Pleasanton Unified Sch. Dist., 167 F. Supp. 2d 1108 (N.D. Cal.
2001). Ten years earlier, a U.S. magistrate judge upheld the decision of school
officials to reject a valedictory speech with religious content on the grounds that
allowing the speech would violate the Establishment Clause. See Guidry v. Broussard,
897 F.2d 181, 181-82 (5th Cir. 1990). The Fifth Circuit upheld the judgment below but
did not reach the constitutional issues. See id. at 182-83.
148. Doe v. Madison Sch. Dist. No. 321, 147 F.3d 832, 834 (9th Cir. 1998),
withdrawn and complaint dismissed for lack of standing and nootness, 177 F.3d 789
(9th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
149. Id.
150. Id
151. See id.
152 See id. at 836 ("[Wlhen a state uses a secular criterion for selecting graduation
speakers and then permits the speaker to decide for herself what to say, the speech
does not bear the imprimatur of the State.").
153. See iL at 835-36. The court also noted that the policy required graduation
programs to include a disclaimer to make clear that student messages represent the
personal views of the students and are not endorsed by the school. See id. at 837-38.
154. See Doe v. Madison Sch. Dist. No. 321.177 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
155. Cole v. Oroville Union High Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2000). cert.
denied, 121 S. Ct. 1228 (2001).
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nonsectarian and nonproselytizing. 156 The Cole case arose when the
school refused to permit Chris Niemeyer, who was co-valedictorian in
1998, to deliver a speech with sectarian, proselytizing content.'57
Niemeyer claimed that the school's refusal to allow him to deliver the
speech violated his free speech rights.158 The court disagreed on the
grounds that allowing Niemeyer to deliver his speech would have
violated the Establishment Clause.1 59  According to the court,
Niemeyer's speech was not private speech but was speech bearing the
imprint of the state, and, thus, prohibiting the speech was required to
avoid religious endorsement by the school."
Unlike the court in Doe, the Cole court emphasized the public
characteristics of the speech rather than the private aspects.
According to the court, like the religious messages in Santa Fe,
Niemeyer's speech would have been delivered at a school-controlled
event, held on school property, funded by the school, and broadcast
over the school's public address system.' 61 The court also emphasized
that the school retained the authority to review the content of student
messages. 62 Whether the court in Cole would have found Niemeyer's
speech to be private expression if the school had not retained the
power to review it is unclear. Without such a power, the policy in
Cole would have been essentially indistinguishable from the policy in
Doe. Certainly the court in Cole was far more disposed to see the
public nature of the speech than was the court in Doe, and, thus, it is
possible that the Cole court would have found the speech to be
impermissible school-sponsored speech even without any school
control over the content. Many of the scholars who have addressed
this issue side with the position in Doe. Even if they view religious
speech pursuant to a prayer policy like that in Santa Fe to be school-
sponsored speech, scholars tend to agree with Justice Souter and the
dissent in Duval L Neutral and secular selection criteria, together
156. Id. at 1096.
157. See id. at 1095. The litigation in Cole also involved another student, Ferrin
Cole, who was prohibited from delivering a sectarian invocation at the ceremony. Id.
In addition to speeches by the valedictorian and salutatorian, the Oroville High
School graduation ceremony included an invocation by a student chosen by a vote of
the senior class. Id. at 1096. Cole was chosen to deliver the invocation for the 1998
graduation, but the school refused to allow him to give the invocation because his
proposed message was sectarian and he refused to make it nondenominational. i.
The Cole court denied Cole's claim for relief on the grounds that the school's prayer
policy was unconstitutional under Santa Fe and that permitting Cole to deliver the
invocation, whether sectarian or nondenominational, would have violated the
Establishment Clause. Id. at 1102-03. According to the court, Cole's invocation was
not protected private speech but unconstitutional religious speech attributable to the
school. Id.
15& Id. at 1095, 1101.
159. Id. at 1103.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
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with the absence of school supervision over the content of the speech,
are sufficient to break the link with the state and preserve the private
nature of the speech."6
However, a closer look at the facts in Cole will demonstrate that
valedictory speeches, like other student messages at graduation, do
not, in fact, remain purely private expression. While valedictory
speeches are certainly partly private, the unfortunate facts in Cole
demonstrate that these speeches have an undeniable public aspect as
well. The speech that Niemeyer had prepared in Cole was essentially
a proselytizing sermon. 6' Niemeyer had included a statement that
"he was going to refer to God and Jesus repeatedly, and if anyone was
offended, they could leave the graduation."1" When the school
principal asked him to "tone down" the proselytizing and sectarian
religious references, Niemeyer refused. 6 If Niemeyer's speech were
truly private speech, Niemeyer would have been correct. This was his
opportunity to say what he wanted, and the school should not be
allowed to interfere. However, what is so shocking about Niemeyer's
statements is that he took this position at all. Niemeyer's statements
demonstrate a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of the
valedictory address and its place within the commencement exercises.
Niemeyer viewed his graduation as a soapbox opportunity to deliver
his own private message regardless of its effect on his listeners.
Niemeyer seemed blind to the fact that the graduation ceremony
belonged as much to the other students and their families as to
himself. However, aside from the bluntness and callousness of
Niemeyer's remarks, Niemeyer's obliviousness is really no different
than the obliviousness of those who argue that valedictory speeches
are private speech. Valedictory speeches are personal statements, but
they are also a part of the school's graduation ceremony. When
school officials gave Niemeyer a chance to speak, they did not intend
to give him a blank check to say whatever he wanted. They gave him
an opportunity to be a part of the exercises and to say something that
was appropriate to the circumstances. When the school did so, it
retained an interest in ensuring that Niemeyer's speech fit into the
general purposes of the graduation and did not significantly diminish
the experience for others.
Up to this point, all of the examples I have given of student speech
at school-related events have been messages delivered pursuant to a
school policy that provides an opportunity for expression. Student
religious expression before a captive audience at a school-related
event can also occur spontaneously, and where it does, the link
between the school and the expression is arguably more tenuous. For
163. See sources cited infra note 223.
164. See Cole, 228 F.3d at 1097
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1096.
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example, a student might thank God during a campaign speech for a
student government office or invoke God's blessing at a pep rally. In
cases like these, the school does not play any active role in procuring
the speech. According to the court in the Chandler cases, where
religious references are entirely the result of student choice and the
school does not invite, suggest or participate in religious speech, the
speech is protected private speech rather than public speech. 67
However, even where student religious speech is entirely a
spontaneous choice by the student, there remain public aspects to the
speech. A brief reference to God in a campaign speech or pep rally
may seem like private speech, but imagine a student who takes the
opportunity to deliver a proselytizing sermonette. In such a case, the
public nature of the speech comes to the fore, just as it did in Cole.
The student is using the school's platform at a school-related event,
and assuming school officials do not intervene to stop the speech, the
speech proceeds with the permission of the school. While the student
expression does not become the equivalent of school speech just
because it is uttered from a school-sponsored pulpit, the
circumstances of its utterance do mean that it bears, at least to some
extent, the aegis of the school.
B. Religious Expression in the Classroom
Like student-initiated religious speech at graduations, school
assemblies or other school-related events, student religious expression
in the classroom has been the subject of much litigation in the lower
federal courts. Most of this litigation centers around religious
messages delivered as part of oral reports or oral presentations. The
similarities between this type of classroom speech and religious
messages at school-related events are obvious. Both types of speech
usually involve a captive audience, and in both situations students
deliver their messages from platforms provided by the school. While
there are many similarities between student-initiated expression in the
classroom and at school-sponsored events, there is surprisingly little
overlap in the case law addressing these two types of speech, even
though many of the same legal issues arise in both contexts. Federal
case law regarding religious expression in the classroom has
developed separately from case law regarding religious messages at
graduation and other school events, and opinions in the two lines of
cases rarely cite each other. However, while federal court case law
regarding classroom speech and speech at school events have rarely
intersected, parallel concepts appear in both lines of decisions. Most
significant for this article is the use of a similar dichotomy between
student speech and school-sponsored speech in both contexts.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 117-20.
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Unlike the case of graduation prayer or prayers at sporting events,
there are no Supreme Court cases directly addressing religious speech
in the classroom. While the number of lower court cases is increasing
and classroom religious speech promises to be the more significant
issue for the future,"6 the lower courts currently base their decisions
on Supreme Court precedents which deal generally with student
expression in the school setting without specifically addressing any of
its religious aspects. The courts have relied on two precedents in
particular. These are the Court's 1969 decision in Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District69 and 1988 decision
in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.'70
In Hazelwood, the Court developed a distinction between private
student expression or "tolerated speech" and school-sponsored
student expression or "promoted speech."'' Private or "personal"
student expression is expression that "happens to occur on the school
premises."7 School-sponsored speech includes "school-sponsored
publications, theatrical productions, and other expressive activities
that students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably
perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school."'" Activities like these
are part of the school curriculum when they are supervised by
teachers and designed to serve pedagogical purposes even if they do
not occur in a traditional classroom setting. 74 According to the Court,
Tinker provides the standard for private student expression. Private
student expression is protected speech and can only be censored or
restricted by the school if it "materially disrupts classwork or involves
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others."'7 Hazelwood
controls school-sponsored or "promoted" speech. Where student
speech takes place as part of a school-sponsored activity, educators
can exercise much greater control over the speech.'76 Editorial control
over the style and content of the speech is permissible as long as this
control is "reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns."'"
Courts should only intervene where there is "no valid educational
purpose" being served by the school's restrictions."7 s
16& See, eg., Martha McCarthy, Religion and Education: Whither the
Establishment Clause?, 75 Ind. LJ. 123, 143 (2000) ("The next wave of Establishment
Clause litigation in public schools may involve the instructional program, with
plaintiffs expanding on the free expression arguments to justify religious content in
student presentations and other assignments.")
169. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
170. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
171. Id. at 270-71.
172. Id. at 271.
173. Id
174. See id.
175. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969).
176. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271-73.
177. Id. at 273.
178. Id.
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The Court in Hazelwood explained that the Hazelwood standard is
more deferential than the Tinker standard because it addresses
situations where the school is "lend[ing] its name and resources to the
dissemination of student expression. "179 In situations like these,
educators should be able to exercise greater oversight to ensure that
students "learn whatever lessons the activity is designed to teach, that
readers or listeners are not exposed to material that may be
inappropriate for their level of maturity, and that the views of the
individual speaker are not erroneously attributed to the school."180
The Tinker-Hazelwood dichotomy between personal student
expression and school-sponsored speech provides the framework for
lower court decisions addressing student religious speech in the
classroom. These cases usually come to the courts in a different
posture than cases addressing student speech at graduations and other
school-related events. In cases involving student-initiated prayer at
graduations, it is usually the school that is defending the religious
expression against the claim of an Establishment Clause violation.
The plaintiffs argue that the speech violates the Establishment Clause
because it is school-sponsored speech endorsing religion, and the
school defends the speech on the grounds that the messages are
private expression, not school-sponsored speech. By contrast, in cases
involving classroom speech, it is usually the school that has excluded
or otherwise restricted the student religious speech, and the student is
challenging the exclusion on free speech grounds. These classroom
speech cases usually involve students below high school age, and
typically the school will argue that prohibiting the religious speech is
necessary to avoid a perception by students that the school endorses
the speech. The student, by contrast, argues that the religious speech
is private expression and, thus, protected by Tinker.
For example, in Duran v. Nitsche, the school prohibited a fifth-
grader from delivering an oral report with religious content on the
grounds that other students might attribute the speech to the school."
According to the teacher in that case, "[f]ifth-graders, when you, as a
teacher, allow things to occur in your classroom, believe, as a rule,
that what is occurring is something that the teacher supports."'" In
DeNooyer v. Livonia Public Schools, a second grade student was
prohibited from playing a videotape of herself singing a "proselytizing
religious song" during the class's show-and-tell period.183 The teacher
refused to allow Kelly DeNooyer to show her tape on the grounds
179. Id. at 272-73.
180. Id. at 271.
181. See Duran v. Nitsche, 780 F. Supp. 1048, 1055 (E.D. Pa. 1991), vacated and
appeal dismissed, 972 F.2d 1331 (3d Cir. 1992).
182- Id.
183. See DeNooyer v. Livonia Pub. Sch., 799 F. Supp. 744, 746 (E.D. Mich. 1992),
aff'd per curiam sub nom., DeNooyer v. Merinelli, 12 F.3d 211, 1993 WL 477030 (6th
Cir. Nov. 18, 1993) (unpublished opinion).
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that other students might believe that the school endorsed the song's
message and that the song might offend students with different
religious faiths.1" The school also argued that showing a videotape
was inconsistent with the purpose of a show-and-tell program." In
C.H. v. Oliva,"8 a first grade student was prohibited from reading a
story with religious content in front of the class."b  As a reward for
special achievement in reading, students in Zachary Hood's class were
permitted to read one of their favorite stories to the class." Zachary
chose a story based on the Bible."8 His teacher refused to let him
read the story to the class but allowed him to read the story to her
outside the presence of the class.19 The school defended this decision
on the grounds that young students "cannot be relied upon to
distinguish between those things their teacher endorses and those
things she merely allows to be expressed in her classroom."'91 The
school also argued that allowing Zachary to read his story might upset
students with other faiths." The litigation in C.H. v. Oliva also
involved a separate incident that occurred when Zachary was in
kindergarten. During the Thanksgiving holiday season, Zachary's
teacher asked the class to make posters depicting what they were
thankful for.193  Zachary's poster was a poster indicating his
thankfulness for Jesus."9 After the students' posters were hung on the
hallway outside the kindergarten classroom, Zachary's poster was
initially removed because of its religious theme and then returned to a
less prominent location. 95
In each of these cases, the school's action was upheld by the lower
courts. All of the courts to address the issue agreed that Hazelivood
provided the standard for addressing classroom speech instead of
Tinker.196 According to the court in Duran, it even "strains language"
184. See id. at 747.
185. Id.
186. C.H. v. Oliva, 990 F. Supp. 341 (D.NJ. 1997), affd, 195 F.3d 167 (3d Cir.
1999), reh'd en banc, 226 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2000) (judgment of district court and of
appellate panel affirmed in part and case remanded with respect to remaining issues),
cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 2519 (2001).
187. See Oliva, 195 F.3d at 169.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 170.
192 Id. at 169, 175.
193. Id. at 168.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 169.
196. See id. at 174, 175; DeNooyer v. Merinelli, 12 F.3d 211, 1993 WL 477030, at *3
(6th Cir. Nov. 18, 1993) (per curiam) (unpublished opinion); C.H. v. Oliva, 990 F.
Supp. 341, 353 (D.N.J. 1997), aff'd, 195 F.3d 167 (3d Cir. 1999), rei'd en banc, 226
F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2000) (judgment of district court and of appellate panel affirmed in
part and case remanded with respect to remaining issues), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 2519
(2001); DeNooyer v. Livonia Pub. Sch., 799 F. Supp. 744, 748 (E.D. Mich. 1992), affd
per curiam sub non., DeNooyer v. Merinelli, 12 F.3d 211, 1993 WL 477030 (6th Cir.
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to call the oral report in that case school-sponsored; it was, rather,
"school itself."1" The district court in DeNooyer agreed. 19 The Third
Circuit panel hearing Oliva also found the speech to be the equivalent
of the "[s]tate's own speech." 199
With Hazelwood controlling, the schools in these cases were given
wide authority to control and restrict the speech, and the courts
repeatedly expressed deference to the educational judgment of school
teachers and administrators."° In Duran, the district court held that
the school's concern that the oral report might be attributed to the
school was a sufficient pedagogical reason to prohibit the speech. 0'
The district court in DeNooyer followed the same reasoning although
the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment without
addressing the religious nature of the speech °.2  The Third Circuit
panel that heard Oliva also argued that the risk that Zachary's story
would be viewed by other students as school-endorsed speech was a
legitimate reason for prohibiting it,203 and the district court below had
reached a similar conclusion.2 ° In addition, the panel in Oliva stated
that the school had a legitimate interest in avoiding the offense and
resentment that exposure to the story might have caused among other
students and their families. 5 With regard to Zachary's poster, both
the panel and the district court found that the school's decision to
Nov. 18, 1993) (unpublished opinion); Duran v. Nitsche, 780 F. Supp. 1048, 1054-55
(E.D. Pa. 1991), vacated and appeal dismissed, 972 F.2d 1331 (3d Cir. 1992). The
Third Circuit sitting en banc in C.H. v. Oliva did not address this issue. Because the
court was equally divided regarding Zachary's story, it upheld the judgment of the
district court without further explanation. See C.H. v. Oliva, 226 F.3d 198, 200 (3d Cir.
2000) (en banc), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 2519 (2001). With respect to Zachary's poster,
the en banc court held that the complaint failed to allege that any of the named
defendants played a role in the treatment of the poster, and the court remanded with
instructions to allow the plaintiffs to cure the deficiencies in the complaint if possible.
Id. at 200-03.
197. Duran, 780 F. Supp. at 1054 n.8.
198. DeNooyer, 799 F. Supp. at 751 ("As in Duran, Kelly's presentation... was
more than school-sponsored speech, it was 'school itself."' (quoting Duran, 780
F.Supp. at 1054 n.8)).
199. Oliva, 195 F.3d at 173.
200. Id. at 171; DeNooyer, 799 F. Supp. at 750; Duran, 780 F. Supp. at 1056.
201. See Duran, 780 F. Supp. at 1056.
202. In an unpublished disposition, the Sixth Circuit approved of the school's
action on the grounds that allowing a student to show a videotape for show-and-tell
would undermine the pedagogical goal of enhancing the students' oral
communication skills. See DeNooyer v. Merinelli, 12 F.3d 211, 1993 WL 477030, at *3
(6th Cir. Nov. 18, 1993) (per curiam) (unpublished opinion). The appellate court
found it unnecessary to reach the school's additional claim that prohibiting the
videotape was required to avoid state endorsement of religion. Id.
203. See Oliva, 195 F.3d at 174-75.
204. See C.H. v. Oliva, 990 F. Supp. 341, 353-54 (D.N.J. 1997), affd, 195 F.3d 167
(3d Cir. 1999), reh'd en banc, 226 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2000) (judgment of district court
and of appellate panel affirmed in part and case remanded with respect to remaining
issues), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 2519 (2001).
205. See Oliva, 195 F.3d at 175.
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temporarily remove the poster and place it in a less prominent
location was justified by the sensitivity of the issues raised by student
religious expression. 206 The panel's decision in Oliva was vacated and
the case heard by the full court en banc, but the en banc opinion did
not discuss the substantive issues in the case.2w
Judge Alito and Judge Mansmann, dissenting from the Third
Circuit's en banc decision, were the lone voices in these cases for
viewing the student speech as private expression." According to
Judges Alito and Mansmann, Tinker is the appropriate standard for
evaluating classroom religious expression rather than Hazeivood
because "when a student is called upon to express his or her personal
views in class or in an assignment," the resulting speech cannot
reasonably be perceived as bearing the imprimatur of the school.20 In
the unlikely event that there is a danger of endorsement, the school
can provide a disclaimer.210 Judge Alito's dissent in Oliva echoes
Justice Brennan's dissent in Hazehvood, which went even further.
According to Justice Brennan, Tinker should always provide the
standard for addressing student speech in a school context., The
occurrence of student speech during a school-sponsored activity does
not turn private speech into school-sponsored speech. It remains
private speech,212 and it can be limited under Tinker if it substantially
or materially disrupts the school functions.1 3 If there is a danger that
the speech will be confused with school speech, the proper remedy is
for the school to disassociate itself from the speech with a disclaimer
or other less oppressive means short of prohibition.214 According to
Justice Brennan, the Hazelvood standard "license[s]. . . thought
control" in the public schools,." ' and threatens to "transform students
into 'closed-circuit recipients of only that which the State chooses to
communicate."'216
206. Id. at 175-76 & n.3; Oliva, 990 F. Supp at 353.
207. Regarding Zachary's poster, the court held that the complaint failed to allege
that any of the named defendants played a role in the removal and relocation of the
poster, and the court remanded with instructions to allow the plaintiffs to cure the
deficiencies in the complaint if possible. See C.H. v. Oliva, 226 F.3d 198, 200-03 (3d
Cir. 2000) (en banc), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 2519 (2001). With respect to the
treatment of Zachary's story, the court was equally divided, and the court affirmed
the judgments below without issuing a new opinion. Id at 200.
208. See id. at 203-14 (Alito, J., dissenting).
209. Id. at 213-14.
210. Id. at 212-13.
211. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260,283-84 (1988) (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
212. See id. at 281-82.
213. Id. at 283-84.
214. Id. at 288-89.
215. Id. at 286.
216. Id. (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511
(1969).
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The dichotomy between private student expression and school-
sponsored speech in these classroom speech cases closely resembles
the dichotomy that federal courts have used to address prayers at
graduation and other religious messages at school-related events. In
both settings, if student speech is characterized as private expression,
it is protected speech. On the other hand, if the speech falls within the
category of school-sponsored speech, it is subject to the limitations
and powers of the school. The big difference between these two lines
of cases is that the classroom speech cases are free speech cases and
the graduation prayer cases are Establishment Clause cases. As
discussed above, it is objecting students who bring the graduation
prayer cases against the scbool on the grounds that student religious
messages at school-related events are school-sponsored speech in
violation of the Establishment Clause. By contrast, in the classroom
speech cases, it is the school that wants to exclude the student
religious speech, and the affected students are arguing that the speech
is protected private speech. In the classroom speech cases, the
school's position is that the student speech is school-sponsored speech
subject to its pedagogical powers. In the graduation prayer cases, the
school's position is that the student expression is private expression
free from its limitations under the Establishment Clause. In theory,
student speech with similar characteristics should be treated
consistently regardless of whether the speech arises in the classroom
or in another captive audience situation like a graduation or school
assembly. If the speech has the features of school-sponsored speech
and the dichotomies developed by the courts are assumed, the speech
should be subject to both the school's powers and its limitations. By
contrast, if the speech is private speech, it should be free from the
powers and limitations of the school except to the extent necessary to
prevent a material disruption of the educational process.
None of the existing cases addressing classroom speech have
decided whether classroom speech which might be confused with
school speech is subject to the limitations of the Establishment Clause
as well as the powers of the school. The district courts in Duran and
DeNooyer expressly declined to address whether allowing the oral
presentations in those cases would have involved an Establishment
Clause violation by the school. 17 Nor did these courts decide whether
second and fifth-graders were, in fact, too young to be able to
distinguish private speech from speech receiving the endorsement of
the school." 8 According to these courts, the school's concern about
the possible confusion over the speech was a sufficient reason to
217. See DeNooyer v. Livonia Pub. Sch., 799 F. Supp. 744, 751 (E.D. Mich. 1992),
affd per curiam sub nom., DeNooyer v. Merinelli, 12 F.3d 211, 1993 WL 477030 (6th
Cir. Nov. 18, 1993) (unpublished opinion); Duran v. Nitsche, 780 F. Supp. 1048, 1056
(E.D. Pa. 1991), vacated and appeal dismissed, 972 F.2d 1331 (3d Cir. 1992).
218. See DeNooyer, 799 F. Supp. at 751; Duran, 780 F. Supp. at 1056.
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prohibit the speech even if these concerns ultimately prove to be
unjustified." 9 The position of these courts that the schools had
legitimately excluded the speech even if their concerns about state
endorsement were unjustified is not convincing. If Hazelvood only
sanctions restrictions on student speech where there is a legitimate
pedagogical interest at stake, then it would seem that there has to be a
real, not just imaginary, danger of endorsement before the school can
act to censor student speech. On the other hand, if there is, in fact,
such a real danger, then it would also seem that the school is not only
free to exclude the religious speech from the classroom, but also is
obligated to do so.
However, as in the context of student-initiated expression at
graduations and other school-related events, the courts are mistaken
to label student speech in the classroom setting as either private or
school-sponsored. Where a student gives an oral report or
presentation, the speech is both public and private. On the one hand,
when a student gives an oral report or presentation, the speech is
clearly their personal speech, and even a very young child will
understand that the speech of their peers is not the same thing as the
speech of their teachers. Indeed, classroom speech is more clearly
private speech than is a message delivered by a student at graduation.
On the other hand, like a graduation speaker, if a student is provided
with a special opportunity to address the class by reading a story,
presenting show-and-tell material or delivering an oral report, the
student has, in effect, been given the school's stage. As they get up in
front of the class, they speak from a platform ordinarily occupied only
by their classroom teacher. Particularly where students are young,
they may well believe that what a fellow student says from that
platform is approved by the school. The teacher's concern in Duran
that young children believe that what their teacher allows to occur in
the classroom is something that the teacher supports is not
unreasonable when it comes to class presentations. For example,
when young children listen to show-and-tell presentations, they
certainly realize that it is their peers who are speaking, not the
teacher, but they may also assume that the school generally supports
what their peers are saying. If the school did not support it, the
students would assume that the teacher would not allow it. Young
children are very familiar with teachers restricting speech which they
do not approve of.
Remarks made in general class discussion or in response to teacher
questions are very different. In those cases, no student has sole
control over the school platform, and even young students realize that
many things that are said during the give and take of classroom
discussion are not endorsed or approved of by the school. Likewise, if
219. See DeNooyer, 799 F. Supp. at 751; Duran, 780 F. Supp. at 1056.
2002] 1183
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
the school opens up a forum for student debate or discourse, students
will also probably realize that the speech that results is private student
expression and not school-endorsed messages. However, oral
presentations differ in important ways from ordinary classroom
discussion or fora for debate, and they are, at least at some level,
inescapably public.
Thus, the mistake that courts make in cases addressing classroom
speech as well as student speech at graduations and other school
events is to see the messages as either private or school-sponsored.
To place student speech into a private box frees that speech from
school control and makes it unanswerable to Establishment Clause
values. On the other hand, to label the speech school-sponsored
expression collapses the distinction between student speech and
school speech and subjects the speech to all the powers and limitations
of the state. If student-initiated speech in classroom settings or at
school-sponsored events is truly grey area speech that is both public
and private then what is needed is a new model for addressing this
speech which takes account of its special features. As I will argue
below, one of the special features of grey area speech is its great value
for the educational process.
III. THE VALUE OF GREY AREA SPEECH
In the previous section, I argued that the dichotomies that federal
courts have used to address student religious speech in classrooms and
at school-related events are too simplistic. Student religious speech in
captive audience situations like these is both public and private, rather
than either public or private. Like the federal courts, most scholars
who have addressed student religious expression in the public school
setting also adopt the familiar dichotomy between permissible private
student expression and impermissible school-sponsored speech.2 0
220. See, e.g., Carl H. Esbeck, Religion and the First Amendment: Some Causes of
the Recent Confusion, 42 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 883, 889-90 (2001) [hereinafter Esbeck,
Religion and the First Amendment]; Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a
Structural Restraint on Governmental Power, 84 Iowa L. Rev. 1, 84 (1998) [hereinafter
Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint]; Gilbert A. Holmes,
Student Religious Expression in School: Is it Religion or Speech, and Does it Matter, 49
U. Miami L. Rev. 377, 410-11 (1994); Douglas Laycock, EqualAccess and Moments of
Silence: The Equal Status of Religious Speech by Private Speakers, 81 Nw. U. L. Rev.
1, 3, 9, 30 (1986); R. Collin Mangrum, Shall We Pray? Graduation Prayers and
Establishment Paradigms, 26 Creighton L. Rev. 1027 (1993); Robert S. Peck, The
Threat to the American Idea of Religious Liberty, 46 Mercer L. Rev. 1123, 1145-47
(1995); Stephen B. Pershing, Graduation Prayer After Lee v. Weisman: A Cautionary
Tale, 46 Mercer L. Rev. 1097, 1117 (1995); Myron Schreck, Balancing the Right to
Pray at Graduation and the Responsibility of Disestablishment, 68 Temp. L. Rev. 1869
(1995); Sekulow et al., supra note 29, at 1018; Whitehead & Crow, supra note 42, at
207; Whitehead, supra note 42, at 230, 236-37. For articles embracing the Tinker-
Hazelwood dichotomy, see Bruce C. Hafen & Jonathan 0. Hafen, The Hazelwood
Progeny: Autonomy and Student Expression in the 1990's, 69 St. John's L. Rev. 379.
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Like the courts, these scholars also disagree about whether the speech
at issue belongs to the private box or the public box, and they draw
the categories of public and private more or less broadly. For
example, for some, school-sponsored speech includes all religious
speech at school-related events." For others, student religious speech
is not school-sponsored unless the government takes an active role in
encouraging or supervising the speech or is otherwise the motivational
source behind the speech.'m Still others take a position somewhere in
the middle. These scholars will typically include most student
religious speech at school-related events in the public box while
categorizing valedictory addresses as private speech and perhaps
other religious messages delivered by students chosen by neutral,
secular criteria as well.223
379-80 (1995); Sekulow et al., supra note 29, at 1023-26; Whitehead, supra note 42, at
243-44; Mark G. Yudof, Tinker Tailored: Good Faith, Civility, and Student
Expression, 69 St. John's L. Rev. 365, 375 (1995).
But see Gey, supra note 30, at 432 (rejecting bright line between private and
government speech); Stanley Ingber, Liberty and Authority: Two Facets of the
Inculcation of Virtue, 69 St. John's L. Rev. 421, 452 (1995) (rejecting Tinker-
Hazeivood dichotomy); Fitschen, supra note 29, at 44041, 444 (rejecting litigation
strategy based on dichotomy between student speech and school speech). Michael
McConnell has also rejected a strict dichotomy between permissible private religious
expression and impermissible government religious speech. McConnell has argued
that when it comes to public education and other areas where the government exerts
significant control over public culture, stripping government speech of all religious
content and symbols will have a secularizing influence on the community. See Michael
W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. Chi. L Rev. 115, 189 (1992)
[hereinafter McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads]. McConnell suggests that
the best way to ensure that government does not influence or distort the religious
choices of the populace is to reduce government pressure in cultural and educational
institutions, see id. at 188, and where government still plays a significant role, to have
"the aspects of culture controlled by the government (public spaces, public
institutions) exactly mirror the culture as a whole." Id. at 193. However, in a recent
article, McConnell approves of the dichotomy that the Court has drawn between
protected private religious expression and impermissible government speech. See
Michael W. McConnell, State Action and the Supreme Court's Emerging Consensus on
the Line Betveen Establishment and Private Religious Erpression, 28 Pepp. L Rev.
681,682,704,707,710 (2001).
221. See, &g., Jonathan C. Drimmer, Hear No Evil, Speak No Evil: The Duty of
Public Schools to Limit Student-Proposed Graduation Prayers, 74 Neb. L. Rev. 411,
420 (1995) (stating that "substantive neutrality" in the public schools requires that
"religion remain absent from school-sponsored events"); Harlan A. Loeb, Suffering in
Silence: Camouflaging the Redefinition of the Establishment Clause. 77 Or. L Rev.
1305, 1332 (1998) (stating that schools have "responsibility of providing a secular
graduation ceremony"). The district court in Gearon v. Loundon County School
Board took a similar position: "The court is persuaded that the correct view is
[that] ... a constitutional violation inherently occurs when, in a secondary school
graduation setting, a prayer is offered, regardless of who makes the decision that the
prayer will be given and who authorizes the actual wording of the remarks." 844 F.
Supp. 1097,1099 (E.D. Va. 1993).
222. See, eg., Mangrum, supra note 220, at 1049-51; Sekulow et al., supra note 29,
at 1093-94; cf. Whitehead & Crow, supra note 42, at 199 (stating that Tinker should
apply to all student speech in the public school setting).
223. See, e.g., Peck, supra note 220, at 1147 n.137 (stating that speech by
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By contrast, in my view, a better way to approach student religious
expression in captive audience situations is to abandon the dichotomy
altogether, recognize that the speech is grey area speech, and develop
an approach that is appropriate to the special characteristics of this
speech. At the end of the previous section, I stated that one of the
special characteristics of grey area speech is its great value for the
educational process. Before I defend this view and develop my own
proposal for addressing grey area speech, it is important to
acknowledge that many courts and scholars would disagree that grey
area religious speech in the public schools is valuable. They tend to
view the presence of religion in the public schools as a dangerous
phenomenon which threatens to undermine national unity, spark
religious divisiveness, and cause offense to nonbelievers or believers
who disagree with the beliefs of the speaker.
For example, in Santa Fe, Justice Stevens worries about the
divisiveness of religion in a public school setting. According to Justice
Stevens, religious beliefs and worship are an "inherently
nongovernmental subject"' 4 that belongs to the "private sphere." 2 5
The election mechanism employed by the Santa Fe School District's
prayer policy "impermissibly invade[d]" 6 that sphere when it
"turn[ed] the school into a forum for religious debate ' 2 7 and, thereby,
"encourage[d] divisiveness along religious lines."2 8 Stevens's concerns
echo those of the Court thirteen years earlier in Edwards v.
Aguillard.u9 According to Aguillard, the Court must be vigilant in
monitoring Establishment Clause compliance in the public schools
because "the public school is at once the symbol of our democracy
and the most pervasive means for promoting our common destiny. In
no activity of the State is it more vital to keep out divisive forces than
in its schools." 30 The belief that the presence of religion in the public
schools will undermine national unity and spark religious conflict has
also appeared in a number of articles addressing student religious
valedictorians chosen according to class standing is private speech which the school
may not censor); Pershing, supra note 220, at 1115-16 (stating that expression of
student speakers selected without regard to his or her religion is private speech if
unreviewed in advance); Nadine Strossen, How Much God in the Schools? A
Discussion of Religion's Role in the Classroom, 4 Win. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 607, 631
(1995) (stating that valedictorians chosen wholly by secular criteria presumptively
engage in nonschool-sponsored private speech); see also Holmes, supra note 220, at
426 ("[A] religious message by a valedictorian who is selected on the basis of merit
and whose speech is a personal statement would qualify as private student religious
expression, unless the school officials approved the speech.").
224. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290,317 (2000).
225. Id. at 311.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 316.
228. Id. at 311, 317.
229. 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
230. Id. at 583-84 (quoting Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203,
231 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the judgment)).
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expression in the schools, 2 as well as some of the lower court
decisions in the area.232 Justice Felix Frankfurter elaborated upon the
same argument forty-three years ago in his concurrence in Illinois ex
rel. McCollum v. Board of Education. 3  In McCollum, the Court
struck down a released time program which provided for religious
teachers employed by private religious groups to come on to school
premises and deliver religious instruction during regular school
hours.' In support of this decision, Justice Frankfurter argued for a
strict principle of separation in the field of public education. 5 Public
schools are "a symbol of our secular unity"' and the "most powerful
agency for promoting cohesion among a heterogeneous democratic
people."" 7 Strict confinement of religion to the private sphere of
church and home is required to keep schools free from "divisive
conflicts" and "entanglement in the strife of sects."'  Schools should
be the "training ground for habits of community,"' --  and the
Constitution prohibits them from "becoming embroiled. . in...
destructive religious conflicts."2" In Justice Frankfurter's view,
separation in the schools is necessary "for assuring unities among our
people stronger than our diversities."'
Other judges and scholars have been concerned that religious
expression in captive audience situations in the schools causes offense
to other students with different views. For example, in Gearon, one of
the reasons that the district court gave for striking down Loudoun
County's graduation prayer policy was that "[t]o involuntarily subject
a student at such an event to a display of religion that is offensive or
not agreeable to his or her own religion or lack of religion is to
constructively exclude that student from graduation."2'42 Similarly, the
Third Circuit panel in Oliva agreed with Zachary's school that
preventing "resentment" among fellow students and their parents as a
result of compelled exposure to Zachary's story was a legitimate
231. See Drimmer, supra note 221, at 436-37 (citing Kenneth L Karst, The First
Amendment, the Politics of Religion and the Symbols of Government, 27 Harv. C.R.-
C.L. L. Rev. 503, 507-08 (1992)); Peck, supra note 220, at 1155-56; Jessica Smith,
"Student-Initiated" Prayer: Assessing the Newest Initiatives to Return Prayer to the
Public Schools, 18 Campbell L. Rev. 303,327-29 (1996).
232. See Cole v. Oroville Union High Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1092, 1104 (9th Cir. 2000)
("The requirement that religion be left to the private sphere is the product of a well-
documented and turbulent history .... "), cert. denied., 121 S. Ct. 1228 (2001).
233. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
234. See id. at 207-09.
235. See id. at 215-17 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the judgment).
236. Id. at 217.
237. Id. at 216.
238. Id. at 217.
239. Id. at 227.
240. Id. at 228.
241. Id. at 231.
242. Gearon v. Loudoun County Sch. Bd., 844 F. Supp. 1097, 1100 (E.D. Va. 1993).
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pedagogical reason for restricting his speech.243 The district court in
DeNooyer also agreed that the school's desire to avoid offense to
other students and parents was a legitimate reason for prohibiting
Kelly from showing her videotape.2'
In addition to judicial concern on this point, a number of scholars
have also pointed out that student religious expression in captive
audience situations can be offensive to those with different views, and
they have defended special restrictions on student religious speech to
avoid this offense. For example, Steven Gey, who is one of the few
scholars to reject the dichotomy that the courts have drawn between
public and private speech,245 has argued that student religious speech
must be prohibited whenever it is "incorporated into the public school
atmosphere or curriculum in a manner that gives religious dissenters
no way to avoid being proselytized without opting out of some portion
of their educational entitlements. '24 6 This restriction applies to student
expression that has been labeled private as well as school-sponsored
expression;"47 all student expression is subject to restriction if it
subjects others to such unwanted "religious pressure. '24 8 Jonathan
Drimmer has argued that public schools have an affirmative duty to
"guarantee that religion remain[s] absent from school-sponsored
events,"24 9 and, thereby, to "protect the nonadherent from unwanted
religious influence.""0 According to Harlan Loeb, schools also have a
responsibility to ensure "a secular graduation ceremony" 1 so that
students are not subjected to religious speech that they find "offensive
or alienating. ' 252
The judges and scholars who are concerned that the presence of
religion in the public schools sparks religious divisiveness and
undermines a sense of unity and community among students will
almost certainly be just as troubled by grey area religious speech in
the schools as with pure school speech. In either case, the religious
speech has public features, and religion is brought directly into the
educational experience. Those who worry about the offense caused
243. C.H. v. Oliva, 195 F.3d 167, 175 (3d Cir. 1999), reh'd en banc, 226 F.3d 198 (3d
Cir. 2000) (judgment of district court and of appellate panel affirmed in part and case
remanded with respect to remaining issues), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 2519 (2001).
244. See DeNooyer v. Livonia Pub. Sch., 799 F. Supp. 744, 751 (E.D. Mich. 1992),
affd per curiam sub nom., DeNooyer v. Merinelli, 12 F.3d 211, 1993 WL 477030 (6th
Cir. Nov. 18, 1993) (unpublished opinion). Recall that the Sixth Circuit affirmed the
district court's decision without addressing the religious nature of the tape. See supra
note 202 and accompanying text.
245. See Gey, supra note 30, at 432.
246. Id. at 441.
247. See id.
248. Id. at 443.
249. Drimmer, supra note 221, at 420.
250. Id. at 426.
251. Loeb, supra note 221, at 1332.
252. Id. at 1331.
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by student religious speech to nonbelievers and those of other faiths
also find grey area speech problematic. It is the delivery of the
religious message in a captive audience situation during regular school
functions that is the source of resentment and offense that concerns
them.
For other scholars, it is difficult to understand why grey area speech
matters so much to believers. Why, asks Frederick Gedicks, do so
many people care about prayer at graduation?a3 Students have the
opportunity to pray privately in schools and the Equal Access Act
provides students with the opportunity to meet with fellow believers
in after-school clubs.' With these other avenues available, Gedicks
cannot understand why proponents of graduation prayer believe that
so much is at stake, 5 and he suspects that what proponents really care
about is "signal[ling] who is in charge of American politics and
culture." 6 Likewise, Douglas Laycock has asked, "[w]hy must there
be prayer at graduation, with a captive audience of children, instead of
at a privately sponsored baccalaureate with an audience of
volunteers?" 7 Laycock also suspects that it is "precisely because
some people want a symbolic affirmation that government approves
and endorses their religion, and because many of the people who want
this affirmation place little or no value on the costs to religious
minorities." 8  Justice Souter echoed Laycock's view in his
concurrence in Lee v. Weisnan.5 9 According to Justice Souter,
students can engage in prayer before or after graduation.2  Prayer
during the official graduation ceremony is a "gratuitous largesse,"261
and Justice Souter agrees with Laycock that what proponents
probably really care about is having a "symbolic affirmation that
government approves and endorses their religion."2
In the remaining portion of this section, I will demonstrate why grey
area religious speech in the public schools really does matter, and why
there is actually a great deal at stake in preserving a place for grey
area speech in the schools. Far from being a source of divisiveness
and a threat to national unity, grey area religious speech in the public
schools is an important foundation for building lasting common bonds
that are forged, not in spite of our religious and nonreligious
253. See Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Ironic State of Religious Liberty in America,
46 Mercer L. Rev. 1157, 1159 (1995).
254. See id. at 1157, 1166.
255. See id. at 1157.
256. Id. at 1159.
257. Douglas Laycock, Summary and Synthesis: The Crisis in Religious Liberty, 60
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 841,844 (1992).
258. I&
259. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577,629-30 (1992) (Souter, I., concurring).
260. See id. at 629. Jessica Smith makes the same point in Smith, supra note 231, at
326.
261. Weisman, 505 U.S. at 629 (Souter, J., concurring).
262. Id. at 630 (quoting Laycock, supra note 257, at 844).
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differences, but, rather, in and through them. Grey area religious
speech can also serve an important role in mitigating the clash over
values in the public schools and can help to make public schools more
hospitable to minority religious groups.
There are, however, risks associated with grey area religious speech,
and any approach for addressing this speech must be consistent with
core Establishment Clause principles, such as neutrality,
nonendorsement, noncoercion and noninterference. The proposal
that I will develop in Part IV seeks to balance the value and risks
associated with grey area speech. A brief outline of this proposal will
be helpful at this point as a preview of the approach I will be
defending later. The first baseline rule of my proposal is that schools
may not discriminate against grey area religious speech where the
speech is entirely student-initiated and the school has not taken any
action to provide a specific opportunity for religious speech. The
second baseline rule is that schools can design and provide an
opportunity for student religious expression in classrooms or at
school-sponsored events as long as the policy provides for an equal
opportunity for nonreligious speech and the policy is scrupulously
neutral and fair between different religious perspectives. Such a
policy will not violate the Establishment Clause if all of the student
perspectives, religious and nonreligious alike, receive equal and
general endorsement by the school. If necessary, the school may use a
disclaimer to make clear to listeners that the school does not endorse
one religion over another or religion over nonreligion.
Whether students engage in religious expression entirely on their
own initiative or pursuant to a fair policy developed by the school, the
school can exercise a limited amount of control over the style and
content of the expression in keeping with its public character. The
school can review or otherwise exercise control over the speech to
ensure that it is appropriate for the occasion and the school's
pedagogical objectives. Such control may not exclude the speech on
the grounds of its religious content or restrict this content unless the
speech is primarily designed to proselytize a specific student audience
and is delivered from a school stage or other type of school platform
or pulpit. Such a platform does not include general class discussion or
a discussion or debate forum opened up by the school for the
interchange of student views. Speech that is primarily designed to
proselytize is speech that is primarily designed to convert a specific
audience to one's own religious beliefs or worship and involves an
insistent call to conversion directed at this audience. Aside from
restricting speech that is primarily proselytizing, school officials may
not review or interfere with the religious content of student religious
speech.
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A. Mitigating the Clash of Values in the Public Schools
One of the most challenging issues facing public education in recent
years has been the clash among parents, teachers, public school
administrators and politicians over what values will be taught in the
public schools.263  As the United States becomes increasingly
pluralistic, it becomes more and more difficult to identify a common
core of moral and civic values to teach in the schools,2 6' and a growing
number of scholars in the fields of law, education and political
philosophy have begun to doubt that consensus over fundamental
values is even possible.2' At the same time, it is widely recognized
that schools cannot help teaching values." Even if a school tries to
remove all values education from its curriculum, there remains a
"hidden curricul[um]" that can never be value neutral.267 By the
hidden curriculum, scholars refer to the subtle and indirect ways in
which schools inevitably transmit values to students. The hidden
curriculum includes the role models that teachers provide, the conduct
required of students in and outside of the classroom, the type of
achievement that grades and other awards are based on, the
governance structure of the school, and even the layout of the
classrooms.' One of the great advantages of robust grey area speech
in the public schools, including religious speech, is that it can help to
mitigate this clash over values by permitting students with minority
perspectives to voice and affirm alternative views in the classroom and
at other school-related functions.
For over a decade, scholars have been returning to the famous Sixth
Circuit decision in Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of Education2l
263. See Salomone, supra note 38, at 1-2, 37-38; see also Amy Gutmann,
Democratic Education xi (2d ed. 1999); George W. Dent, Jr., Of God and Caesar The
Free Exercise Rights of Public School Students, 43 Case W. Res. L Rev. 707, 733
(1993).
264. See Salomone, supra note 38, at 1-2, 241-42, 140.
265. See, e.g., Dent, supra note 263, at 733; Michael W. McConnell,
Multiculturalism, Majoritariansim, and Educational Choice: What Does Our
Constitutional Tradition Have to Say?, 1991 U. Chi. Legal F. 123, 133, 151; see also
William A. Galston, Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtues, and Diversity in the Liberal
State 241-42 (1991) ("Others doubt that any one specification of civic education can
be devised for a liberal polity in which individuals, families, and communities embrace
fundamentally differing conceptions of choice-worthy lives."); Salomone, supra note
38, at 238 (stating that in recent litigation between conservative parents and school
administrators in Bedford, New York, "worldviews are so far apart that there seems
to be no common ground for agreement or compromise"); id. at 188, 196.
266. See, eg., Salomone, supra note 38, at 38; Dent, supra note 263, at 710; Stanley
Ingber, Religious Children and the Inevitable Compulsion of Public Schools, 43 Case
W. Res. L. Rev. 773,778-79 (1993).
267. See Gutmann, supra note 263, at 53; Salomone, supra note 38, at 38; Mary
Hater Mitchell, Secularism in Public Education. The Constitutional Issues, 67 B.U. L.
Rev. 603, 684 (1987).
268. See Gutmann, supra note 263, at 53; Salomone, supra note 38, at 38.
269. 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987).
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to illustrate the problems associated with values education in the
public schools.270 The litigation in the Mozert case arose in Hawkins
County, Tennessee in the early 1980s when the local school board
adopted a new basic reading series for grades one to eight. 27' The
plaintiffs in that case included the Mozerts and six other families who
objected to the new series on the grounds that it exposed their
children to material which systematically inculcated values that
contradicted their conservative Christian religious beliefs. 272  The
plaintiffs sought an exemption under the Free Exercise Clause which
would permit their children to continue attending the public schools
without having to read material from the new readers.273 In 1987, a
panel of Sixth Circuit judges denied the exemption. According to two
of the panel members, the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a cognizable
burden under the Free Exercise Clause because the children were
merely being exposed to beliefs that contradicted their own. They
were not required to affirm any beliefs or engage in any practices
prohibited by their religion.274 While the panel's third member, Judge
Boggs, concurred in the court's result, he disagreed with the majority's
understanding of the burden the plaintiffs alleged. According to
Judge Boggs, the burden in this case was not mere exposure to
contradictory beliefs and values but, rather, the "overall effect" of the
new series.275 The burden that students were subjected to was "many
years of education, being required to study books that, in plaintiffs'
view, systematically undervalue, contradict and ignore their
religion. ' 276 According to Judge Boggs, the burden on the plaintiffs
and their children was a cognizable burden under the Free Exercise
Clause,277 but he concluded that granting the relief requested would
270. The Mozert decision has been the subject of scholarship in fields as diverse as
political philosophy and education policy as well as law. See, e.g., Walter Feinberg,
Common Schools/Uncommon Identities: National Unity and Cultural Difference 158-
61, 182 (1998); Amy Gutmann & Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement
63-69 (1996); Stephen Macedo, Diversity and Distrust: Civic Education in a
Multicultural Democracy 157-65, 201-06 (2000); Salomone, supra note 38, at 121-29;
Amy Gutmann, Civic Education and Social Diversity, 105 Ethics 557, 570-72 (1995);
Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, "He Drew a Circle That Shut Me Out": Assimilation,
Indoctrination, and the Paradox of a Liberal Education, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 581 (1993).
Recently several new books in these fields have reexamined the Mozert case. See
Feinberg, supra; Macedo, supra; Salomone, supra note 38. For further detail about the
background of the Mozert litigation, see Stephen Bates, Battleground: One Mother's
Crusade, the Religious Right, and the Struggle for Control of Our Classrooms (1993).
271. See Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1059-60.
272. See id. at 1074, 1079 (Boggs, J., concurring); see also id. at 1060-61 (Lively,
C.J., majority opinion).
273. See id. at 1060-61.
274. See id. at 1070.
275. Id. at 1074 (Boggs, J., concurring).
276. Id. at 1079.
277. See id. at 1075-76.
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place a substantial imposition on the schools without supporting
authority from Supreme Court precedent."
Judge Boggs's opinion, in particular, demonstrates an appreciation
of what was at stake in Mozert. The Mozerts and the other parents
involved in the litigation objected to a required curriculum which
inculcated values at odds with their own beliefs because they were
concerned that education in contrary values would undermine the
beliefs they were teaching their children at home and influence their
children to adopt contrary views.2 9 These families experienced the
school's efforts to inculcate community norms and values as forced
values imposition by the majority. The Mozert case is a concrete
example of one of the most difficult challenges for public education
today. How can schools teach character and values without imposing
hostile norms on the growing number of religious and nonreligious
minority groups?
Religious advocacy groups, scholars and public leaders have
articulated a number of different approaches for addressing this
challenge. One approach was illustrated in the Mozert case. The
Mozerts sought an accommodation from the public school in the form
of an exemption or "partial opt-out" from the offensive segment of
the curriculum. Since Mozert, parents have continued to take this
route.8 While the Mozerts framed their claim as a free exercise
claim, increasingly the organizations representing parents have been
asserting a general parental right to direct the education and religious
upbringing of their children. 2 ' Partial opt-outs have also been
defended by some scholars. For example, George Dent has argued
that children have a free exercise right to be excused from instruction
that offends their religious beliefs.' In a recent article, Philip Kissam
27& See id. at 1079-80.
279. For similar assessments of what was at stake in Mozert, see Salomone, supra
note 38, at 206; George W. Dent, Jr., Religious Children, Secular Schools, 61 S. Cal. L
Rev. 863, 886-92 (1988); cf. Mitchell, supra note 267, at 684-85 (noting that education
in values contrary to minority religious beliefs can "devastate the religious liberty of
parents and students"). Not all commentators agree with this assessment. Many
scholars follow the majority in Mozert in viewing the burden alleged by the Mozerts
as mere exposure to beliefs that differed from their own. See Gutmann & Thompson,
supra note 270, at 63; Macedo, supra note 270. at 158; Gutmann, supra note 270, at
566. As Judge Boggs observed, the Mozerts' claim was different. They did not object
to mere exposure to contrary beliefs. They objected to a reading series that
consistently "denigrate[d] and oppose[d] their religion." Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1074
(Boggs J., concurring). The cumulative effect of this series substantially impacted the
ability of the families to cultivate and preserve their own values and beliefs.
280. See Salomone, supra note 38, at 62.
281. See id. at 68-70. Litigants have based this right on the Supreme Court's
decision in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), and on two decisions from the
1920s, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925).
282- See Dent, supra note 279, at 891; see also Dent, supra note 263 (arguing that
the Supreme Court's decision in Lee v. Weisnaii bolsters the free exercise claim).
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has also defended exemptions from instruction which burdens
religious and other ethical beliefs.'
Other scholars have argued that publicly funded vouchers for
private schools are the best approach for resolving values conflicts in
education. According to these scholars, values conflicts in the public
schools are intractable. In our diverse nation, there is no way to
formulate a common set of moral and civic virtues that will be
acceptable to all families.' If public schools try to inculcate virtue,
they will end up either imposing majoritarian norms on dissenting
minorities or teaching an anemic, least-common-denominator version
of public virtue, which is too thin and watered-down to accomplish
any useful purpose. 5
Michael McConnell and Carl Esbeck are two prominent legal
scholars who have made this type of argument in defense of
educational choice. According to McConnell and Esbeck, the
pluralism of modern American society means that we really only have
two options. One option is public schools which teach majoritarian
values at the expense of minorities, who must either be indoctrinated
in these majority values or forgo their right to publicly-funded
education . 86 The other option is a publicly funded voucher system
which makes education a matter of family choice.2" The former
"creates a civic orthodoxy";' the latter allows families to support a
diversity of schools reflecting the full pluralism of modern American
society. 9  McConnell and Esbeck are not alone in defending the
virtues of educational choice. Educational choice is rapidly attracting
proponents from other disciplines and from minority groups, scholars
and political leaders on the right and left.2g  One of the great
Dent argues that "[e]xemption from religiously offensive instruction should be
granted unless government has a compelling reason for requiring all children to
receive the instruction. Such grounds exist only if the exemption would leave a child
without some basic knowledge or skill." Id. at 743. According to Dent, "[bly this
standard, most requests for exemption should be granted." Id.
283. See Philip C. Kissam, Let's Bring Religion into the Public Schools and Respect
the Religion Clauses, 49 U. Kan. L. Rev. 593, 600 (2001). Kissam proposes "liberality
both in the granting of exemptions and in reviewing school decisions about the nature
of alternative study." Id. at 620.
284. See McConnell, supra note 265, at 133, 151; Esbeck, The Establishment Clause
as a Structural Restraint, supra note 220, at 94; see also McConnell, The New
Establishmentarianism, supra note 44, at 458, 475.
285. See McConnell, The New Establishmentarianism, supra note 44, at 455,458.
286. See Michael W. McConnell, Governments, Families, and Power: A Defense of
Educational Choice, 31 Conn. L. Rev. 847, 850-51 (1999); Esbeck, The Establishment
Clause as Structural Restraint, supra note 220, at 94.
287. See McConnell, supra note 286, at 851; Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as
Structural Restraint, supra note 220, at 94-95.
288. McConnell, supra note 286, at 850.
289. See id. at 849; Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as Structural Restraint, supra
note 220, at 94-95.
290. See discussion supra note 53.
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advantages of educational choice, its proponents argue, is that it
avoids clashes over values in education.291 Families with minority
beliefs as well as majority beliefs can both choose an education for
their children which reflects and inculcates the particular values of
their own tradition.
Yet another approach to addressing values conflicts in the public
schools has been advocated by the participants in the "new
consensus" of religious, educational and civil liberties groups
discussed above.192 In addition to embracing the basic dichotomy
between protected private religious expression and prohibited school
speech, these groups have also embraced the recent "character
education" movement.293  "Character education" became an
increasingly popular approach to values education in the public
schools in the 1990s.219 The goal of character education programs is to
bring school officials together with parents and other community
members from a wide range of backgrounds in order to identify
personal and civic values that are broadly accepted in the
community.2 95 Examples of such values are honesty, caring, fairness,
responsibility and respect for others.296 While these norms may not be
taught as religious tenets, the mere fact that they coincide with
religious beliefs in the community does not make it impermissible to
teach them.297
The organizations forming the new consensus have also agreed
upon the importance of teaching about religion in the public
schools.2 98 While schools may not teach religion or act in any way
which inculcates or inhibits religion, they can, and should, include
291. See Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as Stiructural Restraint, supra note 220,
at 94-95; Macedo, supra note 270, at 229; McConnell, supra note 286, at 849; see also
Salomone, supra note 38, at 256.
292. For a discussion of the "new consensus," see supra text accompanying notes
31-37.
293. See Finding Common Ground, supra note 33, at 15-1 to 15-11; A Parent's
Guide to Religion in the Public Schools, supra note 35; A Teacher's Guide to
Religion in the Public Schools, supra note 35. at 6; see also Final Report of the Ninety-
Sixth American Assembly, supra note 46, at 166: Religion in the Public Schools: A
Joint Statement of the Current Law, supra note 29.
294. See Salomone, supra note 38, at 38.
295. See Finding Common Ground, supra note 33, at 15-2" A Parent's Guide to
Religion in the Public Schools, supra note 35; A Teacher's Guide to Religion in the
Public Schools, supra note 35, at 6; see also Final Report of the Ninety-Sixth
American Assembly, supra note 46, at 166.
296. See Finding Common Ground, supra note 33, at 15-9.
297. See Religion in the Public Schools: A Joint Statement of the Current Law,
supra note 29; Religious Expression in Public Schools, supra note 33, at 13-7; see also
Finding Common Ground, supra note 33, at 15-2.
29& See Religion in the Public School Curriculum: Questions and Answers (1988),
reprinted in Finding Common Ground, supra note 33, at 6-1; Religion in the Public
Schools: A Joint Statement of the Current Law, supra note 29; Religious Expression
in Public Schools, supra note 33, at 13-7; Religious Liberty, Public Education, and the
Future of American Democracy: A Statement of Principles, supra note 35, at 135.
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objective and balanced teaching about religion as a critical component
of history, literature, social science, and arts classes.299 Teaching about
religion is necessary if students are to learn about the important role
that religion has played in history and culture, 00 and it also helps
students develop a greater understanding of the religious views of
their classmates.301
These three basic components of the new consensus are designed to
work together to reduce conflicts and tensions over the place of
religion and values education in the schools. The vision of the new
consensus is a school which inculcates fundamental moral norms
agreed upon by the community, provides students with a basic
education about the role of religion in history and culture, avoids
school speech endorsing religion but protects private religious
expression and activities by students.
All of these approaches to dealing with values conflicts in the public
schools have drawbacks. Partial opt-outs have been criticized as
unworkable and an administrative nightmare. 3 2  According to
opponents, giving families a right to exempt their children from
offensive material will tear public education to shreds.303 All of the
judges in Mozert made this argument,304 as do numerous scholars.0
They worry that schools will be overwhelmed by numerous claims for
accommodation,3 6 which will "convert[] the schoolhouse door into a
revolving door as different sects participate in the public school
curriculum in differing degrees. ' a3 1 Schools will be required to
299. See Finding Common Ground, supra note 33, at 7-1; Religion in the Public
School Curriculum: Questions and Answers, supra note 298, at 6-3.
300. See Finding Common Ground, supra note 33, at 7-3; Religion in the Public
School Curriculum: Questions and Answers, supra note 298, at 6-2; Religion in the
Public Schools: A Joint Statement of the Current Law, supra note 29; The Bible and
Public Schools: A First Amendment Guide, supra note 29, at 5.
301. See Finding Common Ground, supra note 33, at 7-3; Religion in the Public
School Curriculum: Questions and Answers, supra note 298, at 6-3; A Teacher's
Guide to Religion in the Public Schools, supra note 35, at 2.
302. See, e.g., Salomone, supra note 38, at 240-41; Ingber, supra note 266, at 790-91;
Joanne C. Brant, Not a Prayer for Curricular Reform after Lee v. Weisman, 43 Case
W. Res. L. Rev. 753,759-60 (1993).
303. See, e.g., Salomone, supra note 38, at 240-41; Ingber, supra note 266, at 790-92;
Brant, supra note 302, at 759-60. This metaphor is taken from Justice Jackson's
concurring opinion in McCollum. Those who oppose partial opt-outs frequently
repeat his words: "If we are to eliminate everything that is objectionable to any of
these warring sects or inconsistent with any of their doctrines, we will leave public
education in shreds." Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 235(1948) (Jackson, J., concurring in the judgment), quoted in Mozert v. Hawkins County
Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1069 (6th Cir. 1987); Ingber, supra note 266, at 791-92.
304. See Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1069-70 (Lively, C.J., majority opinion); id. at 1072-73
(Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 1079-80 (Boggs, J., concurring).
305. See Salomone, supra note 38, at 240-41; Ingber, supra note 266, at 790-92;
Brant, supra note 302, at 759-60.
306. See Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1072-73 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Salomone, supra
note 38, at 240-41; Ingber, supra note 266, at 790-92; Brant, supra note 302, at 759-60.
307. Ingber, supra note 266, at 791.
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carefully segregate material from objectionable segments of the
curriculum from course work that objecting students are participating
in, and as the number of opt-out requests grows, this will become
increasingly burdensome and even impossible for schools to
achieve."" In Judge Boggs's words, allowing partial opt-outs would be
a "challenge" to the very "notion of a politically-controlled school
system."'
Proponents of exemptions argue that these critics overstate the
dangers associated with allowing exemptions from the curriculum. If
families and schools work together in good faith, they will often be
able to resolve problems with limited burdens on the schools,3 " and
the existence of an opt-out right is unlikely to spark an avalanche of
accommodation requests." While those who favor partial opt-outs
may well be correct that their opponents' fears are overstated, these
opponents do have valid concerns. As American society grows
increasingly pluralistic, the range of material that might offend
minority religious groups and other families with minority views grows
as well. Furthermore, given the primary importance of religion to the
lives of believers, it is not unreasonable to expect that families with
minority views will make use of the opt-out option. Additionally, as a
practical matter, most lower courts have followed the judges in Mozert
and have been reluctant to grant exemptions to the families who seek
them.312
The principal disadvantage of educational choice as a way of
resolving values conflicts in the schools is that it protects pluralism
and diversity at the expense of the unifying functions of the public
schools.313 Educational choice allows families with minority
viewpoints to obtain an education for their children which reflects
their own particular values and traditions, but children in private
schools do not have the same opportunity to learn about different
viewpoints that they have in the public schools. The pluralism
fostered by educational choice is essentially a separated pluralism.
Students from different religious and cultural backgrounds receive the
kind of deep moral education in their own traditions that is impossible
in the public schools, but they often have less contact with, and, thus,
learn less about traditions different from their own.
Much more will be said below about the benefits of a public school
education that would be lost in a system of educational choice. The
important point here is that educational choice only solves the
308. See id at 790-91.
309. Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1079 (Boggs, J., concurring).
310. See Dent, supra note 263, at 745.
311. See Kissam, supra note 283, at 621.
312. See Salomone, supra note 38, at 128-29, 133-34, 194.
313. McConnell recognizes that this is one of the greatest challenges to educational
choice. See McConnell, supra note 265, at 128.
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problem of values conflicts in the public schools by dismantling the
current system of public schooling. The purpose of educational choice
proposals is to give families an exit option from the public schools, not
to find a resolution to values conflicts within the schools.
There are also disadvantages associated with the proposals offered
by the new consensus. Character education programs are subject to
many of the same problems that are associated with other efforts to
inculcate values in the public schools. Even if school officials work
closely with parents and community members from a variety of
different perspectives to identify a common core of personal and civic
values to teach in the schools, there will be dissenters whose views are
not represented. While it may be possible for most members of the
community to agree on general principles like honesty, responsibility,
caring and respect, as soon as these values are applied to particular
situations or given precise content, divisions will inevitably arise.3 4 If,
on the other hand, schools try to teach these values at a sufficient level
of generality to obtain wide consensus, the principles that are taught
will be anemic and watered-down.315 In addition, teaching about
religion in an objective and balanced manner in the public school
system is more difficult than it may appear at first. There will not be
sufficient time within the curriculum for all views and traditions to be
addressed with the same level of attention and detail, and some
minority religious perspectives are bound to be excluded.2 6
Thus, by trying to teach about religion or inculcate values at all, the
public schools will inevitably end up imposing majoritarian
preferences upon minority groups. By protecting the rights of
dissenting students to engage in private religious expression and
314. See, e.g., Salomone, supra note 38, at 37; Dent, supra note 263, at 733.
315. See McConnell, The New Establishmentarianism, supra note 44, at 455, 458.
316. See McConnell, supra note 265, at 143. Proponents of the new consensus
recognize the challenge of achieving objectivity and balance when teaching about
religion. Because "the school day consists of limited hours, and texts have only so
many pages," Charles Haynes and Warren Nord advocate using the influence of a
religion as the primary criterion for determining whether to include the religion in the
discussion. Nord & Haynes, supra note 31, at 48; see also Warren A. Nord, Religion
and American Education: Rethinking a National Dilemma 254-55 (1995). Because
such a criteria will favor the world's major religions, Haynes and Nord also argue that
teachers should include some treatment of minority religions, and the overall
curriculum should be balanced and fair among religions. See Nord & Haynes, supra
note 31, at 48. While this approach is promising, it does not remove all of the
obstacles to achieving an objective and balanced treatment of religion in the
curriculum. Questions remain about how much time should be given to minority
religions, which minority religions should be included, and when an overall
curriculum qualifies as balanced and fair. Moreover, even in spite of the best efforts
to be fair, some minority religions will surely receive greater coverage than others,
and there will undoubtedly be minority religions that are excluded altogether. As
Nord writes, "[o]bviously there are practical limitations on neutrality .... But this
doesn't mean that we must give up on neutrality completely. We can (and should) be
more rather than less neutral." Nord, supra, at 254.
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activities, the new consensus provides these students with an
important vehicle for preserving and affirming their values and beliefs
among themselves. However, these activities and expressions remain
private and, thus, minority views still do not have a place within the
school's educational program.
Each of these approaches to resolving the conflicts over values in
the public school involves, at least at some level, a push to the private
for religion and religious speech. Partial opt-outs from the public
school curriculum enable religious minorities whose beliefs conflict
with those inculcated by the school to opt out of those portions of the
curriculum which they find offensive. If the right to accommodation is
based on a general parental right to direct the upbringing of one's
children rather than the Free Exercise Clause, parents who have
secular objections can also opt out of material that is inconsistent with
their values and beliefs. Educational choice is essentially the
opportunity for a total opt-out or exit from the public schools
altogether. Families who are unhappy with the values taught in the
public school can leave the public schools and establish their own
schools with public funding. In the approach favored by the new
consensus, values are taught in the public schools, but religious
dissenters are protected with an opportunity to engage in private
religious activity or expression affirming different views.
In contrast to all of these approaches, the most promising approach
to resolving conflicts over values in the public schools is not a push to
the private for religious expression or activity nor a partial or total
opt-out for minority views. Rather, the most promising approach is
for students of all perspectives to "opt in" to the educational process
by voicing and defending differing views in robust grey area speech. If
robust grey area speech in the classroom and other school-sponsored
settings is combined with the central features of the new consensus
proposal, public schools should be able to engage in values education
in a way that is acceptable to religious minorities and majorities alike.
One of the most important features of the new consensus proposal
is the involvement of parents and community members from a range
of different traditions and backgrounds in the process of identifying
the core values that will be taught in the public schools. If dissenting
parents like the Mozerts are invited to participate in identifying
community norms and they accept this invitation, the resulting values
will be more broadly acceptable to the community. This, of course,
requires all participants to recognize that none of them will be able to
have everything that they want. The school officials in Mozert should
have been willing to consider a reading series that was less offensive
to conservative Christian parents in the district, but families like the
Mozerts must also realize that they cannot expect schools to teach
values exactly how they would prefer. In Mozert, two of the plaintiffs
indicated that they would object to any reading materials that exposed
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their children to religious beliefs or values that contradicted their own
without a statement that the other views were incorrect.317 That is
obviously asking too much. However, the school officials in Mozert
also demanded too much when they insisted on a reading series that
was so objectionable to a significant segment of the school population
that dissenting families chose to send their children to private schools
rather than allow their children to read the books.318
The new consensus proposal to include teaching about religion in
the public schools will also help to relieve tensions in the public
schools. Religious believers will feel less excluded from the
educational process if the role of religion in history and culture is
recognized, and if schools take seriously their responsibility to present
the material in an objective and balanced way, families without
religious convictions will be less likely to object.
Of course, complete agreement over the values that will be taught
in the schools will not be possible, nor will it be possible to teach
about religion in a perfectly balanced way. For this reason, it is
critical to supplement the proposals of the new consensus with a
commitment to robust grey area speech which permits students with
differing perspectives to add their own views to the discussion about
religion and values. If, for instance, the children in Mozert were
permitted to bring their perspectives into classroom activities and
other instructional settings, they would be able to reaffirm and defend
their own values against the imposition of majoritarian norms by the
school. Furthermore, by sharing their views with others in school-
sponsored settings, minority students like the Mozerts can contribute
alternative perspectives to the larger school community. It is even
possible that some students with minority views will be prophetic
voices that not only deepen the values education process but, perhaps,
even change community standards.
The protections for private religious expression and activity
advocated by the new consensus allow students with minority views to
affirm their views to themselves and with others who are like-minded.
For example, students can engage in individual prayer throughout the
day when class is not in session, and they can meet with students who
share their faith after school in religious clubs under the Equal Access
Act. Private religious expression in settings like these can help
317. See Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1062 (6th Cir.
1987). According to Judge Boggs, extreme statements like this were elicited by the
defense through skillful cross-examination designed to portray the plaintiffs' claims in
the most unfavorable light. Id. at 1074-75 (Boggs, J., concurring). In fact, the
plaintiffs in the Mozert litigation did not object to any incident of exposure to
contrary values, and they did not demand that the school affirmatively teach the
correctness of their views over others. Id. They objected to the new reading series as
a whole, and their complaint requested an opt-out from the readers, not an education
tailored to their particular religious belief. Id.
318. See id. at 1059.
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minority students preserve their alternative values and lifestyles in the
face of majoritarian pressure.3 19 However, grey area religious speech
goes even further. It allows religious minorities and other students to
share their views with others so that the entire school community can
learn more about what these students believe. By voicing their
perspectives in class or other public settings, students bring their views
into the educational process rather than opt out, exit or privatize
differences. Similarly, when students with religious convictions share
their perspectives in curricular settings, they deepen the process of
learning about religion. Religious minorities who are left out of
textbooks can contribute their perspectives and experiences, and the
religious views that do appear in textbooks come alive when young
adherents speak directly about their beliefs.
According to this view, values education is best understood as a
dialectic. The process of identifying the core values that will be taught
in the public schools should be a widely democratic process involving
parents and community members of all perspectives. However,
because complete agreement will never be possible, there should be
many opportunities for students with minority perspectives to present
their views in class or other instructional settings. By sharing their
views with others, minority students can become a part of the larger
conversation about values, and they may well cause the majority to
revise or redefine their own views. Envisioning values education in
the public schools as a dialectic demonstrates that proponents of
publicly funded vouchers present us with a false choice. They argue
that we must choose between public school education, which imposes
majoritarian values on minority groups, and a publicly funded voucher
system, which leaves values inculcation up to family choice. There is,
however, a third option. That option is a public school system which
inculcates widely held majoritarian beliefs but simultaneously
provides students with opportunities to voice and defend alternative
views. To be sure, the values taught in public schools which seek wide
consensus over community norms will not be as deep and
comprehensive as values taught in private schools. However, this is
not a weakness. Inculcating values which are somewhat thin gives
public school students the opportunity to elaborate upon these values
from their varying perspectives and, thereby, deepen values education
in a way that respects the diversity in American society.
319. I made this argument when I defended protections for robust private religious
expression in the public sphere in Brady, supra note 10, at 557-58; see also Michael W.
McConnell, Neutrality Under the Religion Clauses, 81 Nw. U. L Rev. 146, 149-50
(1986) (The Equal Access Act "protects a liberty of incalculable value to the high
school students involved, who needed the rights of speech and association to maintain
their religious identity."). McConnell has supported released time programs and
moments of silence on similar grounds. See id. at 163-64.
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The dialectical vision for values education elaborated above falls
mid-way between two common models of public school education.
On the one hand, many scholars and courts have envisioned education
as primarily a process of inculcation.320 Schools have an important
responsibility to socialize students in community norms and values
and to teach students the virtues necessary for democratic
citizenship. 21 This was the view of education adopted by the majority
in Hazelwood,3 21 and it has reappeared in other Supreme Court cases
addressing the First Amendment rights of students.323 For example,
the justices have repeatedly affirmed that public schools play a vital
role in "prepar[ing] . . . individuals for participation as citizens, and
in the preservation of the values on which our society rests." '324
Schools "[inculcate] fundamental values necessary to the maintenance
of a democratic political system. ' 31
In contrast to the model of education as inculcation, another model
for education is the marketplace model.326 Scholars and courts
adopting this model emphasize the role of the public school as a
marketplace of ideas.327 Under this view, a robust exchange of ideas
among students and with teachers is the primary vehicle for education,
not indoctrination. z Indeed, under the marketplace model, the
320. See, e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681, 683 (1986)
(holding that one function of a public school system is to inculcate fundamental values
necessary for a democratic society); C.H. v. Oliva, 195 F.3d 167, 171 (3d Cir. 1999)
("[P]ublic schools perform a critical role in shaping the nation's youth, and [the]
federal courts should be wary of interfering in this process."), reh'd en banc, 226 F.3d
198 (3d Cir. 2000) (judgment of district court and of appellate panel affirmed in part
and case remanded with respect to remaining issues), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 2519
(2001); Settle v. Dickson County Sch. Bd., 53 F.3d 152, 156 (6th Cir. 1995) ("Learning
is more vital in the classroom than free speech."); Hafen & Hafen, supra note 220, at
390 (public schools have "broad authority" to teach "values and skills that enable true
autonomy").
321. See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681, 683; Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch.
Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 913-14 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Macedo,
supra note 270, at 7, 39.
322. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260,266-67 (1988).
323. See cases cited infra notes 324-25.
324. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76 (1979), quoted in Pico, 457 U.S. at 864
(Brennan, J., plurality); id. at 876 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment); id. at 896 (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 913 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
325. Ambach, 441 U.S. at 77, quoted in Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681, and in Pico, 457
U.S. at 864 (Brennan, J., plurality); id. at 876 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment); id. at 889 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 896 (Powell, J.,
dissenting); id. at 914 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
326. See Mitchell, supra note 267, at 699-706, for a discussion of the differences
between the inculcation and marketplace models.
327. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969);
Whitehead & Crow, supra note 42, at 205.
328. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512; Whitehead & Crow, supra note 42, at 205-06, 211:
see also Sekulow et al., supra note 29, at 1020 (stating that the purpose of education is
education, not indoctrination).
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danger is that schools will become "indoctrination centers"-- which
impose a state-prescribed orthodoxy on all students. " While most
Supreme Court decisions addressing student rights in the public
schools have embraced the inculcation model of education, in Tinker,
which was the Court's first major decision in this area, the Court
embraced the marketplace model. According to the Court in Tinker,
the classroom is "peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas,' ' '33' and strong
protection of student First Amendment rights is necessary to prevent
schools from becoming "enclaves of totalitarianism. ''3 2 Justice
Brennan's dissent in Hazelwood adopted a similar view. Justice
Brennan criticized the decision in Hazelwood for rolling back Tinker's
protections for student speech and giving schools wide supervisory
and editorial powers that can be used to "strangle the free mind at its
source."
333
When it comes to student expression in the public schools, it is not
surprising that the inculcation and marketplace models of education
entail very different standards of protection. Those embracing the
inculcation model of education tend to view student speech rights
quite narrowly. Thus, the Court in Hazelwood gave schools wide
latitude to control student expression in school-sponsored settings.
Only when student speech is personal speech that merely happens to
occur on the school premises do students receive the full protections
articulated by the Court in Tinker.-'
By contrast, those embracing a marketplace model of education
advocate strong protections for student expression. For example, in
his dissent in Hazelwood, Justice Brennan rejected the Court's
distinction between private student speech and school-sponsored
speech.335 According to Justice Brennan, student expression does not
lose its private character just because it is uttered in a school-
sponsored setting, and all student speech should be evaluated under
Tinker.336  Thus, only when speech materially or substantially
interferes with school functions or the rights of other students can it
be restricted.337  Scholars and commentators embracing the
329. Sekulow et al., supra note 29, at 1020.
330. See Pico, 457 U.S. at 876-77 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment).
331. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512 (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603
(1967)).
332. Id at 511.
333. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 280 (1988) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (quoting West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)).
334. See id. at 270-71 (majority); see also supra text accompanying notes 171-78.
Scholars adopting the inculcation model have also tended to embrace Hazelwood's
interpretation of student speech rights. See, e.g., Hafen & Hafen, supra note 220, at
390,393-96.
335. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 281-84 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
336. See id; see also supra notes 211-13 and accompanying text.
337. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513.
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marketplace model agree.338 Student speech in captive audience
situations or other school-sponsored settings remains private
expression just like personal expression outside instructional time, and
the same standard should apply in both cases. 33 9
The view of public education in this article is a hybrid model which
combines the inculcation model with the marketplace model. On the
one hand, schools do play an important role in transmitting
fundamental values to the nation's youth, and parents and community
members should actively participate in the process of defining these
fundamental values. The school is not just a platform for debate
among students and teachers. The school has an interest in seeing
that students learn community norms and traditions, as well as
standards of civility, effective communication skills and how to engage
one another respectfully. If schools were really only a marketplace of
ideas and there were no greater limits on grey area speech than truly
personal speech, the educational experience would be little more than
a loosely regulated debate in which students stand on soap boxes
delivering pronouncements like Niemeyer's sermon in Cole.
On the other hand, because complete agreement over fundamental
values will never be possible and community standards are always
capable of improvement, education should not be viewed solely as
inculcation. Students should have opportunities in classrooms and
school-sponsored settings to voice alternative perspectives and to
challenge and deepen the views presented by the school. The fact that
the speech is religious rather than secular should not alter the school's
treatment of the speech. Student religious speech can make important
contributions to discussions about values just as secular speech can.
Thus, it is a mistake to view education as either inculcation or a free
market for ideas. Education is ideally both, and viewing education as
both inculcation and a marketplace for ideas means that much student
expression in school-sponsored settings is unavoidably grey. It has
both public and private features, and both of these features must be
taken into account and balanced along with the inculcative and
marketplace goals of education itself.
Some readers will undoubtedly object to the dialectical vision for
values education described above. My discussion has been
sympathetic to religious minorities and other groups whose values
differ from the majoritarian norms taught in the public schools, and I
have sought to both protect dissenting views as well as make a place
for them in the values education process. Many scholars are much less
338. See, e.g., Sekulow et al., supra note 29, at 1073 (stating that Tinker should
apply to all classroom speech); Whitehead & Crow, supra note 42, at 199 (stating that
with, perhaps, an exception for lewd or indecent speech, Tinker should apply to all
student expression in public schools).
339. See Sekulow et al., supra note 29, at 1071-77, 1093-94, 1095; Whitehead &
Crow, supra note 42, at 175, 199.
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sympathetic to the claims of religious minorities. Indeed, those who
are familiar with the literature on the Mozert case will recall that
many scholars who have written on Mozert from within the liberal
tradition view the minority perspectives held by the Mozerts and
other religious fundamentalists as dangerous and destructive forces
which threaten to undermine the core values essential for democratic
society. 34 For these scholars, Mozert demonstrates the limits of the
state's responsibility to protect minority religious perspectives. When
parents like the Mozerts object to education in our nation's shared
civic values, schools need not and, indeed, should not accommodate
their objections"' unless doing so would serve democratic values by
keeping their children in the public schools.4 2 Thus, when it comes to
the core civic values embraced by these scholars, the proper response
to those who object to forced assimilation is nonaccommodationism.
When core democratic values are at stake, education is not a dialectic.
It is a one-way inculcation process in which minority groups are
obliged to submit. Even private schools have an obligation to teach
these core values.43
The problem with such a view is that it assumes that we have finally
identified the core moral and civic virtues that all children should
learn. Such a view denies that minority groups may have something to
teach us about how our fundamental values might be revised and
refined. While some minority perspectives may, in fact, be more
destructive than helpful, it is often impossible to identify which
minority voices are truly prophetic and which are not until the debate
and discussion are well under way. Thus, rather than a non-
accommodationist stance, the better path is to embrace a place for the
voices of dissenting students in the process of values education. In
Douglas Laycock's words, while "[s]ome will view it as a good thing to
drag these 'backward' [religious] institutions into the secular virtues of
the post-modern age,. . . [that] assumes a totalitarian confidence in
contemporary secular values."'
B. Promoting Unity in and through Diversity
In addition to mitigating values conflicts in the public schools, grey
area religious speech can also help to build a strong and lasting unity
among citizens of diverse backgrounds in an increasingly pluralistic
nation. The challenge of how to forge and sustain unity amid an
increasingly diverse population has been a critical issue in recent
340. See Gutmann & Thompson, supra note 270, at 65-68; Macedo, supra note 270,
at 201-03; Gutmann, supra note 270, at 571-72.
341. See Gutmann, supra note 263, at 122-23; Gutmann & Thompson. supra note
270, at 63-69; Macedo, supra note 270, at 201-09; Gutmann. supra note 270, at 571-72.
342. See Gutmann, supra note 263, at 122-23; Macedo, supra note 270, at 206.
343. See Gutmann, supra note 263, at 117.
344. Laycock, supra note 257, at 853.
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scholarship concerning education policy. Political philosophers,-45
education theorists346 and others347 have been concerned that the
growing diversity in American society may undermine the demands of
national unity if the needs for both unity and diversity are not
properly balanced.34 How, William Galston writes, can the
contemporary liberal state "forge[] and maintain[] needed unity in the
face of the centrifugal forces of diversity?" 9
One common response is to build unity upon common democratic
values that all citizens can share in spite of their differences. Because
these values are not natural or innate, civic education is essential, and
the project of civic education is a critical, if not the most critical, goal
of public school education. If the public schools inculcate common
democratic virtues and a shared civic character among students, the
increasing diversity and pluralism of American society will not
threaten national unity but can coincide with shared purposes and
sentiments.
This is the response that has been given by a number of prominent
scholars who have embraced what has been called "political
liberalism. ' 350 According to political liberals, the powers of the state
are limited to matters of civic concern rather than "comprehensive"
religious or philosophical ideas about the good life as a whole."'
Disagreement about comprehensive doctrines or ideas about human
life as a whole will always exist,352 but agreement can be reached on
the political essentials of a liberal democratic regime.353 One of the
most important responsibilities of the state is to promote and preserve
345. See, e.g., Galston, supra note 265; Gutmann, supra note 263; Macedo, supra
note 270; William A. Galston, Two Concepts of Liberalism, 105 Ethics 516 (1995);
Gutmann, supra note 270; Stephen Macedo, Constituting Civil Society: School
Vouchers, Religious Nonprofit Organizations, and Liberal Public Values, 75 Chi.-Kent
L. Rev. 417 (2000) [hereinafter Macedo, Constituting Civil Society]; Stephen Macedo,
The Constitution, Civic Virtue, and Civil Society: Social Capital as Substantive
Morality, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 1573 (2001) [hereinafter Macedo, The Constitution,
Civic Virtue, and Civil Society].
346. See e.g., Eamonn Callan, Creating Citizens: Political Education and Liberal
Democracy (1997); Eamonn Callan, Common Schools for Common Education, 20
Canadian J. Educ. 251 (1995); Terence H. McLaughlin, Liberalism, Education and the
Common School, 29 J. Phil. Educ. 239 (1995).
347. See, e.g., Salomone, supra note 38.
348. See, e.g., id. at 229; McLaughlin, supra note 346, at 239.
349. Galston, supra note 265, at 10.
350. The term "political liberalism" coincides with the title of John Rawls's
influential book Political Liberalism (1993). In addition to Rawls, other prominent
political philosophers who have adopted a similar understanding of liberalism are
William Galston, Stephen Macedo, Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thomson. Rosemary
Salomone's recent work in Visions of Schooling: Conscience, Community, and
Common Education, supra note 38, also fits within this tradition.
351. See Macedo, supra note 270, at 166-68; Rawls, supra note 350, at 38; Gutmann,
supra note 270, at 558.
352. See Macedo, supra note 270, at 166-67; Rawls, supra note 350, at 36.
353. See Galston, supra note 265, at 245, 255-56; Macedo, supra note 270, at 168.
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the foundations of liberal democracy by inculcating the political
principles and values which underlie democratic governance among
the nation's youth.3" It is by teaching shared democratic values and
virtues that the unity of American society is forged and sustained.
For some political liberals, the requirements for good citizenship
are viewed narrowly, and there is plenty of space for a diversity of
views and lifestyles concerning the good life as a whole. For example,
William Galston envisions the liberal state as a "Diversity State"
which affords maximum feasible space for difference."'5 The state
must provide a vigorous system of civic education that teaches core
political virtues such as tolerance, respect for the rights of others, law
abidingness, and the capacity to evaluate the performance of political
leaders,3 56 but these requirements for democratic citizenship are
viewed minimally.3 7  For others, the requirements of democratic
virtue are much broader. For example, for Amy Gutmann, Stephen
Macedo, John Rawls and Dennis Thompson, civic virtue also includes
the capacity and willingness to discuss matters of basic justice in terms
accessible to all citizens." 8 Macedo also includes openness to change,
openness to social diversity, and self-criticism, as well as many
additional values.3 9 For Gutmann, a capacity for critical thinking is
also necessary360 as well as the ability to evaluate and make choices
among alternative ways of personal and political life.- t According to
Gutmann, children must develop the intellectual skills necessary to
evaluate ways of life different from their parents.'
However, regardless of whether the requirements for democratic
citizenship are understood narrowly or broadly, all of these scholars
argue that the demands of civic education outweigh competing claims
by families whose beliefs or ways of life conflict with civic values.
354. See Galston, supra note 265, at 245,255-56; Gutmann, supra note 263, at 39-41,
51-52; Gutmann & Thompson, supra note 270, at 359; Macedo, supra note 270, at 10-
11, 13-14, 15-16, 42-43; Galston, supra note 345, at 528.
355. Galston, supra note 345, at 524.
356. See Galston, supra note 265, at 245-46; Galston, supra note 345, at 528.
357. See Galston, supra note 265, at 299.
358. Macedo calls this the virtue of "public reasonableness." Macedo, supra note
270, at 171-73. Rawls refers to it as the duty of "civility." Rawls, supra note 350, at
217, 224. Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson call it "reciprocity." Gutmann &
Thompson, supra note 270, at 14, 52-53, 55-56.
359. See Macedo, supra note 270, at 25, 125. Macedo's list of democratic virtues
includes mutual respect, mutual understanding, tolerance, openness to change, self-
criticism, openness to social diversity, public reasonableness, active cooperation with
other citizens, a willingness to think critically about public affairs and participate
actively in the political process, a sense of ownership of public places, and a
willingness to help the weak. See id. at 10-11, 25, 125.
360. See Gutmann, supra note 263, at 51.
361. See id at 40. In his later writings, Macedo agrees with Gutmann about these
virtues. See Macedo, supra note 270, at 238-40.
362. Gutmann, supra note 263, at 30. Gutmann's list of civic virtues also includes
toleration and mutual respect. Id. at 118.
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Parents have significant freedom to educate their children in their
own values and traditions, but where these values or beliefs collide
with the requirements of civic education in democratic values, the
parents' values must yield to the demands of the state.3 63  Thus,
Gutmann, Macedo and Thompson have defended the Sixth Circuit's
decision in Mozert on the grounds that the exposure of children to a
diversity of world views and values is essential to fostering the
democratic virtues of critical thinking, openness to diversity, mutual
respect and tolerance, and the willingness and capacity to make public
claims in terms that are accessible to other citizens.3 64  Galston
disagrees that so much was required for good citizenship,365 but where
his more "parsimonious ' '36 core of democratic virtues is at stake, he
would also agree that "this civic core takes priority over individual or
group commitments . "3. 7 John Rawls expresses some regret that
not all ways of life are compatible with the requirements of
democratic education,3" and he "lament[s] the limited space, as it
were, of social worlds . ... ,6 Macedo expresses no such regret:
"[s]o be it," he says, if "[1]iberal civic education. . . favor[s] some
ways of life or religious convictions over others. 370 We should not
"cry crocodile tears" over those who oppose education in shared
values essential for liberal society,371 and, indeed, the state has an
important responsibility to transform the diversity of private
associations and groups so that they are supportive of civic values.372
Regardless of whether they understand political liberalism
minimally like Galston or broadly like Macedo and Gutmann, the
unity that these scholars favor is a unity of sameness and assimilation.
What we need, writes Macedo, is "[p]rofound forms of sameness":"'
"[a] liberal democratic polity does not rest on diversity, but on shared
363. See Galston, supra note 265, at 251-52, 255-56; Gutmann, supra note 263, at
122; Macedo, supra note 270, at 201-02; Rawls, supra note 350, at 156-57, 199-200;
Gutmann, supra note 270, at 570-72.
364. See Gutmann & Thompson, supra note 270, at 65-68; Macedo, supra note 270,
at 201-03; Gutmann, supra note 270, at 570-72; Stephen Macedo, Liberal Civic
Education and Religious Fundamentalism: The Case of God v. John Rawls?, 105
Ethics 468, 471,477, 485-86 (1995).
365. See William A. Galston, Expressive Liberty, Moral Pluralism, Political
Pluralism: Three Sources of Liberal Theory, 40 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 869, 904-05
(1999); Gutmann, supra note 263, at 298. Galston discusses the Mozert case at length
in Galston, supra, at 896-905.
366. Galston, supra note 265, at 299.
367. Id. at 256. Parental authority is limited by the fact that a "child is at once a
future adult and a future citizen." Id. at 252.
368. See Rawls, supra note 350, at 200.
369. Id. at 197.
370. Macedo, supra note 270, at 202.
371. Id. at 197.
372. See id. at 13-14, 15-16, 134-35, 277; Macedo, The Constitution, Civic Virtue, and
Civil Society, supra note 345, at 1573-74; Macedo, Constituting Civil Society, supra
note 345, at 418, 427-28.
373. Macedo, supra note 270, at 2.
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political commitments weighty enough to override competing
values." '374 Thus, the bonds of unity are envisioned as common values
that stand in contrast to and in tension with the diversity of individuals
and associations in American society. Unity and diversity essentially
occupy separate spaces, and the bigger the requirements for unity, the
smaller the space for diversity.
Judges and legal scholars who worry that the presence of religion in
the public schools will cause religious conflict and divisiveness share a
similar understanding of the requirements for national unity and the
relationship between unity and diversity in American society. When
Justice Frankfurter argued that religion should be kept out of the
public schools because religious conflicts threaten the role of the
schools in promoting a "common destiny"'375 and "cohesion among a
heterogeneous democratic people,' 3 6 he viewed unity as a matter of
sameness and assimilation just as political liberals do today. For
Justice Frankfurter, the purpose of the separation of church and state
is to ensure that the "unities among our people" will remain "stronger
than our diversities."" In Santa Fe, Justice Stevens expressed a
similar understanding of unity as a matter of commonality. For
Justice Stevens, the election mechanism in Santa Fe's prayer policy
violated the Constitution when it "turn[ed] the school into a forum for
religious debate" and, thereby sparked divisions along religious
lines. 8 Schools are not a place for religious debate or divisions over
matters of such deep difference. Religious beliefs belong in a "private
sphere" '379 where they will not divide citizens against each other.
This article proposes a very different understanding of the
foundation and requirements for national unity. Seeking to build
national unity on sameness and assimilation is fundamentally unsound
and misguided. Pushing religion out of the public schools into a
private realm in order to avoid divisiveness will neither build unity nor
reduce conflict. On the contrary, it will only serve to temporarily
suppress differences which ultimately cannot be repressed. Religious
convictions are too important a part of the lives of religious believers
as well as the nation's moral traditions for religion to remain
separated from public life in a private sphere. Interchanges between
believers and nonbelievers and among believers from different
traditions will inevitably occur, and the true test of national unity will
be whether citizens can listen to one another and converse about their
374. Id. at 134. Similarly, according to Galston. "'[11iberal purposes ... define what
the members of a liberal community must have in common. These purposes are the
unity that undergirds liberal diversity." Galston, supra note 265, at 3.
375. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 231 (1948)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring in the judgment).
376. Id. at 216.
377. Id at 231.
378. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290,316-17 (2000).
379. Id. at 311.
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differences peacefully and respectfully. Pushing religious matters out
of the public schools does not serve to foster such understanding or
engagement. It leaves in place the misunderstandings and
resentments that are the real source of destructive conflict. Isolating
religious differences in a private sphere will only cause them to fester;
it will do nothing to reduce conflict.
Nor is inculcating a common set of civic values the most promising
avenue to lasting unity. There will always be dissenting views, and if
the goal is sameness, then unity will come at the expense of diversity.
For families like the Mozerts, the inculcation of shared democratic
values meant the destruction of their way of life. Furthermore,
inculcation in common values in the face of dissent will also likely lead
to deeper divisions rather than greater commonality. The Supreme
Court made this observation fifty-eight years ago in its famous
decision in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette.8 The
Barnette decision addressed the constitutionality of a Board of
Education policy requiring a compulsory flag salute to become a
regular part of the educational program in the state's public schools.",
Families adhering to the Jehovah's Witnesses faith objected to the
application of the statute to their children on the grounds that the flag
salute was prohibited by their religion.3 2 Three years earlier, the
Court had denied a similar request for relief in Minersville School
District v. Gobitis.38  Writing for the majority in Gobitis, Justice
Frankfurter stated that the flag is "the symbol of our national
unity.' '3 4 By seeking to promote that unity through the flag salute
policy, West Virginia was pursuing "an interest inferior to none in the
hierarchy of legal values. '' 315 Justice Frankfurter's words are echoed
by political liberals today, but the Court in Barnette pointed out the
flaw in these arguments. According to the Court, "[a]s governmental
pressure toward unity becomes greater, so strife becomes more bitter
as to whose unity it shall be, '386 and ultimately "[c]ompulsory
unification of opinion achieves only the unanimity of the
graveyard. '38
A better path to unity is not to seek a unity of sameness but,
instead, a unity that is forged in and through diversity rather than at
its expense. The goal should not be a common identity, but a common
bond based upon a mutual knowledge of our differences and a mutual
ability to engage one another in a respectful dialogue about these
380. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
381. See id. at 625-26.
382. See id. at 629.
383. 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
384. Id. at 596.
385. Id. at 595.
386. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 641.
387. Id. "Those who begin coercive elimination of dissent soon find themselves
exterminating dissenters." Id.
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differences. If people from diverse backgrounds can learn to
understand, listen and talk to one another about their differences as
well as their commonalities, those abilities will be the strongest
foundation for national peace. Religious differences do not need to
be relegated to "the individual's church and home" to avoid
religious strife, nor do we need to neutralize or remove these
differences. Quite the opposite. It is a mutual understanding and the
ability to discuss differences that promotes lasting harmony, not
forced assimilation.
Grey area religious speech in the public schools can play a vital role
in building this kind of unity. Public schools are one of the few places
where citizens from different backgrounds come together and interact
for sustained periods of time in their formative years. Far from being
a place where religion should be excluded, the public schools are an
ideal place for young people to learn about the religious and
nonreligious beliefs of their peers and to develop the ability to
understand and engage one another. Grey area speech is critically
important for this process. When students express religious and
nonreligious beliefs in the classroom or in other captive audience
situations, their peers learn about these beliefs. The students who are
speaking also learn how to communicate effectively with those who
are different. There are risks, to be sure, associated with grey area
speech. The public characteristics of this speech mean that schools
should have some authority to ensure that the speech is appropriate to
the occasion, civil and respectful of the speaker's audience, and
consistent with the school's pedagogical objectives. The school also
has an interest in protecting Establishment Clause values such as
neutrality, nonendorsement and noncoercion. However, within these
limits, robust grey area speech, including religious expression, should
be encouraged and protected.
Those scholars who object to grey area religious speech on the
grounds that it may offend nonbelievers and those with different
religious convictions take a very short-sighted position. Democratic
governance in a diverse nation will collapse if people with different
views are not willing to listen to those who disagree with their
position. Student expression in captive audience situations is
important primarily because students will be exposed to differing
views and, thus, will learn about perspectives different from their own.
Religion may be an especially sensitive topic, but students will
encounter religious differences eventually, and it is better for students
to encounter these differences with some understanding and
knowledge rather than repressed mistrust or misunderstanding
fostered through lack of communication. Teaching children that they
388. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 217 (1948)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring in the judgment).
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do not need to listen to those whose ideas offend them is surely a most
unpromising preparation for citizenship in a pluralistic democratic
regime.
Scholars who embrace political liberalism would agree that schools
play an important role in teaching students how to converse with
those who are different and reach mutually satisfactory positions.
However, the vision of dialogue that political liberals have in mind is
very different from the one I describe. For political liberals, the basic
political principles governing the use of state power are only
legitimate if these principles are based on reasons that all citizens can,
in theory, accept.389 This is the ideal of "public reason," and one of
the virtues that civic education must foster is the willingness to engage
in public reason when fundamental political principles are at stake.90
Citizens engage in public reason when they offer each other reasons
that other citizens can not only understand but can also be reasonably
expected to endorse.391 Citizens must offer reasons that are "publicly"
or "mutually" accessible or, in other words, reasons that are shared or
could become shared by other citizens. 312 Reasons that are based on
faith or otherwise require citizens to adopt the speaker's sectarian way
of life to be understood do not qualify as public reasons.?3 Rawls
refers to the willingness to engage in public reason as the "duty of
389. See Gutmann & Thompson, supra note 270, at 25, 52-53; Macedo, supra note
270, at 174; Rawls, supra note 350, at 217.
390. According to Rawls, citizens need only engage in public reason when
discussing "'constitutional essentials' and questions of basic justice." Rawls, supra
note 350, at 214. For other political liberals, public reason should govern all political
discussion. See, e.g., Gutmann & Thompson, supra note 270, at 52 ("Deliberative
democracy asks citizens and officials to justify public policy by giving reasons that can
be accepted by those who are bound by it."); Amy Gutmann, Religious Freedom and
Civic Responsibility, 56 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 907, 908 (1999) ("When religious or
secular citizens argue in public for a mutually binding law or policy... [they] are
morally responsible for making arguments that strive for reciprocity.").
391. See Rawls, supra note 350, at 243; John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason
Revisited, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 765, 771 (1997); see also Gutmann & Thompson, supra
note 270, at 52-53, 55-56; Macedo, supra note 270, at 172-73.
392- See Gutmann & Thompson, supra note 270, at 14, 55; Macedo, supra note 270,
at 172; John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement 90-91 (2001).
393. According to Gutmann and Thompson, not all religious arguments are
nonpublic. Religious arguments that appeal to principles that can be shared with
nonbelievers are consistent with public reason. See Gutmann & Thompson, supra
note 270, at 56-57; see also Gutmann, supra note 390, at 909 (stating that citizens can
offer religious arguments as long as these arguments "at least can be translated into
mutually justifiable reasons for mutually binding policies"). However, for Gutmann
and Thompson, it is always illegitimate to appeal to any authority, religious or
otherwise, whose conclusions are "impervious" to critical assessment and evaluation
based on public reason. See Gutmann & Thompson, supra note 270, at 56. Macedo
agrees. See Macedo, supra note 270, at 172. Rawls's most recent position is slightly
different. According to Rawls, citizens may offer religious arguments, whether they
are publicly accessible or not, as long as they also offer reasons that are publicly
justifiable. See Rawls, supra note 391, at 776, 783-84.
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civility. ' '3 4 For Gutmann and Thompson, it is the virtue of
"reciprocity."395  For Macedo, the virtue is called "public
reasonableness. 396
Being able to engage in public reason is certainly an important skill,
but it should not replace the capacity to understand and engage in
dialogue about reasons and premises that are not shared. Political
liberals imagine a political world in which citizens speak a kind of
"Esperanto" which uses only shared premises and standards of
reasoning. In the real world, citizens use all sorts of reasons in public
debate, some of which meet the criteria of "publicness" and some of
which do not. Dialogue based on "first order" moral languages is not
only natural and inevitable, but it is a good thing. When participants
use first order moral languages, they can bring new and unfamiliar
premises and standards of reasoning to the conversation, and these
new perspectives can, in turn, add a prophetic dimension to the
dialogue which transforms generally accepted ways of thinking.
However, even if the use of first order moral languages in public
debate is not desirable, it is certainly unavoidable in any democratic
regime that respects basic guarantees of freedom of speech. Building
national unity on the widespread use of moral Esperanto is unrealistic.
Students need to learn how to engage in discussions that include
differences as well as commonalities, and for this type of dialogue,
experience in listening to and communicating with those of deeply
diverse beliefs is as essential as training in Esperanto.
For some legal scholars, my understanding of unity as something
which is achieved in and through diversity rather than through
sameness or assimilation is an impossible ideal. These scholars
envision religion as inherently exclusionary, dogmatic and
nonrational. Religion, they argue, rests upon unquestioning faith in
"absolute" standards that resist critique and rational analysis.3w
Whereas secular beliefs depend on matters of human experience and
reason that all can understand, religious conviction involves a leap of
faith that submits to an "extrahuman" source of authority
unaccessible to nonbelievers.398 Once that leap is taken, faith rejects
394. Rawls, supra note 350, at 217.
395. Gutmann & Thompson, supra note 270, at 14,52-53,55-56.
396. Macedo, supra note 270, at 169.
397. See Gey, supra note 30, at 382,451-53.
398. See Suzanna Sherry, Enlightening the Religion Clauses, 7 J. Contemp. Legal
Issues 473, 478, 480 (1996). Abner Greene has also described religious conviction as
involving a leap of faith in an extrahuman source of authority that is not accessible to
nonbelievers, but he does not go so far as to suggest that religious conviction is
inherently dogmatic or necessarily resists rational critique or analysis. See Abner S.
Greene, The Political Balance of the Religion Clauses, 102 Yale LJ. 1611, 1614, 1617,
1619-20 (1993) [hereinafter, Greene, The Political Balance of the Religion Clause];
Abner S. Greene, Is Religion Special? A Rejoinder to Scott Idleman, 1994 U. I11. L
Rev. 535, 540.
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disproof and ignores contrary evidence.399 The result is that religious
convictions are inherently "insular[] and exclusi[onary]. '40  These
convictions make sense to those who share the faith, but those without
faith cannot understand or discuss them.40 Those who understand
religion this way argue that the inaccessibility of religious belief means
that there must be limits on the role that religion can play in political
discourse and policy-making. 2  The introduction of religious
convictions into public discourse effectively excludes nonbelievers
from meaningfully participating in that discourse. 03 When religious
convictions are at stake, it "is [not] possible for those without faith to
enter the discussion. '4" 4 For these scholars, it seems that there can be
no meaningful understanding and engagement among believers and
nonbelievers about religious convictions that rest on faith.
Conversation and dialogue is only possible if it is based on publicly
accessible reasons that all can share.
The problem with this view is that it is based on an overly simplistic
understanding of religious faith. Most religious believers do have
faith in a deity whose nature and will exceed the capacity of humans
to fully understand through unaided reason (and even with the
assistance of grace). Believers also generally embrace at least the
fundamentals of faith as matters that are "absolute" and unchanging.
However, religious faith is not disconnected from human experience
or reason and most of the world's religions do not give a detailed
blueprint for all aspects of human life. For most believers, faith is a
matter of assent that involves reason and experience as well as the
characteristic leap. 5  Believers have faith because their religious
convictions make sense of their world and experiences, and these are
matters that all humans share. Saint Augustine expressed the nature
of faith well when he gave his own reasons for belief: "you have made
us for yourself and our heart is restless until it rests in you. '"406 Thus,
399. See Suzanna Sherry, Religion and the Public Square: Making Democracy Safe
for Religious Minorities, 47 DePaul L. Rev. 499, 510 (1998); Sherry, supra note 398, at
482.
400. Gey, supra note 30, at 453.
401. See id.; Sherry, supra note 398, at 482.
402. See Gey, supra note 30, at 454-55; Sherry, supra note 399, at 501.
403. See Sherry, supra note 399, at 509 ("Those who do not share a belief in the
same God or the same sacred texts have little or nothing to contribute to the
discussion."); cf. Gey, supra note 30, at 417 ("Political disputes over religious
absolutes are by nature dangerously exclusionary and divisive."). Abner Greene has
made a similar argument: "[b]asing law expressly on values whose authority cannot be
shared by citizens as citizens, but only by those who take a leap of faith, excludes
those who do not share the faith from meaningful participation in political
discourse .... " Greene, The Political Balance of the Religion Clauses, supra note 398,
at 1614.
404. Sherry, supra note 398, at 482.
405. For further discussion, see Brady, supra note 10, at 575.
406. Saint Augustine, Confessions 3 (Henry Chadwick ed., Oxford Univ. Press
1991) (397-400).
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faith is not completely impervious to outside understanding. Nor is
the extrahuman source of authority upon which faith rests an entirely
supernatural force unrelated to the world of common human
experience that believers and nonbelievers alike inhabit. To the
contrary, for believers, the universe itself bears the imprint of the
creator and faith helps to order and to make sense of experiences that
we all share.' The statement that faith is so resistant to change that it
"ignore[s] contradictions, contrary evidence, and logical
implications"' and "remain[s] steadfast even in the face of empirical
disproof' is also incorrect. Such statements manifest an ignorance
about the close relationship between intellect, experience and faith in
the lives of believers, and they make a mockery of those who affirm
religious convictions.
If religion is a matter of intellect and experience as well as of faith,
then fruitful dialogue between believers and nonbelievers and among
those of different religious traditions is possible at a number of
different levels. In the first place, conversation and dialogue lead to a
better understanding of those who are different. Even if none of the
participants change their convictions, they can all benefit by knowing
more about what others think and believe, and in many cases this will
lead to greater mutual respect. Perhaps, for instance, if scholars had
closer contact with religious believers, particularly those with
conservative beliefs, they would not make statements like "trust in
God" is "faith in the face of evidence to the contrary."' '  That
statement and others like it are both demeaning and inaccurate.
Douglas Laycock has noted that his respect for religion was the result
of "frequent contact with sophisticated believers," including through
his work on behalf of religious liberty.4 ' In my own case, respect for
secular perspectives began wvith frequent contact with nonbelievers in
the public schools. In either case, it is clear that one of the best
foundations for mutual respect is mutual understanding.
In addition to better understanding of each other, dialogue among
believers and nonbelievers can also identify areas of mutual
agreement. If religion is not disconnected from human experience
but, rather, seeks to explain experience just as secular perspectives do,
then those with religious and nonreligious understandings of the world
407. According to traditional Christian theology, God is the formal as well as the
efficient cause of the world, and this means that the universe reflects and shares in His
nature and goodness. In Biblical terms, humans are made in the -image of God,"
and, thus, all human beings participate to some degree in His Being. There is,
therefore, a natural correspondence between God's will and commands and the
yearnings of the human heart.
408. Sherry, supra note 398, at 482.
409. Gey, supra note 30, at 454.
410. Macedo, supra note 270, at 248.
411. Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 313,
355 (1996).
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have much to talk about. Furthermore, dialogue can also lead to
mutual growth and development. When believers listen to those from
other religious and nonreligious traditions, they can learn information
that will help them to understand their own beliefs better, and the
same is true of nonbelievers. As noted above, most religious belief
systems do not give believers a definitive blueprint for all aspects of
life, and listening to others can help believers grow in the
understanding of their faith and what this faith requires in particular
circumstances. The same will be true for nonbelievers whose own
secular perspectives can be deepened through conversations with
believers. Dialogue with others may also lead believers to refine,
revise or change non-core aspects of their faith, which usually do not
have the same absolute and immutable quality as central religious
tenants. In some cases, dialogue will lead participants to change their
positions in more far-reaching ways. Believers might change their
faith or lose faith, and secular participants might convert to religious
belief. Whether such changes are good or bad depends upon one's
viewpoint, but the possibility of change means that it is critical for
believers and nonbelievers alike to understand one another if they
want to be able to influence each other.
There is, in addition, the possibility that the change and
development which result from mutual understanding and
conversation will lead individuals and even the larger community to a
greater understanding of the truth. The idea that there is a truth
which underlies the world of human discourse, or that we can know
anything about truth even if it exists, has been hotly debated in recent
decades.412 However, most people would agree that some beliefs are
better than others. Indeed, the conviction that some beliefs are better
than others is so strong among the political liberals that they would be
willing to suppress alternative beliefs and lifestyles that collide with
democratic values and norms as they understand them. The mistake
that the political liberals make is not their belief that some views are
better than others or that American political traditions have great
value and should be taught in the schools. Education should be, in
part, inculcation in community wisdom and traditions. Their mistake,
as Laycock states, is to have a "totalitarian confidence 41 3 in their
understanding of these traditions.4"4 If there is truth, which I believe,
412 See Kathleen A. Brady, Putting Faith Back into Constitutional Scholarship: A
Defense of Originalism, 36 Cath. Law. 137, 161-62, 176 & n.160 (1995).
413. Laycock, supra note 257, at 853.
414. Most political liberals do not insist that there is a single correct interpretation
of America's democratic traditions, see Rawls, supra note 391, at 773-75, and they also
allow for some revisions to their own understanding of democratic values and norms,
see Gutmann & Thompson, supra note 270, at 351-52, 356. However, the range of
different views that they are willing to accommodate is limited. For example, Rawls
argues that political liberalism is consistent with a family of conceptions of justice, but
this family only includes "reasonable" conceptions that satisfy the criteria of
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then the most plausible conclusion to draw from continuing
disagreement is that we do not yet fully understand it and that
interchange among differing perspectives will help us get closer to it.
Thus, education should be, in part, also a marketplace of ideas which
allows students to deepen and challenge and, perhaps, even to change
prevailing norms. It is in this process of learning to engage in
conversation and discussion with others over matters where there is
deep disagreement that true and lasting unity is forged. A unity of
sameness which tries to achieve commonality by forcing all people to
accept one set of fundamental principles and norms in politics or any
other field is an unstable unity. Such an effort will not only provoke
contest and strife; it will also stifle the processes by which these norms
can be refined and revised so that they come closer to the truth that
all parties seek.
The defense of grey area religious speech in this section is based on
the value that this speech has for forging national unity through
mutual understanding, dialogue and, ultimately, growth and
development. Some legal scholars argue that the purpose of the
religion clauses is to ensure as far as practically possible that
government has no effect on the religious beliefs and choices of the
populace. In Douglas Laycock's words, the goal is a "substantive
neutrality" that "insulates" religious beliefs and practice from
government influence or control.4!1 5 According to Michael McConnell,
the central value of the religion clauses is "religious liberty, and
religious liberty requires that, whenever possible, government action
leave untouched the preexisting religious mix in the community."1 6
Carl Esbeck states that the "aim. . . is to minimize the effects of
governmental action on individual or group choices concerning
religious belief and practice." '417 The assumption behind all of these
reciprocity. See Rawls, supra note 391, at 773-74. 803. Likewise, Gutmann and
Thompson envision change and revision to their understanding of reciprocity, but any
revisions cannot challenge the foundational principles that they outline for
deliberative democracy. See Gutmann & Thompson, supra note 270. at 352. The
views of fundamentalist Christians like the Mozerts are inconsistent with these
foundational principles. See id. at 65-66, 350.
415. See Douglas Laycock, The Underlying Unity of Separation and Neutrality, 46
Emory L.J. 43, 45 (1997) (stating that the underlying purpose of the religion clauses is
"substantive neutrality" which seeks to minimize government influence on religious
choice); Douglas Laycock, The Benefits of the Establishment Clause, 42 DePaul L
Rev. 373, 373 (1992) (stating that the "religion clauses are designed to make religious
practice and nonpractice, belief and nonbelief, wholly matters of private choice
insulated from government influence or control").
416. McConnell, supra note 319, at 148-49; see also McConnell. Religious Freedom
at a Crossroads, supra note 220, at 169; Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of
Religion, 1985 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 1, 39.
417. Carl H. Esbeck, A Constitutional Case for Governmental Cooperation with
Faith-based Social Service Providers, 46 Emory L. 1.4 (1997).
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views is that religion should be "let. . . alone" by government.4",
Government's effect on religious choices should be "nil." '4t9
The relationship between religion and government advocated in
this article is different. Government should not seek to affect the
religious choices of citizens by interfering with religious expression or
other religious activities, or engaging in its own religious speech.
Neither should government seek to tame the beliefs of religious
minorities so that these beliefs fit better with mainstream political
values. However, the government may provide a vehicle for the
exchange of religious and nonreligious views, and that vehicle can be a
platform for speech that has public as well as private features, such as
grey area student speech in the public schools. If such a vehicle does
lead to communication and exchange, the result will almost certainly
be to change the preexisting mix of religious views in the community.
Hopefully this change will be mutually beneficial and will promote
greater understanding and truth. Certainly it will not leave student
beliefs exactly the same. However, as long as all students have an
equal opportunity to express their views and the school does not
indicate a preference for some beliefs over others, students and their
families should have nothing to fear. If one's views are true, they can
withstand some scrutiny, and by opting into the conversation, students
can learn to explain and share their opinions with others, as well as to
voice any disagreement with the values taught by the school. In so
doing, they may even change the views of their listeners.
C. Strengthening the Public Schools
The current system of public education in America is under
increasing attack.411 Scholars who believe that values conflicts in the
public schools are intractable are increasingly looking to publicly
funded voucher systems as a way to avoid battles over what values are
to be taught in the schools. 4 ' Scholars are also promoting educational
choice as essential for protecting and respecting diversity.4 2 Whereas
political liberals such as Gutmann and Macedo have defended public
schools as the most promising way to inculcate shared democratic
norms among the nation's youth,423 opponents of the current system
object to the public schools because they do not sufficiently protect
diversity.42 4 The project of the public schools is, indeed, to inculcate a
418. Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50 DePaul L.
Rev. 1, 11 (2000).
419. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, supra note 220, at 193.
420. See Macedo, supra note 270, at 16; Salomone, supra note 38, at 8,243.
421. See supra notes 284-91 and accompanying text.
422. See supra notes 284-91 and accompanying text; see also Macedo, supra note
270, at 16, 231.
423. See Gutman, supra note 263, at 70; Macedo, supra note 270, at 232.
424. See McConnell, supra note 286, at 849-51.
1218 [Vol. 70
PRIVATE RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION
shared understanding of democratic citizenship, they argue, but the
problem with this project is that we no longer have a single
understanding of citizenship or shared fundamental values. The
traditional public school system, writes Michael McConnell, "has run
its course."4" It can no longer "establish a coherent position in the
face of the conflicting demands of a diverse nation."'4 2 Its "purpose of
providing a unifying moral culture in the face of our many
differences" is impossible.427 The model for the future is a pluralistic
system of schools which reflect and inculcate the particular norms and
traditions of America's diverse groups and subcultures."
In this article, I have tried to chart a middle course between those
who favor public schools as a way to promote sameness and
assimilation and those who believe that respecting the diversity and
pluralism of American society requires abandoning the public school
model. The model of public education that I have offered is a hybrid
or dialectical model which affirms the authority of schools to teach
broadly inclusive community norms while also providing opportunities
for student speech challenging these norms in grey area settings as
well as private settings. This dialectical model should make public
school education more acceptable to minorities and majorities alike
while at the same time fostering a national unity forged in and
through diversity rather than at its expense.
It is not the purpose of this article to take a definitive position on
the issue of educational choice. Whether a publicly funded voucher
system should be adopted by legislatures, and whether such a system,
if adopted, would be constitutional, are questions beyond the scope of
this discussion. The wisdom of a voucher system, in particular,
depends on numerous factors, some of which are not even touched on
in this article. For example, educational choice has been defended as
a mechanism for addressing the problem of failing public schools in
the inner cities,4 29 and proponents have also argued that increasing
competition among schools will improve educational outcomes."'
Thus, the merits of educational choice involve issues relating to
economic equality and educational outcomes as well as diversity and
parental rights. This article does, however, suggest that policy makers
and families should be very cautious before abandoning the benefits
that public schools can have over a publicly funded system of
pluralistic schools.
425. McConnell, supra note 265, at 149.
426. Id.
427. Id. at 150.
428. See id at 125; Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint,
supra note 220, at 95.
429. See Salomone, supra note 38, at 243.
430. See Macedo, supra note 270, at 16,22.
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In the first place, public school education benefits the larger society
in a number of ways. By bringing students from various backgrounds
together for educational purposes, the public schools can help build
national unity by fostering mutual understanding and engagement
with difference. A system of private schools that cater to different
religious and cultural subgroups in American society provides strong
protection for diversity, but it is much less effective in fostering unity.
While some private schools may have students from a wide variety of
backgrounds, many will not, especially those that are established by
religious and other cultural minorities. In these schools, students may
have very little first-hand experience with students who hold world
views very different from their own.
Furthermore, if part of the reason that some parents favor school
choice is because their local public schools are not doing enough to
teach children values, or are teaching the wrong values, abandoning
the public schools will do little to help other children in the
community. These concerns have been one of the motivating factors
behind the support for educational choice among conservative
Christian families in recent years. As the triumphalist efforts of the
religious right to convert and reclaim American culture have faded
over the last decade and given way to increasing withdrawal from
mainstream society, Christians have been abandoning public
education in favor of private education or home schooling for their
children. Both extremes are unfortunate. Public schools belong to all
families, conservative and nonconservative alike, and all have the
right and responsibility to help shape the values that are taught there.
Conservatives should no more commandeer public education than
political liberals. Nor should they seek official endorsement of their
religious views over others. However, withdrawal is also not the
appropriate response. As conservative religious groups become more
aware of their minority status, they have increasingly adopted a
protectionist stance with respect to the state. The state and public
institutions like the public schools are seen as part of a hostile public
culture, and conservative Christians are increasingly asserting rights to
opt out or exit from this culture rather than making efforts to change
it. The better response is to opt in, instead of opt out, and participate
with other members of the community in defining the norms that will
be taught in the schools. This process will involve compromise, to be
sure, and no group of parents can be expected to get everything that
they want. However, the strength and moral character of our society
and the well-being of our children depends in large part on the type of
education that the nation's youth receive, and, thus, parents have an
important responsibility not to abandon the educational institutions of
the larger public culture. If the public schools welcome the
participation of all groups in the process of defining community norms
and minority voices join with the majority in accepting the invitation,
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the larger community will benefit. If the schools also provide students
from all backgrounds with the opportunity to voice and affirm their
views in grey area settings, parents with minority beliefs do not need
to worry that the well-being of their own children will be endangered
in the process.
Students from minority religious and cultural groups as well as
majority backgrounds can also benefit in important ways from public
school education. As discussed above, interaction and communication
with those who hold different perspectives can help believers and
nonbelievers better understand their own positions, and they can
refine and revise their positions in light of new information. By better
understanding the views of those who hold different positions,
students can also learn how to explain their convictions to others and,
perhaps, encourage others to reconsider their views.4 '
Some scholars have argued that children need a culturally coherent
education that supports the values that they are taught at home." If
the messages that children hear at school clash with what they learn at
home, the "cultural dissonance" will cause "psychological and
emotional fragmentation" and stress. 33 This may well be true if
children are from religious or cultural communities who have
separated from mainstream culture and whose lifestyles and traditions
are dramatically different from those around them, such as the Amish
or Hasidic Jewish communities.4 -' However, for most children,
learning that their peers have different religious beliefs or values
should not be too surprising or distressing unless the school actively
favors the views of some students over others. To the contrary, it will
make students more comfortable with differences and better able to
relate to people from different backgrounds. If, on the other hand,
children are isolated from cultural dissonance when they are growing
up, they will be less prepared to deal with difference when they
encounter it later life. All adults except those living in separated
communities will inevitably encounter different views, and the
experience of difference will be less jarring and upsetting if individuals
431. As Saint Paul writes: "I have become all things to all men, that I might by all
means save some." 1 Corinthians 9:22. Saint Paul means that knowledge and
understanding of those who are different is critical to reaching them with a new
message.
432- See Salomone, supra note 38, at 99, 193,202-03,209.
433. Id. at 265; see also id at 99, 193,209,210.
434. See, eg., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 210-11 (1972) (stating that the
Amish argue that compulsory education above eighth grade would threaten their way
of life by exposing their children to a "'worldly' influence in conflict with their
beliefs" and teaching values "in marked variance with Amish values and the Amish
way of life"); Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687,
692 (1994) (noting that handicapped children from Satmar Hasidic community
experienced "panic, fear and trauma" upon leaving their community and attending
public schools with children "whose ways were so different") (citing Bd. of Educ. of
Monroe-Woodbury Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Weider, 527 N.E.2d 767,770 (1988)).
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have familiarity with it when they are young. Cultural dissonance
between the values taught by the school and the values students learn
at home will be more stressful than hearing different views from
peers. However, if schools invite all parents to participate in
formulating the values that will be taught in school and parents with
minority views accept the invitation, this dissonance between home
values and school values should be lessened. Where dissonance
remains, if students receive strong moral training at home and affirm
their views during the school day in private and grey area settings,
they can preserve their alternative beliefs, and these beliefs may well
be strengthened through the process of defending them and sharing
them with others.
IV. BALANCING THE VALUE OF GREY AREA RELIGIOUS SPEECH
WITH ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE PRINCIPLES
In the previous section, I have demonstrated the importance of grey
area speech for public school students and the larger community. The
value of grey area expression extends to religious expression as well as
secular speech. If we are to achieve national unity based on mutual
understanding and dialogue about our differences, this conversation
must include our religious differences as well as other types of
diversity. Likewise, grey area religious expression is critical for
mitigating the clash over values in public schools. These values
conflicts include religious and nonreligious perspectives, and while
schools may not teach values as religious tenets, moral perspectives
based on America's religious traditions belong in the discussion over
values education just as secular perspectives do. While schools should
strive to teach broadly inclusive values, there will always be dissenting
views. Allowing students with minority views, including religious
views, to express their perspectives in class and other public settings is
critical for mitigating values disputes and strengthening public
education. Indeed, religious traditions are one of the nation's most
significant moral resources, and student religious speech can
contribute to values education in the public school by adding a deeper
and, perhaps, even prophetic dimension to the community norms
being taught in the schools. Student religious speech can also
challenge classmates and the larger school community to reevaluate
and even revise prevailing norms in light of more demanding
standards of personal and social responsibility.
435. See Memorandum from President William J. Clinton to the Secretary of
Education and the Attorney General concerning Religious Expression in Public
Schools (July 12, 1995) (memorandum accompanying first release of the Clinton
Administration Guidelines on Religious Expression in Public Schools, supra note 33);
see also The Williamsburg Charter (1988), reprinted in Articles of Faith, Articles of
Peace: The Religious Liberty Clauses and the American Public Philosophy 127, 134
(James Davison Hunter & Os Guinness eds., 1990).
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There are, perhaps, no better examples of the value that grey area
religious speech can have for the school community than some of the
inspirational messages delivered by students pursuant to the Loudoun
County, Virginia prayer policy before it was struck down in Gearon.
The Loudoun County prayer policy was in effect for one year prior to
the Gearon decision, and a message was delivered at each of the
county's four high schools during graduation. These messages
included religious invocations as well as secular messages. At one
high school, the student speaker delivered a spiritual, though not
explicitly religious, message urging classmates "not to make our lives a
quest for money, nor a quest for fame. These things will ultimately
pass away and are not permanent solutions to life's problems. Instead
I hope that we will make our lives a quest for the truth."4" Another
invocation asked God to "[h]elp us to spread your light wherever our
paths may lead us and help us to always treat our fellow man with
kindness and love."4 37 A third invocation asked the "Almighty" to give
the graduates the "strength to endure hardships, wisdom to make
decisions, courage never to give up, love and friendship to guide them
and the faith that can accomplish the impossible."4" The message at
436. Gearon v. Loudoun County Sch. Bd., 844 F. Supp. 1097, 1101 (E.D. Va. 1993).
The entire message stated:
It has been said, "Redeem the time, because the days are evil[.]" [Wihen we
look at all that is going on around us, it become[s] obvious that the world is
spinning wildly out of control. Right now in Bosnia there is a war going on,
where thousands of innocent people are being killed. In Central Africa, an
entire generation is being killed by AIDS. There are famines in the Third
World claiming the lives of the people there. If anyone could come up with
answers to all these problems, then they would have. The answer lies on a
spiritual level that everyone needs to seek within themselves, to find the
truth. This graduation is an ending and a beginning. The end of 13 years of
schooling. Also, this is the beginning of a quest, the beginning of our adult
lives. I urge each of us, myself included, not to make our lives a quest for
money, nor a quest for fame. These things will ultimately pass away and are
not permanent solutions to life's problems. Instead I hope that we will all
make our lives a quest for the truth.
Id
437. Id. The entire text of these remarks was:
Dear Heavenly Father, We thank you for the blessings you have bestowed
upon us which have brought us together to celebrate this wonderful
occasion. We thank you for our families, our teachers, and our friends who
have helped us to grow physically, intellectually, and spiritually. As we
move on to another phase in our lives, we humbly ask that you grant us the
ability to meet each challenge and opportunity we may encounter with
strength, courage, and wisdom. Help us to spread your light wherever our
paths may lead us and help us to always treat our fellow man with kindness
and love. Amen.
Id
438. Id. The entire message was:
Let us give thanks[.] Almighty, Please watch over the future of these young
men and women. Show them that the future for them is bright and although
the road may be wearisome and long at times they are never alone. Show
them the many open doors offered to them and help them to make the most
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the fourth Loudoun County high school was not religious."9 Each of
these spiritual and religious messages expresses valuable ideals for
personal and interpersonal excellence that go well beyond what a
public school is likely to teach in a broadly inclusive character
education program. Not just care for others, but kindness and love,
are urged. Not just respect for the law, but a determination to search
for the truth instead of material well-being. Not just honesty and
respect for others, but wisdom, friendship and unfailing courage and
faith. Student expression like this benefits the entire community by
encouraging listeners to consider a higher standard of responsibility
than they are likely to hear from school officials. The Loudoun
County public schools lost something valuable when students could no
longer express spiritual and religious ideals like these publicly at
graduation.
However, while grey area religious speech is valuable, it should not
be completely free from the oversight and control of the school. Grey
area speech in captive audience situations like classrooms and school-
related events is both public and private, and in view of that, schools
have an interest in ensuring that speech is appropriate to the occasion
and relevant to the pedagogical objectives that the school is
attempting to convey. Thus, where religious speech occurs in the
classroom, it must be responsive to the school's assignment. Zachary
Hood, for example, should be able to read his favorite story to the
class as part of his reward for special achievements in reading, but not
of these opportunities. Guide these young men and women in their future
endeavors and give them the talents and the tools necessary to their
happiness and success in the future. Give them strength to endure
hardships, wisdom to make decisions, courage to never give up, love and
friendship to guide them and the faith that they can accomplish the
impossible. Amen.Id.
439. The opening remarks at Loudoun Valley High School were as follows:
Welcome honored friends, families, guests and candidates of graduation to
the commencement exercises of the Class of 1993. These commencement
exercises mark the ending to one chapter of our lives and the preface to
another. Let us reflect in our special ways upon the memories that we have
compiled throughout our four years in high school-the bonds that we have
established and the friendships we have strengthened are just a few
remnants that we will cherish. Now let us bow our heads and give thanks to
all those who have guided, supported and lead us to the point of which we
are today. Best of luck to you, graduates of 1993.
Id. at 1101-02.
'he closing remarks were:
Let our faith guide us through these lessons of life to help us build a brighter
future for us and generations to come. May the class of 1993 be blessed with
a prosperous and successful future. No [sic] we leave with a sense of dignity
and pride. A pride in ourselves and in our accomplishments. We step into a
whole new world full of love & hate, triumphs & tragedies, successes, and
failures.
Id. at 1102.
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in response to a mathematics lesson.' In addition, the Supreme
Court has held that schools have an interest in teaching students the
"habits and manners of civility."" Consequently, when students
engage in religious expression in grey area settings, schools can
exercise some control to ensure that the manner of the speech is civil
and respectful of other students. In addition, schools need to consider
important Establishment Clause principles that may be at risk when a
student speaks religiously. These include the school's obligation of
neutrality and nonendorsement as well as the school's responsibility to
ensure that listeners are not coerced to affirm beliefs that they do not
share. At the same time, in striking a balance between the benefits
and risks of grey area religious speech, schools must be careful not to
interfere or become entangled with religious matters. Thus, any
school oversight or control over religious speech must be limited in
scope and exercised lightly. Balancing all of these considerations is
not an easy task, but the value of grey area religious speech means
that it is important to try.
In this section, I will lay out an approach for treating grey area
religious speech that takes into account all of these considerations and
strikes a workable balance between the benefits of grey area religious
expression and the preservation of Establishment Clause values. This
proposal has two baseline principles. The first baseline principle is
that when student religious expression is entirely student-initiated and
the school has not taken any action to provide the opportunity for
religious speech, the expression should receive the same protections
that secular speech does. The school may not prohibit or restrict the
speech because it is religious, nor may it favor the speech because of
its religious content. If there is a possibility that other students might
perceive the school's attitude to be one of preference for religion over
nonreligion rather than neutrality, the school should use a disclaimer
to clarify that the school takes a neutral position. However, general
endorsement of religious and nonreligious student expression on an
equal basis is permissible. The school does not violate the
Establishment Clause by, for instance, signaling general approval of
all student show-and-tell presentations even if one or more of the
presentations has religious content. What the school cannot do is
favor the religious presentation over the nonreligious presentations.
This view is consistent with Justice O'Connor's interpretation of the
endorsement test. As Michael McConnell has pointed out, there are
at least two possible interpretations of the requirements of the
endorsement test. 2 On the one hand, the endorsement test may
440. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 279 (1988) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
441. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986) (citing C. Beard
& M. Beard, New Basic History of the United States 228 (1968)).
442. See McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, supra note 220, at 156-57.
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simply mean that the government may not endorse religion over
nonreligion or prefer one religious sect over another. The justices
frequently phrase the test this way,443 and this interpretation is
consistent with Justice O'Connor's statement that the Establishment
Clause permits government to acknowledge the role of religion in
American society as long as it does not "convey a message that
religion or a particular religious belief is favored or preferred.""4 The
other interpretation of the endorsement test is that government action
which endorses religion is unconstitutional regardless of whether the
government also endorses comparable nonreligious perspectives to
the same degree. This interpretation is favored by those who argue
that the endorsement test demands a "secular state." 445 Under this
view, the government must not take any action which expresses
443. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38,70 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring in
the judgment) (stating that the endorsement test precludes "government from
conveying or attempting to convey a message that religion or a particular religious
belief is favored or preferred"); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 593
(1989) (same) (quoting Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 70 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment)); Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 27 (1989) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in the judgment) ("[G]overnment may not favor religious belief over
disbelief.").
444. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 70 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); see also
Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 623 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) ("The Court has avoided drawing lines which entirely sweep away all
government recognition and acknowledgment of the role of religion in the lives of our
citizens for to do so would exhibit not neutrality but hostility to religion.").
For example, in County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Justice O'Connor argued that
the government's display of a menorah outside a government building was
constitutional because its presence next to a Christmas tree and sign saluting liberty
conveyed a message of "pluralism and freedom of belief during the holiday season."
Id. at 635 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). The
context of the Menorah in the display did not neutralize its religious meaning, but it
was clear that the state was not expressing preference for Judaism. See id. Rather, a
"reasonable observer would.., appreciate that the combined display is an effort to
acknowledge the cultural diversity of our country and to convey tolerance of different
choices in matters of religious belief or nonbelief by recognizing that the winter
holiday season is celebrated in diverse ways by our citizens." Id. at 635-36.
445. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 610 (Blackmun, J., majority opinion). Thus, Justice
Blackmun argued in Allegheny that government can only celebrate the secular aspects
of holidays with religious and secular meanings. Id. at 611-12. According to
Blackmun, the menorah in Allegheny was constitutional because its religious meaning
was secularized by its placement next to the Christmas tree and the sign saluting
liberty. Id. at 617-20.
Justices Marshall and Brennan also followed this interpretation of the
endorsement test in Mergens. According to Justice Marshall, if a school operates its
club system as a mechanism for promoting fundamental values and citizenship,
permitting a religious club will signal school endorsement of religion even if the club
system does not prefer religious activities over nonreligious activities. See Bd. of
Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 265, 268 (1990) (Marshall, J., concurring in the
judgment). The only way to negate the message of endorsement is for the school to
affirmatively disassociate itself from the religious club. See id. at 270. The school can
do this by discontinuing its general endorsement of the club system. See id.
Alternatively, the school can continue its general endorsement of student clubs and
affirmatively disclaim any endorsement of religious clubs. See id.
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approval of religion even if the government also expresses approval of
similarly situated religious and nonreligious perspectives on an equal
basis. While this latter interpretation of the endorsement test appears
to be the one favored by the lower courts in the graduation prayer
cases, the first reading is more consistent with the fundamental
Establishment Clause value of neutrality.' If the endorsement test
prohibits government from expressing general and equal approval of
similarly situated religious and nonreligious perspectives, the
Establishment Clause would require the disfavoring of religion. For
instance, allowing first graders to read their favorite stories to the
class except where the story is a religious story clearly sends a message
of disapproval of religion.' 7 Permitting Zachary to read his religious
story would have signaled general approval of the presentation, but no
more so than approval of other student stories, and such a "double
endorsement" should be constitutional.
The second baseline rule is that schools can design and provide an
opportunity for student religious expression at graduations or other
school-related events as long as the school's policy provides an equal
opportunity for nonreligious speech and the school's policy is
scrupulously neutral and fair among different religious perspectives.
Such a policy will not violate the Establishment Clause if all the
student perspectives, religious and nonreligious alike, receive equal
and general endorsement by the school. If necessary, the school
should use a disclaimer to make clear to the audience that the school
does not endorse religion over nonreligion or favor a particular
religious perspective over others. The principle behind the first
baseline rule is to allow students to bring their religious perspectives
into class discussion or other public school settings on an equal basis
with secular perspectives. It protects the right of students to initiate
religious speech where nonreligious views are allowed. The principle
behind the second baseline rule is to permit the school to initiate an
opportunity for students from a variety of backgrounds to engage in
446. Ever since the Court's landmark decision in Everson v. Board of Education,
330 U.S. 1 (1947), the Court has affirmed neutrality between religion and nonreligion
as a fundamental Establishment Clause principle. See hi. at 15 ("Neither can
[government] pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion
over another."). For other decisions affirming the importance of neutrality, see, for
example, Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 809-10 (2000) (Thomas, J., plurality); id. at
838 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 883 (Souter, J., dissenting);
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 839 (1995); Bd. of
Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 703.04 (1994); Sch.
Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 215, 222, 225 (1963).
447. See Chandler v. James (Chandler I), 180 F.3d 1254, 1261 (11th Cir. 1999)
("The discriminatory suppression of student-initiated religious speech demonstrates
not neutrality but hostility toward religion ...."), judgment vacated sub non.
Chandler v. Siegelman, 530 U.S. 1256 (2000), opinion and judgment reinstated sub
nom. Chandler v. Siegelman (Chandler II), 230 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2000), cert.
denied, 121 S. Ct. 2521 (2001).
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religious and nonreligious expression at school-related events and in
other grey area settings. The fact that the school's motivation is to
make a place for specifically religious speech should not matter if the
program provides an equal opportunity for religious and nonreligious
speech and the school's policy is fair and neutral among religious and
nonreligious perspectives." 8 Indeed, by creating an opportunity for
students with different religious and nonreligious perspectives to
express these views in grey area settings, the school provides a
valuable occasion for students to learn about the different beliefs of
their classmates and for speakers to develop the skills necessary to
communicate their beliefs effectively and respectfully.
If a school chooses to create an opportunity for religious and
nonreligious expression at graduations, sporting events or other
school functions, the challenge will be for the school to devise a policy
that, in fact, treats religious and nonreligious perspectives fairly and
provides a chance for speakers from a range of perspectives to
participate. When the school has students from a wide variety of
backgrounds, designing such a policy should not be difficult. A policy
similar to the hypothetical that I described in Section II would be
appropriate for events like graduations. The school can set aside a
handful of slots for inspirational messages and randomly select
student volunteers to fill these slots. If the composition of the
community is diverse, the result will be a range of different religious
and nonreligious perspectives reflecting this diversity."'
The more problematic situation is where a school district is not
diverse, and either one or more religions predominates or secularism
predominates. In this situation, a policy of random selection from a
list of volunteers will skew the results in favor of the dominant belief
system. To address this problem, the school could set aside a handful
448. Similarly, Douglas Laycock has argued that moment of silence laws which are
passed in order to accommodate prayer should be constitutional as long as they are
neutral between religious and secular thought on their face and in effect. See Laycock,
supra note 220, at 62. Michael McConnell has made a similar argument. See
McConnell, supra note 319, at 166. According to McConnell, it is not the motivation
behind a law that matters, but whether its effects are neutral. See McConnell, supra
note 416, at 4748.
449. For similar proposals, see Rick A. Swanson, Time for a Change: Analyzing
Graduation Invocations and Benedictions Under Religiously Neutral Principles of the
Public Forum, 26 U. Mem. L. Rev. 1405 (1996) (proposing the adoption of a public
forum analysis for graduation prayers); Jonathan Frehls, Note, Simplifying
Establishment Clause Jurisprudence in Student-Selected Prayer Cases Through the Use
of Public Forum Principles, 20 Rev. Litig. 233 (2000) (proposing graduation prayer
policy closely aligned with the principles of public forum analysis); Gregory M.
McAndrew, Note, Invocations at Graduation, 101 Yale L.J. 663 (1991) (proposing
equal access approach to graduation invocations).
However, as discussed in the text below, a system of random selection will not
provide an equal and fair opportunity for minority perspectives in communities where
one or more religions predominate. In such communities, a different selection
mechanism is required.
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of slots and develop a neutral mechanism that would allow for a
greater diversity of perspectives. For example, the school might
provide for a few broad categories like Protestant, Catholic, Jewish,
Muslim, other religion, and nonreligious, and ask student volunteers
to identify themselves with one of these categories. The school could
then randomly select from among these categories to fill the available
slots. Once the denominations are assigned to the available slots, the
school could randomly select one student from among the volunteers
for each selected group. The result will be a diverse selection of
messages representing the religious and nonreligious perspectives in
the community.
To be sure, unless the school has a separate baccalaureate service,
there will not be enough time for all religious denominations to be
represented, nor will there be time for the full range of perspectives
within denominations. Keeping the number of denominations limited
to familiar and broad categories such as Protestant, Catholic, Jewish,
Muslim and other religion4 5 will help to avoid disputes over
denominational categories and subcategories,45" ' but it will also mean
that in any given year there will be students whose particular beliefs
are not represented. However, if the system ensures a real chance
that any of the religious perspectives in the community could be
selected and the result is a broadly inclusive and diverse group of
voices, the policy will be consistent with the values of fairness and
neutrality as well as the benefits of grey area speech. Students of
minority and majority faiths as well as those of no religion will learn
more about each other and will learn better how to communicate with
each other.
450. In some communities, an additional category or two might be appropriate
where there are significant numbers of students of other belief systems, such as
Buddhism, Hinduism or Native American religions.
451. Given the vast number of denominations and subdenominations in the United
States today, it is imperative that schools avoid becoming entangled in questions
about which religious groups should count as separate categories. The difficulty of
identifying appropriate denominational categories is well-recognized. For example, in
Lee v. Weisman, Justice Souter argued that attempts to promote a diversity of
religious views at graduation ceremonies would result in "the government and,
inevitably, the courts... mak[ing] wholly inappropriate judgments about the number
of religions the State should sponsor and the relative frequency with which it should
sponsor each." 505 U.S. 577, 617 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring); see also McAndrew,
supra note 449, at 682 n.121 (stating that a self-conscious effort to provide diversity by
selecting recipients of different religious and nonreligious groups will result in
difficulties associated with "identifying various discrete beliefs and the persons
holding them"). By using a handful of widely recognized and broad categories like
Catholic, Jewish, Muslim and Protestant, my proposal avoids this problem though it
does so at the price of some over-generalization. My proposal also avoids school
entanglement in determinations about which combination of speakers should be
included in the program and how frequently different denominations should be
represented because both of these determinations would be made by a system of
random selection.
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Furthermore, as long as a diversity of voices are represented, there
will be no danger that students in the audience will experience the
type of coercive pressures that were present in Lee v. Weisman. In
Weisman, there was one prayer delivered by a school-selected clergy
person, and the Court noted that there was a danger that dissenting
students would perceive a respectful silence as participation in the
religious observance. In my proposal, students from a range of
backgrounds will speak, and student listeners will notice that students
from majority faiths are quietly listening to students of minority faiths
and vice versa. In a setting like this, no reasonable student will
confuse respectful silence with participation or approval.
In addition to these baseline rules, my proposal would allow schools
to exercise limited supervision over grey area religious expression in
certain specific cases. First, regardless of whether students engage in
religious expression entirely on their own or pursuant to a policy
developed by the school, the school can review or otherwise control
the style or content of the speech to ensure that it is appropriate for
the occasion, relevant to the school's pedagogical objectives, and civil
and respectful to other students. For example, if the school has a
policy allowing inspirational messages at graduation, the school
should be able to review the content of the speeches to ensure that
they are, in fact, inspirational messages rather than practical jokes,
political diatribes or demeaning assaults on members of the school
administration or student body. However, when the school reviews or
supervises the style or content of religious expression, it should
exercise editorial control only over the secular aspects of the speech
and nonreligious stylistic matters like grammar, sentence structure or
tone. School officials may not interfere with the religious content of
the speech, nor exclude the speech on the grounds of its religious
content. Such interference would risk unconstitutional entanglement
of the school in religious matters as well as a violation of the
constitutional demands of neutrality. For example, if a school
required religious references at graduation to be nonsectarian in order
to avoid offending listeners, the school would be favoring ecumenical
religions over less ecumenical ones and would become quickly
entangled in decisions about which types of references meet the
nonsectarian standard.453 If the school sought to otherwise edit or
restrict the content of religious expression so that it is palatable and
nonoffensive to nonbelievers, the same problem would arise. The
school would have to decide when religious expression crosses the line
between palatable to offensive, and the likely result would be the
452. See Weisman, 505 U.S. at 593.
453. See, e.g., id. at 616 (Souter, J., concurring) (stating that the "distinction
between 'sectarian' religious practices and those that would be, by some measure,
ecumenical enough to pass Establishment Clause muster ... invite[s] the courts to
engage in comparative theology").
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censorship of minority views in favor of communal standards of
religious appropriateness.
Schools should, however, be permitted to restrict certain types of
proselytizing speech. Numerous scholars have pointed out the
difficulties associated with placing a proselytizing restriction on
graduation prayers or other student speech. For instance, much
religious speech has proselytizing elements, and if the restrictions
apply to all proselytizing speech, it could sweep away a significant
amount of student religious speech. 4 Indeed, any time a student
defends the value of their religious perspectives to others, there is a
proselytizing element to the speech. Second, it will be difficult for the
school to determine when student speech crosses the line to
proselytizing without the school becoming entangled in reviewing the
religious content of the speech. 55 Third, the term "proselytizing"
speech is vague: When is speech proselytizing? Should the intent of
the speaker be the relevant consideration or its effect or both?-,
Fourth, because the term "proselytizing" is vague and it can apply to
so much religious speech, there is a danger that schools would use a
proselytizing restriction as a mechanism to keep out most, if not all,
student religious expression. Finally, some scholars have argued that
there is no authority for drawing a distinction between proselytizing
and nonproselytizing speech.4" The Supreme Court has interpreted
the First Amendment to protect speech designed to persuade as much
as other types of speech,4"8 and "[t]he right to proselytize is at the core
of the first amendment. 459
The proselytizing restriction that I suggest below is not inconsistent
with these observations. Schools should only be allowed to restrict
religious speech where it is primarily designed to proselytize a specific
student audience and is delivered from a school stage or other type of
school platform or "pulpit." Such a school platform does not include
general class discussion or a discussion or debate forum opened up by
the school for the interchange of student views. Speech that is
454. See Douglas Laycock, "Noncoercive" Support for Religion: Another False
Claim about the Establishment Clause, 26 Val. U. L. Rev. 37, 66 (1991) (noting that
"[m]uch prayer would be proselytizing" and "[tihere are endless variations of
proselytizing").
455. See Doe v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F3d 806, 835-36 (5th Cir. 1999)
(Jolly, J., dissenting), affd, 530 U.S. 290 (2000); Steven H. Aden, Who Speaks for the
State?: Religious Speakers on Government Platforms and the Role of Disclaiming
Endorsement, 9 Win. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 419,428-29 (2001).
456. See Salomone, supra note 38, at 225.
457. Whitehead, supra note 42, at 245.
458. See Sekulow et al., supra note 29, at 1023 ("Free trade in ideas means free
trade and the opportunity to persuade, not merely describe facts.") (quoting Thomas
v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537 (1945)); Whitehead, supra note 42, at 245 (also citing
Collins).
459. Laycock, supra note 220, at 32; see also McConnell, supra note 319, at 166
("[Tihe right to proselytize, a.k.a freedom of speech, is constitutionally protected.").
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primarily designed to proselytize is speech that is primarily designed
to convert a specific audience to one's own specific religious beliefs or
worship and involves an insistent call to conversion. This restriction
on proselytizing speech is intentionally very narrow. The restriction
essentially applies to attempts by students like Chris Niemeyer to
command the school's platform in a grey area setting and use it as an
opportunity to deliver a proselytizing sermon. As noted earlier, the
attempt to deliver such a sermon ignores the fact that graduation
ceremonies and other school-related events belong to all students and
are not just a soapbox opportunity for purely private speech. When
students use a captive audience situation to deliver a sermon, they are
abusing their position and engaging in speech which is inherently
inappropriate and disrespectful of their audience. The audience at a
graduation or school assembly has not assembled to hear a sermon but
to engage in school-related functions.
However, aside from speech which meets this definition of
primarily proselytizing expression, schools should not interfere with
student religious expression even if the speech has proselytizing
elements. Such interference would, indeed, quickly entangle the
school in religious matters and open the door for broad restrictions on
religious content. The test that I have suggested for impermissible
proselytizing is designed to avoid entanglement and vagueness.
Unless the student is using a school stage or other platform and her
speech is primarily designed to convert a specific audience and
involves an insistent call to conversion directed at that audience, the
speech should be permitted. Niemeyer's sermon fits this description,
but most speech would not. For example, Kelly DeNooyer's
"proselytizing song"" in DeNooyer would not meet this definition of
primarily proselytizing speech. The videotape that Kelly wanted to
show to her second-grade class showed her singing a song describing
her experience of having accepted Jesus as her Savior at an early
age.461 The song's title was "I Came to Love You Early," and the last
verse is representative of the song's content: "I remember how You
touched me, but I can't explain at all/ How a choice that's so
important could be made by one so small,! I just put aside my
questions; what You said to do, I've done,/ And I thank You for the
blessings of coming to You young."462 While this song certainly
460. DeNooyer v. Livonia Pub. Sch., 799 F. Supp. 744, 746 (E.D. Mich. 1992), affd
per curiam sub nom., DeNooyer v. Merinelli, 12 F.3d 211, 1993 WL 477030 (6th Cir.
Nov. 18, 1993) (unpublished opinion).
461. See id.
462. Id. at 746 n.1. The other verses were as follows:
Verse 1.
I felt sometimes I didn't have a story I could share.
I wasn't rescued from a past destroyed by dark despair.
O but, Jesus, I have memories of the times that we've been through.
And I wouldn't trade one moment of growing up with You.
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describes the advantages of Christian faith and Kelly testified that she
hoped the song might save some of her classmates, the song did not
contain a proselytizing message directed specifically at her classmates,
nor did it involve an insistent call to conversion. It was simply Kelly's
account of her own faith experience. As long as students who express
religious views do not make their audience the unwilling object of a
sermon or sermonette, they should be allowed to share their views
like any other students.
Some readers might object that my primarily proselytizing
restriction does not provide listeners with sufficient protections
against offensive religious speech. For example, some students might
be offended by Kelly's song even if it is not primarily proselytizing
speech. However, as I have argued above, schools should not
suppress student religious speech just because other students might
find it offensive or disagreeable. It is important that students learn to
listen to and understand views that are different from their own,
including religious views. The proselytizing restriction that I propose
has a very narrow purpose. It protects students when they are made
the unwilling objects of insistent sermonizing directed to them and
designed to make them change their views. Such speech exerts a kind
of coercive pressure on students in a captive audience situation, and
schools have an interest in ensuring that their platforms are not used
to exert such pressure.' However, schools do not otherwise have a
legitimate interest in protecting students from hearing religious views
with which they disagree. Quite the opposite. Schools should
recognize the valuable opportunity that grey area settings provide for
students of different backgrounds to grow in mutual understanding.
Refrain. I came to love You early, came to know You young.
You touched my heart, dear Jesus, when my life had just begun.
I gave You my tomorrows and a childish heart of sin,
And You've saved me from a lifetime of what I might have been.
Verse 2.
You filled some days with laughter,
You held me when I cried.
You said, "Child, you can do anything;" You helped me when I tried.
No [sic] I treasure ev'ry mem'ry, and I'm sure there couldn't be
A child who could have known more love than You have given me.
lId
463. Unlike sermonizing from a platform usually occupied by school officials,
sermonizing in speech fora opened up by the school for student discussion or debate
or in general classroom discussion does not involve the same dangers and should not
be prohibited. When a school opens up a forum for student exchange, the speech that
results is private speech, not grey area speech, and all speakers. religious and
nonreligious alike, will be using that forum to persuade their listeners. Ukevise,
student speech in general classroom discussion is also private speech, and there is no
danger that students will feel coercive pressures from passing student comments made
as part of a general exchange of numerous student opinions and views. Where a
student occupies a stage or platform usually occupied by school officials or teachers
and they are given a special opportunity to address their peers. the risk of coercive
pressures arises and justifies limited restrictions.
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Other readers may object that the primarily proselytizing test I
propose would result in the entanglement of schools in religious
matters even if the restriction is limited to speech that is primarily
proselytizing. To the extent that schools will have some authority to
step in and stop or edit student religious speech, there will be risks of
unconstitutional interference with religion. It is certainly true that
even a narrowly drawn proselytizing restriction will result in some
contact between school officials and religious speech. However,
unless schools routinely encounter proselytizing sermons, any
entanglement will not be excessive.4" Restricting an occasional
proselytizing sermon does not involve the school in the type of
"comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance"
that the Court has found to be unconstitutional.465
In its recent Establishment Clause case law in the funding area, the
Court no longer assumes that public school employees who provide
supplemental educational services on parochial school campuses will
be tempted to inculcate religion, and, consequently, it has rejected its
prior assumption that pervasive monitoring systems violating the
Constitution would be required to prevent this abuse." In Mitchell v.
Helms, Justices O'Connor and Breyer indicated that they would
extend a similar assumption to religious school teachers and officials.
Justices O'Connor and Breyer now assume that teachers and officials
of religious schools will act in good faith in their use of public funds,
and, thus, that pervasive monitoring procedures will not be required
to prevent the diversion of state funds to religious uses." A similar
assumption of good faith and attitude of hopefulness should apply to
the context of student religious expression. If schools protect all
student expression equally and religious speech is treated with the
same respect as nonreligious speech, most students will also act
respectfully of one another, and proselytizing sermons like the speech
in Cole will be rare. Furthermore, if schools do not suspect covert
sermons in every incidence of religious expression and determine to
use their editorial powers over religious expression very lightly, any
464. The Court has held that "[e]ntanglement must be 'excessive' before it runs
afoul of the Establishment Clause." Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 233 (1997); see
also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971) (stating that government action
"must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion"') (citing Walz
v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
465. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619 (striking down private school aid program which
required "[a] comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance" to
ensure that funds were not directed to religious uses); see also Agostini, 521 U.S. at
234 (upholding funding program that did not require "pervasive monitoring" of
religious institutions); Walz, 397 U.S. at 675 ("[T]he questions are whether the
involvement is excessive, and whether it is a continuing one calling for official and
continuing surveillance leading to an impermissible degree of entanglement.").
466. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 232-35.
467. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 861 (2000) (O'Connor, J., concurring in
judgment).
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involvement of the school in student religious expression should be
minimal. It is possible that there will be more Chris Niemeyers than I
predict or that schools will be tempted to engage in heavy-handed
control over religious speech. However, until this possibility arises,
the assumption should be that the limited review provided for in my
proposal will not lead to excessive entanglement in violation of the
Establishment Clause.
Moreover, if the school focuses on the manner and purpose of the
speech when applying the primarily proselytizing restriction, the
school need not become involved in questions of theology or religious
belief at all. Unlike a requirement that speech be nonsectarian, which
would involve the schools in theological determinations about the
ecumenical character of the speech,' 68 a primarily proselytizing
restriction only requires the school to determine whether the speech is
primarily designed to proselytize a specific student audience and
involves an insistent call to conversion. A proselytizing sermon will
have the same, easily recognizable features regardless of which
religion the speaker belongs to, and the proselytizing features are
separable from the religious content of the speech. Carl Esbeck has
argued that the "Supreme Court's sensitivity to entanglement is
proportional to the examined law's proximity to subject matters that
are inherently religious." 9 If this is true, a narrowly drawn primarily
proselytizing restriction should pass constitutional muster.
Those who would object to any restriction on proselytizing speech
on the grounds that there is no authority for drawing a distinction
between proselytizing and nonproselytizing speech and that the First
Amendment protects both types of speech equally, miss the fact that
student religious expression in captive audience situations is not
purely private speech. Where speech is purely private, the First
Amendment does, indeed, provide equal protections for speech
designed to persuade and for nonproselytizing speech. 70 However,
when students speak in grey area settings, their speech is partly public,
and the school has an interest in and an obligation to ensure that
Establishment Clause principles are also preserved. A limited
restriction, which applies only to speech that is primarily proselytizing,
is consistent with broad First Amendment protections for persuasive
speech as well as the value that religious expression has in grey area
settings. At the same time, such a restriction balances the school's
interest in ensuring that student speech is appropriate for the
occasion, respectful of other students and noncoercive. The argument
that there is no authority for a distinction between proselytizing and
nonproselytizing speech is, furthermore, inaccurate. At the heart of
468. See, e.g., source cited supra note 453.
469. Esbeck, Religion and the First Amendment: Some Causes of the Recent
Confusion, supra note 220, at 915.
470. See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516,537 (1945).
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the accommodationist position described in the introduction is a
distinction between state religious speech which merely
accommodates or acknowledges religion and speech which is
proselytizing. 47 1 According to the accommodationists on the Court,
the former is constitutional, but the latter is not.472  When the
accommodationists had enough votes to obtain majorities in the early
1980s, two Court opinions used this distinction between proselytizing
and nonproselytizing speech.473 While the distinction I draw is
different because I am addressing grey area speech rather than state
speech and my proposal restricts only speech which is primarily
proselytizing instead of all proselytizing speech, these Supreme Court
cases lend support.
Several additional objections could be made to the proposal for
addressing grey area religious speech that I have laid out. First, it
might be argued that allowing grey area religious expression in school
districts where one or a few religions predominate over others will
have the effect of disfavoring minority perspectives. However, this
objection overlooks the benefits that grey area religious expression
can have for students of minority faiths. In a community where one or
a few religious perspectives predominate, it is especially important for
religious minorities and nonbelievers to have a chance to voice their
own viewpoints in classroom and other grey area settings. Such an
opportunity will give minority students the chance to explain and
affirm their views, and students from the majority faiths have much to
learn from and about students with dissenting views. While students
with minority backgrounds might be hesitant to speak up if most of
their peers hold different views, a school that is committed to
inculcating the virtues of civility and mutual respect can encourage
students to feel more comfortable in expressing different opinions. If,
on the other hand, the school responds by cutting off grey area
religious speech by minorities and majorities alike, neither group will
benefit. Existing misunderstandings and resentments will fester, and
religious and nonreligious dissenters will be the ones to suffer most
from traditional prejudices and animosities. Students from majority
and minority faiths can also learn valuable communications skills from
471. For a discussion of the accommodationist position, see supra text
accompanying notes 14-21.
472. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 661 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
473. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 794-95 (1983) ("The content of the
prayer [by Nebraska's legislative chaplain] is not of concern to judges where, as here,
there is no indication that the prayer opportunity has been exploited to proselytize or
advance any one, or to disparage any other, faith or belief."); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465
U.S. 668, 680 (1984) ("When viewed in the proper context of the Christmas Holiday
season, it is apparent that, on this record, there is insufficient evidence to establish
that the inclusion of the creche is a purposeful or surreptitious effort to express some
kind of subtle governmental advocacy of a particular religious message.").
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the experience of expressing their views in public. In a school that
inculcates civility and mutual respect, students of majority faiths can
learn how to communicate respectfully with minorities, and both
groups of students can learn to communicate more effectively so that
their positions are understood by those who hold different views.
Thus, it is especially in communities where one or a few religious
perspectives predominate that grey area religious speech is so
important. When schools in such communities go beyond merely
protecting student-initiated religious expression on an equal basis with
nonreligious speech and take the additional step of providing a
platform for religious and nonreligious speech at graduations or other
grey area settings, they create further valuable opportunities for
mutual learning and exchange. For example, if the Santa Fe School
District had developed a graduation prayer policy that provided all
religious and nonreligious voices with a fair and equal opportunity to
participate in the ceremony, the result would have been a graduation
ceremony with messages from students representing the Protestant
majority as well as students from minority faiths. The requirement
that a school provide an equal and fair opportunity for nonreligious
and minority religious speech means that the price to be paid for
prayer at graduation will be a chance for religious and nonreligious
dissenters to speak as well, and the result would be beneficial to all.
Indeed, there would probably be few other occasions when the
Baptists in Santa Fe would assemble to hear Mormon or Catholic
religious messages as well as their own.
Other readers might object to the proposal outlined above because
they fear that it will leave schools few tools to control speech which
most Americans, religious and nonreligious alike, would view as
harmful and destructive. If, for example, school officials cannot
exercise editorial control over the religious content of student speech,
will families be forced to listen to student graduation speakers who
propose to deliver white supremacist or anti-Semitic messages with
religious overtones? While such messages would, indeed, be very
harmful to the community, the likelihood that a student would engage
in such speech in a grey area setting is very small. Moreover, if a
student does attempt to deliver a hate-filled message, the school can
disallow messages when they are inappropriate for the occasion or
unrelated to the school's pedagogical objectives. Thus, a white
supremacist message at graduation can be disallowed on the grounds
that it does not qualify as an inspirational message quite apart from
any religious content. Restricting opportunities for grey area speech
would be unfortunate and unnecessary. If schools proceed on the
assumption that students with religious convictions will behave
responsibly and respectfully when they address their peers, they will
usually find that their hopes are justified.
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A final objection to the proposal outlined above is more difficult.
Some readers will agree that religious speech in grey area settings is
generally a valuable learning experience for speakers and listeners
alike, but will disagree when the speech at issue takes the form of
prayer. Prayer, writes Frederick Gedicks, is a "form of worship; if it is
expression at all, it is a unique kind of expression."474 The court in
Harris v. Joint School District No. 241 called prayer "the
quintessential religious practice."475 According to Justice Brennan,
prayer is, for some, a very private experience.476 William Marshall has
argued that there are those for whom "being exposed to another
tradition's prayer is a sin., 47 7  Thus, a captive audience situation
involving prayer may present special difficulties. While being
required to listen to student expression advocating religious or
nonreligious ideas with which one disagrees is generally a beneficial
experience for students, being forced to listen to a prayer invoking a
"false" God may be especially troubling for some believers. Prayer,
unlike other types of student expression, involves communication with
the Divine, and required presence at an act of worship with which one
disagrees might, for some people, be close to blasphemy. There are,
on the other hand, many believers and nonbelievers who have no
religious objections to hearing a prayer with which they disagree, and
for them, listening to a prayer or inspirational message at graduation
could be an uplifting and enlightening experience. Perhaps the best
course for schools to take would be to have a separate school-
sponsored baccalaureate service prior to, or following, the regular
graduation exercises so that attendance is entirely voluntary. 478 A
separate ceremony like this will also allow time for more messages to
be presented than is possible if the invocations are part of the regular
exercises. Moreover, the opportunity for additional messages may
make it easier to design a policy that provides an equal and fair
opportunity for religious minorities and nonbelievers to participate.
Viewing student religious expression in captive audience situations
like the classroom, graduations and other school-related events as
grey area speech is not only more accurate than viewing it as either
private speech or school-sponsored speech, but it also makes possible
a better balance between the value of the speech, Establishment
Clause principles and the school's pedagogical interests. If grey area
religious expression is viewed as school-sponsored expression and,
474. Gedicks, supra note 253, at 1166.
475. Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, 41 F.3d 447, 458 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting
Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526, 1534 (11th Cir. 1983), affd, 472 U.S. 38 (1985)),
vacated as moot, 515 U.S. 1154 (1995).
476. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 820 & n.47 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
477. William P. Marshall, The Culture of Belief and the Politics of Religion, Law &
Contemp. Probs., Winter/Spring 2000, at 453,465.
478. Michael McConnell has also suggested such a practice. See McConnell,
Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, supra note 220, at 159 n.200.
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thus, subject to the full Establishment Clause restrictions that apply to
school speech, the result will be to push valuable student speech out of
the schools. On the other hand, if grey area religious expression is
viewed as private student expression, schools will not have enough
control over the speech to ensure that the speech is consistent with the
school's pedagogical objectives and does not exert coercive pressures
on students. Section II has already described in detail what would be
lost if grey area religious speech is viewed as school-sponsored speech
and, thus, excluded from the schools under the Establishment Clause.
The lower court decisions in Chandler, Duval and Doe help to
illustrate the problem with viewing grey area speech as private speech.
In each of these cases, the courts held that one of the hallmarks of
private student expression is the absence of school review and
supervision over the content of the expression."' If student religious
speech occurs entirely at the student's initiative or pursuant to a
school policy that selects speakers according to neutral, secular
criteria, and the speech is not subject to editorial control by the
school, the speech is private. On the other hand, if the school
exercises control over the speech, there is a risk that it will be labeled
school-sponsored religious speech and, thus, will be subject to the
same Establishment Clause limitations as school speech.
By drawing the dichotomy this way, these courts were clearly trying
to preserve a space for student religious expression at school events or
assemblies. However, the consequence will be to encourage schools
who want to retain a place for student religious expression at school-
related events to remove all supervision over the speech in order to fit
it into the private box. This attempt to privatize grey area speech will,
in turn, leave schools without the ability to prevent the type of sermon
Chris Niemeyer prepared in the Cole case. Schools will also lack the
flexibility to exercise editorial control in order to ensure that the
messages are appropriate to the occasion and relevant to the school's
pedagogical goals. By affirming that only private religious expression
is permissible in captive audience situations and defining private
expression as expression free from school control, the decisions in
Chandler, Duval and Doe force schools to choose between permitting
religious expression and giving up control over the speech or retaining
control over the speech and disallowing expression with religious
content. Given the value of grey area religious speech and the equal
importance of retaining limited control over such speech, this choice is
479. See Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd. (Duval II), 250 F.3d 1330, 1337 (11th Cir.
2001) (en banc), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 644 (2001); Chandler v. James (Chandler 1),
180 F.3d 1254, 1264 (11th Cir. 1999), judgment vacated sub nona. Chandler v.
Siegelman, 530 U.S. 1256 (2000), opinion and judgment reinstated sub nom. Chandler
v. Siegelman (Chandler II), 230 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct.
2521 (2001); Doe v. Madison Sch. Dist. No. 321, 147 F.3d 832, 835-36 (9th Cir. 1998),
withdrawn and complaint dismissed for lack of standing and moomness, 177 F.3d 789
(9th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
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unfortunate. The most likely result over the long-run will be that
schools will choose the retention of control over student speech
instead of allowing religious messages. Even if a school begins by
relinquishing control over student religious speech, as soon as the
school encounters a speaker like Niemeyer, it will undoubtedly choose
to retain control in the future at the expense of additional religious
speech, and the result will be very little space for religious expression
at school-related events.
Another unfortunate result of drawing the dichotomy the way that
the courts do in Duval, Chandler and Doe is that it prevents schools
from developing prayer policies for graduations and other events that
are carefully constructed to provide fair and equal opportunities for
religious minorities and nonbelievers to participate. The courts in
Duval and Doe suggested that prayers or other religious messages
may only be delivered at graduation if speaker selection is by neutral
and secular criteria.480 Such a rule would permit the school to choose
graduation speakers randomly from a list of volunteers or select the
class's valedictorian as speaker. However, in communities where one
or a few religions predominate, either of those mechanisms will skew
any religious speech in favor of the majority religion. If the school
tries to ensure a broader range of views by developing a policy such as
the one I have suggested above, the school will violate the
Establishment Clause by making selections based in part on religious
criteria. Thus, schools will have to choose between using neutral and
secular criteria and having a less diverse set of messages, or
abandoning their efforts to make a place for inspirational student
messages at graduation.
Scholars have observed that, after Santa Fe, the next round of
litigation over student religious speech at school-related events is
likely to be about religious messages delivered by valedictorians. 41
There is a strong chance that lower courts will conclude that such
messages are constitutional if the speeches are prepared without
school supervision or review. However, even if courts allow religious
messages by valedictorians, a single message by one student will be an
inadequate substitute for a prayer policy that provides for a range of
views. Ironically, the privatization of student messages at graduation
and other school-related events will come at the price of diversity.
By contrast, viewing student religious expression in captive
audience settings as grey area speech and adopting the analysis that I
480. See Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd. (Duval I), 206 F.3d 1070, 1076-77 (11th
Cir. 2000) (en banc), cert. granted and judgment vacated, 121 S. Ct. 31 (2000), opinion
and judgment reinstated, 250 F.3d 1330 (11th Cir. 2001) (en banc), cert. denied, 122 S.
Ct. 664 (2001); Doe, 147 F.3d at 836.
481. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, The Supreme Court and Religious Liberty, 40 Cath.
Law. 25, 56-57 (2000); Erwin Chemerinsky, Divided Court Grapples with Religion,
Trial, Sept. 2000, at 86, 86.
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have proposed will give schools more flexibility to develop
opportunities for student speech that will ensure a balance of views
and protect minority religious and nonreligious perspectives as well as
majority views. This proposal also allows significantly more space for
student religious expression regardless of whether the speech is
entirely initiated by the student or delivered pursuant to a specific
school policy for school-related events. If student speech bears the
hallmark of state involvement any time the school exercises
supervision or editorial control over the speech, ' very little speech in
captive audience settings will qualify as private. Show-and-tell
presentations, oral reports and classroom speech pursuant to a school
assignment will all be considered school-sponsored public speech if
the teacher retains the power to evaluate the speech as he or she
surely will. The only place left for religious messages in captive
audience situations will be the rare occasion when the school allows
students to speak without school supervision or oversight.
By contrast, recognizing that student speech in captive audience
settings is grey and adopting the approach in this article provide more
protection for student religious speech. Students will be able to
express religious views on an equal basis with nonreligious views, but
the school can exercise editorial control over the secular aspects of the
religious speech and step in to prevent speech which is primarily
proselytizing. This approach balances the value of the speech with the
school's pedagogical interests as well as important Establishment
Clause principles such as neutrality, nonendorsement, noninterference
and noncoercion.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this article has been multifold. I have demonstrated
that using the familiar dichotomy between government speech and
private speech to evaluate the constitutionality of student religious
expression in the public schools misses the fact that most of the
disputes over student religious expression involve speech which occurs
in a grey area between private and school speech. I have also
developed a proposal for addressing grey area religious speech that
balances the value of this speech with the Establishment Clause
principles of neutrality, nonendorsement, noninterference and
noncoercion. In so doing, I have tried to resist the push to private
religious expression and activity that has gathered so many adherents
on and off the courts in recent years. Protecting private religious
expression is, indeed, important, but there is also an important place
in the public schools for student expression that is partly public and
482- See Duval II, 250 F.3d at 1341 ("What turns private speech into state speech in
this context is, above all, the additional element of state control over the content of
the message.").
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partly private. We miss something critical when we fail to recognize
and to protect the value of this speech. Religious voices also deprive
us of something significant when they opt out of grey area settings in
favor of private expression in private settings. Rather than adopting a
protectionist stance that seeks to preserve private religious activity
and expression from the larger public and cultural institutions of
American society, religious adherents should adopt a service-oriented
approach that affirms their responsibility to contribute to culture as
well as to protect themselves from culture. At the same time, all
citizens should recognize that opting into public institutions and
culture does not mean controlling public settings but, rather, sharing
the space with diverse voices.
